Changes

In [[Freud]]'s work, the term '[[affect]]' stands in opposition to the term '[[idea]]'. The opposition between the affective and the intellectual is one of the oldest themes in philosophy, and made its way into Freud's vocabulary via German psychology.For Lacan, however, the opposition between the affective and the intellectual is not valid in the psychoanalytic field. 'This opposition is one of the most contrary to analytic experience and most unenlightening when it comes to understanding it' (Sl, 274).

Thus, in response to those who accuse Lacan of being over-intellectual and of neglecting the role of affect, it can be pointed out that this criticism is based on what Lacan saw as a false opposition (Lacan also argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy thinking - see E,171). Psychoanalytic treatment is based on the symbolic order, which transcends the The opposition between affect and intellect. On the one hand, psychoanalytic experience 'is not that of an affective smoochy-woochy' (Sl, 55). On and the other hand, nor intellectual is psychoanalytic treatment an intellectual affair; 'we are not dealing here with an intellectual dimension' (Sl, 274). The Lacanian psychoanalyst must thus be aware one of the ways oldest themes in which both 'affective smoochy-woochy[[philosophy]], and made its way into [[Freud]]' and intellectualisation can be resistances to analysis, imaginary lures of the ego. Anxiety is the only affect that is not deceptives vocabulary via [[German]] [[psychology]].

For [[Lacan is opposed to those analysts who have taken ]], however, the affective realm as primary, for opposition between the affective is not a separate realm opposed to and the intellectual; 'The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found valid in a mythical beyond of the production of the symbol which would precede the discursive formulation' (Sl, 57). However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of affect, pointing to the fact that a whole year of the seminar is dedicated precisely to discussing anxiety (Lacan, 1973a: 38)psychoanalytic field.

Lacan does not propose a general theory 'This opposition is one of affects, but only touches on them insofar as they impinge on psychoanalytic treatment. He insists on the relationship of affect most contrary to the symbolic order; affect means that the subject is affected by his relation with the Other. He argues that affects are not signifiers but signals (S7, 102-3), analytic experience and emphasises Freud's position that repression does not bear upon the affect (which can only be transformed or displaced) but upon the ideational representative (which is, in Lacanmost unenlightening when it comes to understanding it's terms, the signifier) (EcSl, 714274).

Thus, in response to those who accuse Lacan's comments on of being over-intellectual and of neglecting the concept role of affect have important implications in clinical practice. Firstly, all the concepts in psychoanalysis which have traditionally been conceived in terms of affects, such it can be pointed out that this criticism is based on what Lacan saw as the transference, must be rethought in terms a false opposition (Lacan also argued that criticisms of their symbolic structurebeing over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy thinking - see E, if the analyst is to direct the treatment correctly171).

Psychoanalytic [[treatment]] is based on the symbolic order, which transcends the opposition between affect and intellect.  On the one hand, psychoanalytic experience 'is not that of an affective smoochy-woochy' (Sl, 55).  On the other hand, nor is psychoanalytic treatment an intellectual affair; 'we are not dealing here with an intellectual dimension' (Sl, 274).  The Lacanian psychoanalyst must thus be aware of the ways in which both 'affective smoochy-woochy' and intellectualisation can be resistances to analysis, imaginary lures of the ego.  [[Anxiety]] is the only [[affect]] that is not deceptive. [[Lacan]] is opposed to those [[analyst]]s who have taken the affective realm as primary, for the affective is not a separate realm opposed to the intellectual. 'The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a mythical beyond of the production of the symbol which would precede the discursive formulation' (Sl, 57).  However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of affect, pointing to the fact that a whole year of the seminar is dedicated precisely to discussing anxiety (Lacan, 1973a: 38). [[Lacan]] does not propose a general theory of affects, but only touches on them insofar as they impinge on psychoanalytic treatment.  He insists on the relationship of affect to the symbolic order; affect means that the subject is affected by his relation with the Other.  He argues that affects are not signifiers but signals (S7, 102-3), and emphasises Freud's position that repression does not bear upon the affect (which can only be transformed or displaced) but upon the ideational representative (which is, in Lacan's terms, the signifier) (Ec, 714). Lacan's comments on the concept of affect have important implications in clinical practice.  Firstly, all the concepts in [[psychoanalysis]] which have traditionally been conceived in terms of [[affect]]s, such as the [[transference]], must be rethought in terms of their [[symbolic]] [[structure]], if the [[analyst]] is to direct the [[treatment]] correctly. Secondly, the affects [[affect]]s are lures [[lure]]s which can deceive the [[analyst]], and hence the [[analyst ]] must be wary of being tricked by his own affects[[affect]]s.  This does not mean that the analyst must disregard his own feelings for the patient, but simply that he must know how to make adequate use of them (see COUNTERTRANSFERENCE).