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"In the beginning of psychoanalysis is transference," without any [[intersubjectivity]], because between the two partners the subject-supposed-to-know acts as a [[third]], as "the pivot from where everything that goes on in transference is articulated." This pivot is the signifier introduced in the [[discourse]] instituted by it, a [[formation]] as though detached from the analysand, which has nothing to do with the analyst's person. It is "a [[chain]] of letters that leads the not-known to [[frame]] [[knowledge]]," which concerns [[desire]]. The [[Graph]] of Desire still guides the analysis but an [[identity]] is asserted between the [[matheme]] of the subject-supposed-to-know and the <i>[[agalma]]</i> of [[Plato]]'s <i>The [[Symposium]]</i>, which presents "the pure angle of the subject as the free rapport to the signifier, a signifier from which both the desire of knowledge and the desire of the Other are isolated."<br>
Lacan wants to establish, as to the passage from the analysand to the analyst, "an eaquation whose constant is the <i>agalma</i>" (this term being a sort of compromise between <i>[[objet a]]</i> and the [[phallus]]). Once "the desire that, in its functionning, uphelds the analysand has been resolved, the analysand no longer wants to remove the possibility of such [[desire,]] the [[remainder]] which, insofar as it determines his [[division]], makes him fall from his [[fantasy]] and destitutes him as subject." Lacan interprets the depressive position often noticed as the end of the analysis in [[terms]] of <i>désêtre</i> and "[[subjective]] destitution. "The subject sees its assurance sink, a [[self]]-assurance that comes from the fantasy in which everybody's opening onto the [[real]] is constituted." The subject realizes that the grasp of desire is nothing other than that of a <i>désêtre</i>. "In this <i>désêtre</i> what is unveiled is the nonessential [[nature]] of the subject-supposed-to-know; the analyst-to-be is dedicated to the <i>agalma</i> of the [[essence]] of desire, even if it means that the analyst-to-be has to be reduced to an ordinary signifier, since the subject is the signifier of the pure signifying relation." Does going through the fantasy, then, mean going toward the [[drive]] or toward a confrontation with the signifier? Thus Lacan answers: "The being of desire meets the being of knowledge to be reborn from their [[knot]] in a [[strip]] formed by the only side on which only one [[lack]] is inscribed, that which upholds the <i>agalma</i>." The <i>agalma</i> becomes the signifier of the bar that is put on the Other (A); the gap of (- </font><font face="Symbol" size="3">F</font><font face="BOOKMAN" size="3">) opens in the Other; and the (<i>a</i>) falls from the Other.<br>
Slavoj [[Zizek]] argues that "here we find the inescapable deadlock that defines the position of the loved one: the other sees something in me and wants something from me, but I cannot give him what I do not possess - or as Lacan puts it, there is no rapport between what the loved one possesses and what the loving one [[lacks]]. The only way for the loved one to escape this deadlock is to stretch out his hand toward the loving one and to [[return]] love, that is to [[exchange]], in a [[metaphorical]] gesture, his status as the loved one for the status of the loving one. This [[reversal]] designates the point of [[subjectivization]]: the [[object]] of love changes into the subject the [[moment]] it answers the call of love. And it is only by way of this reversal that a genuine love emerges: I am truly in love not when I am simply fascinated by the <i>agalma</i> in the other, but when I [[experience]] the [[other, the]] object of love, as frail and lost, as [[lacking]] 'it', and my love none the less survives this [[loss]]."
