Changes

In [[Freud]]'s [[work]], the term "[[affect]]" stands in opposition to the term "[[idea]]". The opposition between the [[affect|affective]] and the [[affect|intellectual]] is one of the oldest themes in [[philosophy]], and made its way into [[Freud]]'s [[vocabulary ]] via [[German]] [[psychology]].

<blockquote>"This opposition is one of the most contrary to [[analytic ]] [[experience ]] and most unenlightening when it comes to [[understanding ]] it."<ref>{{S1}} p.274</ref></blockquote>

Thus, in response to those who accuse [[Lacan]] of [[being ]] [[affect|over-intellectual]] and of neglecting the [[role ]] of [[affect]], it can be pointed out that this criticism is based on what [[Lacan]] saw as a [[false ]] opposition.<ref>[[Lacan]] also argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy [[thinking]]. {{E}} p.171</ref>

<blockquote>"We are not dealing here with an intellectual [[dimension]]."<ref>{{S1}} p.274</ref></blockquote>

[[Lacan]] is opposed to those [[analyst]]s who have taken the [[affect]]ive realm as primary, for the [[affect]]ive is not a [[separate ]] realm opposed to the [[intellectual]].

<blockquote>"The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a [[mythical ]] beyond of the production of the [[symbol ]] which would precede the discursive formulation."<ref>{{S1}} p.57</ref></blockquote>

However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of [[affect]], pointing to the fact that a [[whole ]] year of the [[seminar]] is dedicated precisely to discussing [[anxiety]].<ref>{{TV}} p. 38</ref>

[[Lacan]] does not propose a general [[theory ]] of [[affect]]s, but only touches on [[them ]] insofar as they impinge on [[psychoanalytic treatment]]. He insists on the [[relationship ]] of [[affect]] to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]; [[affect]] means that the [[subject]] is affected by his relation with the [[Other]]. He argues that [[affect]]s are not [[signifier]]s but [[signal]]s,<ref>{{S7}} p. 102-3</ref> and emphasizes [[Freud]]'s [[position ]] that [[repression]] does not bear upon the [[affect]] (which can only be transformed or [[displacement|displaced]]) but upon the ideational [[representative ]] (which is, in [[Lacan]]'s [[terms]], the [[signifier]]).<ref>{{Ec}} p. 714</ref>

[[Lacan]]'s comments on the [[concept ]] of [[affect]] have important implications in [[clinical]] [[practice]].

Secondly, the [[affect]]s are [[lure]]s which can deceive the [[analyst]], and hence the [[analyst]] must be wary of being tricked by his own [[affect]]s. This does not mean that the [[analyst]] must disregard his own feelings for the [[patient]], but simply that he must [[know ]] how to make adequate use of them.

Finally, it follows that the aim of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is not the reliving of [[past]] experiences, nor the [[abreaction]] of [[affect]], but the articulation in [[speech]] of the [[truth]] [[about ]] [[desire]].

[[Another ]] term in [[Lacan]]'s [[discourse]], related to but distinct from "[[affect]]," is the term "[[passion]]." [[Lacan]] speaks of the "[[three ]] fundamental passions": [[love]], [[hate]] and [[ignorance]].<ref>{{S1}} p. 271</ref> This is a reference to Buddhist [[thought]].<ref>{{E}} p. 94</ref> These [[passion]]s are not [[imaginary|imaginary phenomena]], but located at the junctions between the [[order|three order]]s.