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=Context and Influences=
As with all of Lacan's papers, there is a [[multiplicity]] of allusions and references in '[[The Mirror Stage]]', which can often confuse a reader who is unfamiliar with its context. The paper is concerned with the [[formation]] of the ego through the [[identification]] with an image of the self. According to Freud's second [[model]] of the [[mind]] - what is usually referred to as the '[[topographical]]' model (see Thurschwell 2000: ch. 5) - the ego represents the organized part of the [[psyche]] in contrast to the unorganized elements of the [[unconscious]] ([[The Id|the id]]). As Freud writes, the 'ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the [[external]] world…. The ego represents what may be called [[reason]] and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions' (Freud 1984a [1923]: 363-4). In this sense, the ego is often associated with consciousness, but this is a mistake. The ego is related to consciousness, but it is also in constant tension with the [[demands]] of the unconscious and the imperatives of the [[superego]]. The function of the ego, therefore, is defensive insofar as it mediates between the unconscious (the id) and the demands of external [[reality]] (the [[SuperEgo|superego]]). Even at this early stage of his career Lacan was concerned to distinguish the ego from the [[subject]] and to elaborate a conception of [[subjectivity]] as [[divided]] or '[[alienated]]'. Before explaining the detail of his argument, it is important to [[understand]] that Lacan drew on a wide range of influences from [[philosophy]] and experimental [[psychology]] in [[order]] to formulate his ideas in this paper. So, I will first briefly highlight four strands of [[thinking]] in 'The Mirror Stage': the [[philosophical]] [[tradition]] of [[phenomenology]]; the [[work]] of the [[psychologist]] Henri Wallon (1879-1962) on mirroring; the work of the ethologist Roger [[Caillois]] (1913-78) on [[mimicry]]; and the work of [[philosopher]] Alexandre [[Kojève]] (1902-68) on [[recognition]] and [[desire]].
=Phenomenology=
In what we can see as the first [[phase]] of Lacan's career - from the completion of his doctoral [[thesis]] in 1932 to 'The Rome [[Discourse]]' in 1953 (see Chapter 2) - he was philosophically speaking a phenomenologist. Phenomenology derives from the work of the [[German]] philosopher Edmund [[Husserl]] (1859-1938) and is concerned with the [[nature]] of 'pure phenomena', that is to say, with the idea that [[objects]] do not [[exist]] independently as things in the [[world]] [[separate]] from our [[perception]] of them but are intimately linked to human consciousness. According to phenomenologists, human consciousness is not the [[passive]] recognition of [[material]] phenomena that are simply there, 'given', but a [[process]] of actively constituting or 'intending' those phenomena. Husserl argued that we cannot be certain of anything beyond our immediate [[experience]] and therefore have to ignore, or 'put in brackets', everything [[outside]] our perception or consciousness. He called this process '[[phenomenological]] reduction' in the sense that we reduce the external world to consciousness alone. In short, the process of thinking [[about]] an [[object]] and the object itself are mutually dependent. As Terry Eagleton (1983) [[notes]], this is all very abstract and unreal, but the idea behind phenomenology was, paradoxically, to get away from abstract philosophical [[speculation]] and get back to the analysis of things themselves in [[real]] [[concrete]] situations.
Husserl's ideas were further developed by his most famous pupil Martin [[Heidegger]] (1889-1976). Heidegger argued that all [[understanding]] is historically situated. As human beings we always perceive the world from a specific [[situation]] and our most fundamental desire is to transcend or surpass that situation. This is what Heidegger called the '[[project]]': as a subject one is physically situated in time and [[space]] but one then 'projects' oneself into the [[future]]. Human subjectivity or what we call [[existence]] involves this constant process of projecting oneself out on to the world and into the future. For Heidegger, therefore, human consciousness is not an inner world of [[thoughts]] and images but a constant process of projecting outside, or what he called '[[ex-sistence]]'. These ideas were carried over to [[France]] by Jean-[[Paul]] [[Sartre]] (1905-80), after he attended Heidegger's lectures in 1932. In an early work entitled Transcendence of the Ego (1934) Sartre distinguished between [[self-consciousness]] and the ego. As we saw above, Freud defined the ego as the reasoning faculty of the mind, mediating between unconscious passions and [[external reality]]. By extending Heidegger's [[notion]] of the project Sartre suggested that [[Self-Consciousness|self-consciousness ]] was essentially '[[nothing]]', while the ego was an object in the world perceived by [[The Subject|the subject]]. In the 1930s and 1940s Lacan was strongly influenced by these ideas. Sartre's [[distinction]] between subject and ego paved the way for Lacan's own formulation of the relationship between subject and ego in the mirror stage, while the notions of 'ex-sistence' and 'nothingness' recur throughout his work. What is crucial for understanding Lacan, however, and especially where he adopts ideas from philosophy, [[anthropology]] and [[linguistics]], is that he always transforms [[concepts]] into a psychoanalytic [[register]]. Thus, he transferred phenomenological notions of ex-sistence and nothingness from the realm of consciousness to the unconscious. As Jacques-[[Alain]] [[Miller]] writes:
It was essential to him that the unconscious not be taken as an interiority or container in which some [[drives]] are found over on the one side and a few identifications over on the other…. He took the unconscious not as a container, but rather as something ex-sistent - outside itself - that is connected to a subject who is a [[lack]] of [[being]]. (1996:11)
We will see what Miller means by '[[Lack of Being|lack of being]]' below.
=The Self as Mirror Image=
=The Mirror Stage=
[[The Mirror Phase|The mirror phase ]] occurs roughly between the ages of six and 18 months and corresponds to Freud's stage of [[Primary Narcissism|primary narcissism]]. That is the stage of human [[development]] when the subject is in [[love]] with the image of themselves and their own bodies and which precedes the love of others (see Thurschwell 2000: ch. 5). Between the ages of six and 18 months the infant begins to recognize his/her image in the mirror (this does not mean a literal mirror but rather any reflective surface, for example the [[mother]]'s face) and this is usually accompanied by [[pleasure]]. The [[child]] is fascinated with its image and tries to [[control]] and play with it. Although the child initially confuses its image with reality, he/she soon recognizes that the image has its own properties, finally accepting that the image is their own image - a reflection of themselves.
During the mirror stage, then, the child for the [[first time]] becomes aware, through [[seeing]] its image in the mirror, that his/her body has a [[total]] form. The infant can also govern the movements of this image through the movements of its own body and thus experiences pleasure. This sense of [[completeness]] and mastery, however, is in contrast to the child's experience of its own body, over which it does not yet have [[full]] motor control. While the infant still feels his/her body to be in parts, as fragmented and not yet [[unified]], it is the image that provides him/her with a sense of unification and [[wholeness]]. The mirror image, therefore, anticipates the mastery of the infant's own body and stands in contrast to the [[feelings]] of [[fragmentation]] the infant experiences. What is important at this point is that the infant [[identifies]] with this mirror image. The image is him/herself. This identification is crucial, as without it - and without the [[anticipation]] of mastery that it establishes - the infant would never get to the stage of perceiving him/herself as a [[complete]] or whole being. At the same time, however, the image is [[alienating]] in the sense that it becomes confused with the self. The image actually comes to take the place of the self. Therefore, the sense of a unified self is acquired at the price of this self being an-other, that is, our mirror image. Lacan describes it like this:
According to Lacan, from the moment the image of unity is posited in opposition to the experience of fragmentation, the subject is established as a rival to itself. A [[conflict]] is produced between the infant's fragmented sense of self and [[the imaginary]] [[autonomy]] out of which the ego is [[born]]. The same rivalry established between the subject and him/herself is also established in future relations between the subject and others. As Benvenuto and Kennedy put it, 'the primary conflict between identification with, and primordial rivalry with, the other's image, begins a [[dialectical process]] that [[links]] the ego to more complex social situations' (1986:58). To exist one has to be recognized by an-other. But this means that our image, which is equal to ourselves, is mediated by the [[gaze]] of the other. The other, then, becomes the [[guarantor]] of ourselves. We are at once dependent on the other as the guarantor of our own existence and a bitter rival to that same other.
Critics of Lacan's mirror stage argue that he in fact has things completely the wrong way round. In order for the subject to identify with an image in the mirror and then to mis-recognize themselves, they must first have a sense of themselves as a self. If the Lacanian subject is an alienated subject then this presupposes a 'non-alienated' subject in the first [[instance]], otherwise there is nothing that one can meaningfully be said to be alienated from. Hence, the idea of a primary lack or absence is based upon the presupposition of a primary [[presence]] or unity. Lack in this sense is secondary and not primary. Anthony Elliott argues that the very [[terms]] of Lacan's mirror stage are all wrong: mirror reflection, lack and absence are not pre-existing phenomena but the work of the subject and [[The Imaginary|the imaginary ]] (see Elliott 1998: ch. 4). Lacan's use of the term alienation is rather different from that of his critics though. Through the mirror stage the infant imagines that it achieves mastery over its own body but in a place outside of itself. Alienation, in Lacan, is precisely this 'lack of being' through which the infant's realization (in both senses of the term: forming a distinct concept in the mind and becoming real) lies in an-other place. In this sense, the subject is not alienated from something or from itself but rather alienation is constitutive of the subject - the subject is alienated in its very being.
=The Mirror, the Screen and the Spectator=
In this sense the cinema should be located not in Lacan's [[imaginary order]] but in the [[symbolic]] order (see Chapter 2).
Metz defines identification with either characters or actors as [[secondary identification]]. The [[Primary Identification|primary identification ]] of the cinema is not with something that is seen (as in the mirror stage) but with something seeing, as Metz puts it, 'a pure, all-seeing and invisible subject' (1982:97). What is seen in this situation - the object on the screen - does not know it is being seen and it is this lack of awareness in the object that it is seen that facilitates the voyeuristic quality of the cinema. Film spectators are essentially voyeurs without being aware that they are voyeurs. Metz insists on the [[need]] to maintain a [[separation]] [[cinema and psychoanalysis]]. What psychoanalysis provides film studies with are the concepts through which we can understand how cinema works, especially notions of [[scopophilia]] (the overwhelming desire to look) and [[fetishism]]. We will see how these concepts work in our [[discussion]] of feminist film criticism in 'After Lacan'. First, we must consider one more groundbreaking article.
=Laura Mulvey and Visual Pleasure=
For both Baudry and Metz the cinematic spectator was conceived of as essentially a [[male]] voyeur. In an incredibly influential essay, 'Visual Pleasure and [[Narrative]] Cinema', Laura Mulvey took up these debates and argued that the cinema produces a fundamentally male gaze or look and that the [[woman]] is always the object of this gaze. Mulvey suggested that there were three levels upon which [[The Gaze|the gaze ]] operated in the cinema. First, there is the gaze of the camera as it is filming and this, following Metz, is always a voyeuristic gaze. Second, there are the looks intrinsic to the film narrative and these are usually the looks of male protagonists, as they position [[women]] characters within the narrative itself. Finally, there is the gaze of the spectator, and, as this gaze is facilitated by the previous two positions - of the camera and of the protagonists within the film - it is an inherently male position to adopt. Mulvey's formulation of the 'male gaze' provided the starting point for many debates around the possibility of elaborating [[feminine]], black and gay spectator positions. Would women always remain the object of the spectacle or does [[Lacanian psychoanalysis]] offer alternative ways out? We will see how Lacanians addressed this issue in subsequent chapters.
=Summary=
In 'The Mirror Stage' Lacan draws on an extraordinary range of sources from philosophy, psychology and ethology, to reformulate the psychoanalytic conception of the ego and the imaginary. The imaginary is the realm of the ego, a pre-[[linguistic]] realm of sense perception, identification and an illusory sense of unity. The primary relation in the imaginary is a relation with one's own body, that is to say, the [[specular]] image of the body itself. These imaginary processes form the ego and are repeated and reinforced by the subject in his/her relationship with the external world. The imaginary, therefore, is not a [[developmental]] phase - it is not something that one goes through and grows out of - but remains at the core of our experience. As the sense of original unity and coherence in the mirror phase is an illusion, there is a fundamental disharmony regarding the ego. The ego is essentially a terrain of conflict and discord; a site of continual struggle. What Lacan refers to as a 'lack of being' is this [[ontological]] gap or primary [[loss]] at the very heart of our subjectivity. Lacan goes further, however, than just suggesting that we have lost an original sense of unity; he argues that this loss is constitutive of subjectivity itself. In short, the imaginary is a realm of identification and mirror-reflection; a realm of [[distortion]] and illusion. It is a realm in which a futile struggle takes place on the part of the ego to once more attain an imaginary unity and coherence.
