The term 'transference ' (''transfert) The term 'transference' ) first emerged inFreud's work as simply another term for the displacement of affect from one idea to another.<ref>see Freud, 1900a: SE V, 562</ref>Later on, however, it came to refer to the patient's relationship to the analyst as it develops in the treatment. This soon became the central meaning of the term, and is the sense in which it is usually understood in psychoanalytic theory today.
The use of a special term to denote the patient's relationship to the analyst is justified by the peculiar character of this relationship. Freudwas first struck by the intensity of the patient's affective reactions to the doctor in Breuer's work treatment of Anna O in 1882, which he argued was due to the patient transferring unconscious ideas onto the doctor.<ref>Freud, 1895d</ref>As he developed the psychoanalytic method, Freud first regarded the transference exclusively as simply another term for a RESISTANCE which impedes the displacement recall of affect fromrepressed memories, an obstacle to the treatment which must be 'destroyed'.<ref>Freud, 1905e: SE VII, 116</ref>
one idea Gradually, however, he modified this view, coming to another (see Freudthe transference also as a positive factor which helps the treatment to progress. The positive value of transference lies in the fact that it provides a way for the analysand's history to be confronted in the immediacy of the present relationship with the analyst; in the way he relates to the analyst, 1900a: SE V, 562the analysand inevitably repeats earlier relationships with other figures (especially those with the parents). Later onThis paradoxical nature of transference, howeveras both an obstacle to the treatment and that which drives the treatment forward, itperhaps helps to explain why there are so many different and opposing views of transference in psychoanalytic theory today.
came to refer Lacan's thinking about transference goes through several stages. His first work to deal with the subject in any detail is 'An Intervention on the patientTransference,'s relationship <ref>Lacan, 1951</ref> in which he describes the transference in dialectical terms borrowed from Hegel. He criticises ego-psychology for defming the transference in terms of [[affects]]; "Transference does not refer to any mysterious property of affect, and even when it reveals itself under the analyst as appearance of emotion, it develops only acquires meaning by virtue of the dialectical moment in thewhich it is produced."<ref>Ec, 225</ref>
treatmentIn other words, Lacan argues that although transference often manifests itself in the guise of particularly strong affects, such as [[love]] and hate, it does not consist of such emotions but in the structure of an intersubjective relationship. This soon became structural definition of transference remains a constant theme throughout the rest of Lacan's work; he consistently locates the central meaning essence of transference in the symbolic and not in the imaginary, although it clearly has powerful imaginary effects. Later on, Lacan will remark that if transference often manifests itself under the termappearance of love, it is first and foremost the love of knowledge (''savoir'') that is the senseconcerned.
Lacan returns to the subject of the transference in which the seminar of 1953-4. This time he conceives it is usually understood not in terms borrowed from Hegelian dialectics but in psychoanalytic theory todayterms borrowed from the anthropology of exchange.<ref>Mauss, LÈvi-Strauss</ref>
The use Transference is implicit in the speech act, which involves an exchange of signs that transforms the speaker and listener: In its essence, the efficacious transference which we're considering is quite simply the speech act. Each time a special term man speaks to denote another in an authentic and full manner, there is, in the patient's relationship to true sense, transference, symbolic transference - something which takes place which changes the nature of the analyst istwo beings present.<ref>Sl, 109</ref>
justified In the seminar of the following year, he continues to elaborate on the symbolic nature of transference, which he identifies with the compulsion to repeat, the insistence of the symbolic determinants of the subject.<ref>S2, 210-11</ref>This is to be distinguished from the imaginary aspect of transference, namely, the affective reactions of love and aggressivity. In this distinction between the symbolic and imaginary aspects of transference, Lacan provides a useful way of understanding the paradoxical function of the transference in psychoanalytic treatment; in its symbolic aspect ([[repetition]]) it helps the treatment progress by revealing the peculiar character signifiers of this relationshipthe subject's history, while in its imaginary aspect (love and hate) it acts as a resistance. Freud was first struck by<ref>see S4, 135; S8, 204</ref>
Lacan's next approach to the intensity subject of transference is in the patienteighth year of his seminar,<ref>Lacan, 1960-1</ref> entitled simply 'The Transference'. Here he uses Plato's affective reactions Symposium to illustrate the relationship between the analysand and the analyst. Alcibiades compares Socrates to a plain box which encloses a precious object (Grk ''agalma''); just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates, so the doctor analysand sees his object of desire in Breuer'sthe analyst (see [[objet petit a]]).
treatment In 1964, Lacan articulates the concept of transference with his concept of Anna O in 1882the [[subject supposed to know]], which he argued was due remains central to Lacan's view of the transference from then on; indeed, it is this view of the transference which has come to be seen as Lacan's most complete attempt to theorise the patientmatter.
transferring unconscious ideas onto According to this view, transference is the doctor (Freudattribution of knowledge to the Other, 1895d)the supposition that the Other is a subject who knows; 'As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere . As he devel-. . there is transference."<ref>Sll, 232</ref>
oped Although the existence of the transference is a necessary condition of psychoanalytic methodtreatment, Freud first regarded it is not sufficient in itself; it is also necessary that the analyst deal with the transference in a unique way. It is this that differentiates psychoanalysis from [[suggestion]]; although both are based on the transference exclu-, psychoanalysis differs from suggestion because the analyst refuses to use the power given to him by the transference.<ref>see E, 236</ref>
sively as From quite early on in the history of psychoanalysis it became common to distinguish between those aspects of the patient's relationship to the analyst which were 'adapted to reality' and those which were not. In the latter category fell all the patient's reactions which were caused by 'perceiving the analyst in a RESISTANCE distorted way'. Some analysts used the term 'transference' to refer to all aspects of the analysand's relationship to the analyst, in which impedes case they distinguished the distorted 'neurotic transference' or 'transference neurosis' from the recall 'unobjectionable part of repressed memoriesthe transference' or 'therapeutic alliance."<ref>Edward Bibring, anElizabeth Zeztel</ref>
obstacle Other analysts argued that the term 'transference' should be restricted to the treatment which must 'unrealistic' or 'irrational' reactions of the analysand (William Silverberg, Franz Alexander). However, the common assumption underlying both of these positions was that the analyst could tell when the patient was not reacting to him on the basis of who he really was but rather on the basis of previous relationships with other people. The analyst was credited with this ability because he was supposed to be better 'destroyedadapted to reality' (Freudthan the patient. Informed by his own correct perception of reality, 1905e: SE VIIthe analyst could offer 'transference interpretations'; that is, 116)he could point out the discrepancy between the real situation and the irrational way that the patient was reacting to it. It was argued that such transference interpretations helped the analysand to gain 'insight' into his own neurotic transference and thereby resolve it or 'liquidate' it.
Gradually, however, he modified Some of Lacan's most incisive criticisms are directed at this view, coming to see way of representing psychoanalytic treatment. These criticisms are based on the transference also asfollowing arguinents:
1.The whole idea of adaptation to reality is based on a positive factor which helps naive empiricist epistemology, involving an appeal to an unproblematic notion of 'reality' as an objective and self-evident given. This entirely neglects what psychoanalysis has discovered about the construction of reality by the ego on the basis of its own mÈconnaissance. Hence when the analyst assumes that he is better adapted to reality than the patient he has no other recourse than 'to fall back on his own ego' since this is the only 'bit of reality he knows'.<ref>E, 231</ref> The healthy part of the patient's ego is then defmed simply as 'the part that thinks as we do'.<ref>E, 232</ref> This reduces psychoanalytic treatment to progressa form of suggestion in which the analyst simply 'imposes his own idea of reality' on the analysand. The positive value <ref>E, 232</ref> Thus 'the inability [of the analyst] to sustain a praxis in an authentic manner results, as is usually the case with mankind, in the exercise ofpower."<ref>E, 226</ref>
transference lies in the fact 2.The idea that it provides a way for the analysand's history 'distorted perception of the analyst' could be liquidated by means of interpretations is a logical fallacy, since the transference is interpreted on the basis of, and with the instrument of, the transference itself.<ref>S8, 206</ref> In other words, there is no [[metalanguage]] of the transference, no vantage point outside the transference from which the analyst could offer an interpretation, since any interpretation he offers "will be received as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be."<ref>E, 231</ref>
confronted in Thus it is contradictory to claim that the immediacy transference can be dissolved by means of an interpretation when it is the present relationship with transference itself which conditions the analystanalysand's acceptance of that interpretation; in "the emergence of the subject from thetransference is thus postponed ad infinitum."<ref>E, 231</ref>
way Does this mean that Lacanian analysts never interpret the transference? Certainly not; Lacan affirms that "it is natural to interpret the transference,"<ref>E, 271</ref> but at the same time he relates harbours no illusions about the power of such interpretations to dissolve the transference. Like any other interpretation, the analystmust use all his art in deciding if and when to interpret the transference, and above all must avoid gearing his interpretations exclusively to interpreting the transference. He must also know exactly what he is seeking to achieve by such an interpretation; not to rectify the patient's relationship to reality, but to maintain the analytic dialogue. "What does it mean, to interpret the transference? Nothing else than to fill the analysand inevitably repeats earlier relationshipsvoid of this deadlock with a lure. But while it may be deceptive, this lure serves a purpose by setting off the whole process again."<ref>Ec, 225</ref>
with other figures (especially those with When describing the parents)transference as 'positive' or 'negative', Lacan takes two different approaches. This paradoxical Following Freud, Lacan sometimes uses these adjectives to refer to the nature ofthe affects, 'positive transference' referring to loving affects and 'negative transference' referring to aggressive affects.<ref>Ec, 222</ref>
transferenceSometimes, however, as both an obstacle Lacan takes the terms 'positive' and 'negative' to refer to the favourable or unfavourable effects of the transference on the treatment and <ref>see E, 271</ref> (where Lacan argues that when the analysand's resistance opposes suggestion, this resistance must be 'placed in the ranks of the positive transference' on the grounds that which drives it maintains the direction of theanalysis).
treatment forward, perhaps helps to explain why there are so many different and opposing views of transference in psychoanalytic theory today. Lacan's thinking about transference goes through several stages. His first work to deal with the subject in any detail is 'An Intervention on the Transference' (Lacan, 1951), in which he describes the transference in dialec- tical terms borrowed from Hegel. He criticises ego-psychology for defming the transference in terms of AFFECTs; 'Transference does not refer to any myster- lous property of affect, and even when it reveals itself under the appearance of emotion, it only acquires meaning by virtue of the dialectical moment in which it is produced' (Ec, 225). In other words, Lacan argues that although transference often manifests itself in the guise of particularly strong affects, such aS LOVE and hate, it does not consist of such emotions but in the structure of an intersubjective relationship. This structural definition of transference remains a constant theme throughout the rest of Lacan's work; he consistently locates the essence of transference in the symbolic and not in the imaginary, although it clearly has powerful imaginary effects. Later on, Lacan will remark that if transfer- ence often manifests itself under the appearance of love, it is first and foremost the love of knowledge (savoir) that is concerned. Lacan returns to the subject of the transference in the seminar of 19534 This time he conceives it not in terms borrowed from Hegelian dialectics but in terms borrowed from the anthropology of exchange (Mauss, LÈvi-Strauss). Transference is implicit in the speech act, which involves an exchange of signs that transforms the speaker and listener: In its essence, the efficacious transference which we're considering is quite simply the speech act. Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and full manner, there is, in the true sense, transference, symbolic transference - something which takes place which changes the nature of the two beings present. (Sl, 109) In the seminar of the following year, he continues to elaborate on the symbolic nature of transference, which he identifies with the compulsion to repeat, the insistence of the symbolic determinants of the subject (S2, 210-11). This is to be distinguished from the imaginary aspect of transference, namely, the affective reactions of love and aggressivity. In this distinction between the symbolic and imaginary aspects of transference, Lacan provides a useful way of understanding the paradoxical function of the transference in psychoanalytic treatment; in its symbolic aspect (REPETITION) it helps the treatment progress by revealing the signifiers of the subject's history, while in its imaginary aspect (love and hate) it acts as a resistance (see S4, 135; S8, 204). Lacan's next approach to the subject of transference is in the eighth year of his seminar (Lacan, 1960-1), entitled simply 'The Transference'. Here he uses Plato's Symposium to illustrate the relationship between the analysand and the analyst. Alcibiades compares Socrates to a plain box which encloses a precious object (Grk agalma); just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates, so the analysand sees his object of desire in the analyst (see OBJETPETITA). In 1964, Lacan articulates the concept of transference with his concept of the SUBJECT SUPPOSED TO KNOw, which remains central to Lacan's view of the transference from then on; indeed, it is this view of the transference which has come to be seen as Lacan's most complete attempt to theorise the matter. According to this view, transference is the attribution of knowledge to the Other, the supposition that the Other is a subject who knows; 'As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere . . . there is transference' (Sll, 232). Although the existence of the transference is a necessary condition of psychoanalytic treatment, it is not sufficient in itself; it is also necessary that the analyst deal with the transference in a unique way. It is this that differ- entiates psychoanalysis from SUGGESTION; although both are based on the transference, psychoanalysis differs from suggestion because the analyst refuses to use the power given to him by the transference (see E, 236). From quite early on in the history of psychoanalysis it became common to distinguish between those aspects of the patient's relationship to the analyst which were 'adapted to reality' and those which were not. In the latter category fell all the patient's reactions which were caused by 'perceiving the analyst in a distorted way'. Some analysts used the term 'transference' to refer to all aspects of the analysand's relationship to the analyst, in which case they distinguished the distorted 'neurotic transference' or 'transference neurosis' from the 'unobjectionable part of the transference' or 'therapeutic alliance' (Edward Bibring, Elizabeth Zeztel). Other analysts argued that the term 'transference' should be restricted to the 'unrealistic' or 'irrational' reactions of the analysand (William Silverberg, Franz Alexander). However, the com- mon assumption underlying both of these positions was that the analyst could tell when the patient was not reacting to him on the basis of who he really was but rather on the basis of previous relationships with other people. The analyst was credited with this ability because he was supposed to be better 'adapted to reality' than the patient. Informed by his own correct perception of reality, the analyst could offer 'transference interpretations'; that is, he could point out the discrepancy between the real situation and the irrational way that the patient was reacting to it. It was argued that such transference interpretations helped the analysand to gain 'insight' into his own neurotic transference and thereby resolve it or 'liquidate' it. Some of Lacan's most incisive criticisms are directed at this way of representing psychoanalytic treatment. These criticisms are based on the following arguinents: 1. The whole idea of adaptation to reality is based on a naive empiricist epistemology, involving an appeal to an unproblematic notion of 'reality' as an objective and self-evident given. This entirely neglects what psychoanalysis has discovered about the construction of reality by the ego on the basis of its own mÈconnaissance. Hence when the analyst assumes that he is better adapted to reality than the patient he has no other recourse than 'to fall back on his own ego' since this is the only 'bit of reality he knows' (E, 231). The healthy part of the patient's ego is then defmed simply as 'the part that thinks as we do' (E, 232). This reduces psychoanalytic treatment to a form of suggestion in which the analyst simply 'imposes his own idea of reality' on the analysand (E, 232). Thus 'the inability [of the analyst] to sustain a praxis in an authentic manner results, as is usually the case with mankind, in the exercise of power' (E, 226). b 2- The idea that the analysand's 'distorted perception of the analyst' could e liquidated by means of interpretations is a logical fallacy, since 'the transference is interpreted on the basis of, and with the instrument of, the transference itself' (S8, 206). In other words, there is nO METALANGUAGE of the transference, no vantage point outside the transference from which the analyst could offer an interpretation, since any interpretation he offers 'will be received as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be' (E, 231) Thus it is contradictory to claim that the transference can be dissolved by means of an interpretation when it is the transference itself which conditions the analysand's acceptance of that interpretation; 'the emergence of the subject from the transference is thus postponed ad infinitum' (E, 231). Does this mean that Lacanian analysts never interpret the transference? Certainly not; Lacan affirms that 'it is natural to interpret the transference' (E, 271), but at the same time he harbours no illusions about the power of such interpretations to dissolve the transference. Like any other interpretation, the analyst must use all his art in deciding if and when to interpret the transfer- ence, and above all must avoid gearing his interpretations exclusively to interpreting the transference. He must also know exactly what he is seeking to achieve by such an interpretation; not to rectify the patient's relationship to reality, but to maintain the analytic dialogue. 'What does it mean, to interpret . the transference? Nothing else than to fill the void of this deadlock with a lure. But while it may be deceptive, this lure serves a purpose by setting off the whole process again' (Ec, 225). When describing the transference as 'positive' or 'negative', Lacan takes two different approaches. Following Freud, Lacan sometimes uses these adjectives to refer to the nature of the affects, 'positive transference' referring to loving affects and 'negative transference' referring to aggressive affects (Ec, 222). Sometimes, however, Lacan takes the terms 'positive' and 'negative' to refer to the favourable or unfavourable effects of the transference on the treatment (see E, 271, where Lacan argues that when the analysand's resistance opposes suggestion, this resistance must be 'placed in the ranks of the positive trans- ference' on the grounds that it maintains the direction of the analysis). Although Lacan does speak occasionally of COUNTERTRANSFERENCE[[countertransference]], he gen- erally generally prefers not to use this term.
== def ==
The displacement of one's unresolved conflicts, dependencies, and aggressions onto a substitute object (e.g. substituting a lover, spouse, etc. for one's parent). This operation can also occur in the psychoanalytical cure, when a patient transfers onto the analyst feelings that were previously directed to another object. By working through this transference of feelings onto the analyst, the patient can come to grips with the actual cause of his or her feelings.
==def==
'''Transference''' is a phenomenon in [[psychology]] characterized by unconscious redirection of feelings of one person to another. For instance, one could mistrust somebody who resembles an ex-spouse in manners, voice or external appearance; or be overly compliant to someone who resembles a childhood friend.
Transference is common. Only in a personally or socially harmful context can transference be described as a pathological issue, however, there is an experimental new theory of tranference known as AMT (Abusive Multiple Tranference), put forth by [[David W. Bernstein]], in which the abuser not only transfers negative feelings directed towards their abuser to the victim, but also transfers the power and dominance of their own abuser to themselves. This is often the case with murderers, for example the serial killer [[Carroll Cole]]. While his father was away in [[WWII]], Cole's mother engaged in several extra-marital affairs, forcing Cole to watch, and later beat him to ensure that he would not alert his father. Cole would later come to murder many women whom he considered "loose", and those in general who reminded him of his mother. AMT also ties in very closely with Power/Control Killers, as the feeling and view of control is passed from one abuser to those proceeding him or her.
==See also==
* [[Psychological projection|projection]]
==References==
<references />
== References ==
