Changes

{{Top}}contre-[[transfert]]{{Bottom}}

In [[particular]], [[analyst]]s soon [[divided ]] over the [[role ]] allotted to [[countertransference]] in discussions of [[technique]].

On the one hand, many [[analyst]]s argued that [[countertransference]] manifestations were the result of incompletely analysed elements in the [[analyst]], and that such manifestations should therefore be reduced to a minimum by a more [[complete ]] [[training]] [[analysis]].

On the other hand, some [[analyst]]s from the [[Klein]]ian [[school]], beginning with Paula Heimann, argued that the [[analyst]] should be guided in his [[interpretation]]s by his own [[countertransference]] reactions, taking his own [[feelings ]] as an indicator of the [[patient]]'s [[state ]] of [[mind]].

Thus [[Lacan]] defines [[countertransference]] as "the sum of the prejudices, [[passion]]s, perplexities, and even the insufficient information of the [[analyst]] at a certain [[moment ]] of the [[dialectic]]al [[process]]' of the [[treatment]]."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 225</ref>

[[Lacan]] refers to two of [[Freud]]'s [[case ]] studies to illustrate what he means.

In 1957 [[Lacan]] presents a similar [[analysis]] of Freud's treatment of the young [[homosexual ]] woman <ref>{{F}} (1920a [1918]) "[[Works of Sigmund Freud|The Psychogenesis of a Case of Female Homosexuality]]," [[SE]] XVIII, 147.</ref>.

He argues that when [[Freud]] [[interpreted]] the [[woman]]'s [[dream]] as expressing a [[wish ]] to deceive him, he was focusing on the [[imaginary]] [[dimension ]] of the [[woman]]'s [[transference]] rather than on the [[symbolic]] dimension.<ref>{{S4}} p. 135</ref>.

The preceding examples might seem to [[suggest ]] that [[Lacan]] aligns himself with those [[analyst]]s who argue that the [[training]] [[analysis]] should give the [[analyst]] the capacity to transcend all [[affect|affective reactions]] to the [[patient]].

However, [[Lacan]] absolutely rejects this point of view, which he dismisses as a "stoical [[ideal]]".<ref>{{S8}} p.219</ref>.

The [[training]] [[analysis]] does not put the [[analyst]] beyond [[passion]], and to believe that it does would be to believe that all the [[passion]]s stem from the [[unconscious]], an [[idea ]] which [[Lacan]] rejects.

Hence [[Lacan]] does not entirely reject Paula Heimann's [[position]].

For example, if [[Freud]] had reflected a bit more on his feelings towards the young homosexual [[woman]], he might have avoided [[interpreting ]] her [[dream]] as a [[message]] addressed directly to him.<ref>{{S4}} p. 108</ref>.

<blockquote>"No one has ever said that the [[analyst]] should never have feelings towards his [[patient]]. But he must [[know ]] not only not to give into [[them]], to keep them in their [[place]], but also how to make adequate use of them in his technique."<ref>{{S1}} p.32</ref></blockquote>

If [[countertransference]] is condemned by [[Lacan]], then, it is because he defines it not in [[terms ]] of [[affect]]s felt by the [[analyst]], but as the [[analyst]]'s failure to use those [[affect]]s appropriately.

He argues that it connotes a symmetrical [[relationship ]] between the [[analyst]] and the [[analysand]], whereas the [[transference]] is anything but a symmetrical relationship.

When [[speaking ]] of the [[analyst]]'s position it is both misleading and unnecessary to use the term [[countertransference]]; it is sufficient to [[speak ]] of the different ways in which the [[analyst]] and [[analysand]] are implicated in the [[transference]].<ref>{{S8}} p. 233</ref>.

<blockquote>"The [[transference]] is a phenomenon in which [[subject]] and [[psycho]]-analyst are both included. To [[divide ]] it in terms of [[transference]] and [[counter-transference]] . . . is never more than a way of avoiding the [[essence ]] of the matter."<ref>{{S11}} p. 231</ref></blockquote>