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Identity is not a [[Freudian ]] [[concept]]. Theoreticians have defined it in very different ways: as a [[structure ]] that accounts for [[narcissism ]] and is part of the ego; as the ability to remain the same despite changes; as a [[feeling ]] of continuity; or as the sum of representations of the [[self]].

The importance of the [[notion ]] of identity in the [[United States ]] is related to its use in ego-[[psychology]], which considers the ego as a relatively [[autonomous ]] and potentially [[conflict]]-free structure. Many theories of identity [[adapt ]] a portion of [[Freud]]'s view of the ego. Alongside the Freudian ego, which is a structure defined by its functions, [[another ]] ego—or identity related to identifications—is posited (whether [[inside ]] or [[outside ]] [[ego-psychology]]) and conceived of as the outcome of a [[process ]] of individuation.

The first mentions of the importance of the concept of identity for [[clinical ]] [[practice ]] and [[psychopathology ]] date from the nineteen-fifties. When it first appeared in [[psychoanalytic ]] [[discourse]], the concept of identity was associated with two approaches. The first was an attempt to extend the Freudian perspective to a general psychology that would include the ego's relationships with the surrounding [[world ]] and [[guide ]] research on [[child ]] [[development]]. The second sought to apply [[psychoanalysis ]] to pathologies, more serious than [[neurosis]], characterized by disturbances of identity. Phyllis Greenacre evoked the [[internal ]] and [[external ]] faces of identity, and described their favorable and unfavorable aspects. Ralph Greenson isolated a [[screen]]-identity syndrome. Margaret Mahler viewed identity as a facet of development connected with [[object]]-relations, symbiosis, and the possibility of [[separation]]-individuation.

Two major [[psychoanalytical ]] theorists have focused on identity. In 1956 Erik Erikson introduced the concept of an ego identity formed during adolescence, which served as a gauge of psychopathology. In 1961 Heinz Lichtenstein proposed giving identity the priority that the [[libido ]] had for Freud. He considered it the keystone of psychopathology and eventually reframed Freudian [[metapsychology ]] within a monist perspective that challenged the dualistic concept of identification.

Erikson hoped to explain [[human ]] development epigenetically; the various [[stages ]] of his [[model ]] could not be reduced to the [[psychosexual ]] level. The ego was not propelled by [[drives ]] alone but must confront the challenges posed by the [[environment]]. Ego identity was the adolescent [[stage]]; it took over from various identifications and its successful establishment depended on the [[resolution ]] of earlier [[developmental ]] crises. Erikson's ego identity was defined by the [[unconscious ]] quest for personal continuity, by the [[synthesis ]] of the ego, and by group loyalties. It reflected an existential [[dimension ]] of the ego. It was formed through a succession of syntheses of the ego whereby the conflicts of earlier stages were integrated. The opposite of ego identity was a diffusion of identity, a pathological syndrome in which representations of self and object are fluid and unintegrated, and oppositionalism and [[acting out ]] are manifested. Otto Kernberg used this model as a diagnostic criterion for borderline states.

Lichtenstein looked upon human identity as a permanent dilemma because of the [[absence ]] of any [[form ]] of [[guarantee]]. The theme of an invariable identity arose from an unconscious imprint derived from the [[mother ]] thanks to a process of [[mirror ]] [[reflection]]. Variations on this theme constituted the feeling of identity, a creation unique to the child. Pathological developments occurred when themes emerged that were [[impossible ]] to [[satisfy ]] yet necessary for the maintenance of identity. In such [[case ]] a [[subject ]] could be caught in a paradoxical oscillation between the [[search ]] for an annihilating [[other ]] and an isolating [[autonomy]]. The [[principle ]] of identity was the central motivation for the human [[individual]], who was obliged to maintain an identity under more or less continual [[threat]]. This principle replaced the [[reality ]] principle in Lichtenstein's account, and the drives as well as the [[repetition ]] [[compulsion ]] were subservient to it. Identity was assimilated to narcissism, described as a primary thematic with secondary variants. It [[left ]] room for the self, the fourth metapsychological dimension and [[third ]] paradigm of psychoanalysis. Identity was part of an evolutionist view that rejected [[dualism ]] of any kind.

Historically [[speaking]], theories of identity were replaced by theories of the self and by the "self psychology" of Heinz Kohut.

These are [[psychological ]] theories in which the unconscious and libido are secondary. As Freud pointed out, however, [[unity ]] and synthesis are superficial [[concepts]]. Drawing on such criticism, Kohut characterized Erikson's identity as a descriptive psychosocial concept. Edith Jacobson questioned the relevance and [[universality ]] of so-called disturbances of identity, which she considered exaggerated. Roy Schafer [[interpreted ]] the emergence of the concept of identity as symptomatic of a [[subjectivity ]] stripped of a mechanistic and reifying metapsychology and hence in [[need ]] of reformulation. Merely descriptive theories of identity may be said to belong to the sphere of [[phenomenology]]. When the [[conceptual ]] focus is on identity, the ego is cut off from its [[libidinal ]] roots. Furthermore, the view that underpins these theories is exclusively developmental and completely rejects any [[causality ]] based on deferred effects.