==dictionary==
Sigmund Freud's notion of truth evolved from a factual conception into a relativistic method where the true and the false are defined both in relation to a conventional and bounded space (that of the cure) and the dynamic effects that "plausible" constructions might have on the psyche. Truth as an objective no longer remains "the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis" (1914g, pp. 147, 150). It inclines towards the notion of reality testing that demands that the subject partially abandon their illusions. Truth as an ideal is inseparable from psychoanalytic inquiry and is unattainable, except partially in the "nuclei" of truth present within individual and collective distortions.
The search for factors that cause psychic suffering can be confused with the search for truth inasmuch as they are both repressed, misrepresented, displaced, represented by their opposite, and the like. Initially Freud imagined rediscovering the traumatic events in the histories of his patients themselves, but promptly noticing "that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between the truth and fiction that is cathected with affect" (letter to Wilhelm Fleiss, 21 September 1897), he ended up privileging the psychical reality of the subject, wherein a dynamic verisimilitude was elaborated which would take on the value of truth. This relativization of truth seems to coincide with a Pirandellian conception of it (Each in His Own Way). In fact, truth as a value has not disappeared from the Freudian purview but it has become subtler. Thus interpretation is not about the exhumation of truth but rather construction through the adoption of a coherent paradigm (Viderman, 1970), originating from the unperceived formulations of the subject's free associations or dreams.
Thus for Jacques Lacan, truth extricates itself from reality: "In psychoanalytic anamnesis, it is not a question of reality, but of truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come" (1956, p. 48). Truth is not precisely being true to reality, rather it speaks and stutters through its symptomatic distortions.
The analyst has to engage with these "nuclei" of truth, then; Freud, for instance, defined them in relation to the sexual theories of children, which despite being untrue nonetheless each contain "a fragment of real truth" [[Truth]] (1908c, p. 215[[French]]:''vérité''). This is an adult, intellectual mode one of investigation whose results, because they are limited to the possibilities of human understandingmost central, would have been false and yet most complex terms in relation to a broader perspective, but which include nevertheless "inspired" partial but significant interpretations[[Lacan]]'s discourse.
The quest for truth proceeds from a "truth fantasy" (Mijolla-Mellor, 1985), which relates to an image [[aim]] of lost harmony (transparency, luminosity) within the I, the others, and one's self. Truth, in terms of the demand for truthfulness, [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is central to lead the fundamental rule that requires the abandonment of secrecy; however, it also guides the behavior of the analyst in their relationship with the patient, in their vision of the world, and in their research, requiring them [[analysand]] to relinquish personal illusions for articulate the construction [[truth]] of a coherent schema. Challenging illusion and narcissistic comfort, truth, according to Freud, is a force in its own right: "The hardest truths are heard and recognized at last, after the interests they have injured and the emotions they have roused have exhausted their fury" (1910d, p. 215)his or her [[desire]].
Piera Aulagnier gives truth a central place [[Truth]] does not await, in relation some preformed state of fullness, to be revealed to the identity of [[analysand]] by the [[analyst]]; on the subject. It contrary, it is gradually constructed in the object [[dialectic]]al movement of a "battle never definitively won nor lost to which periodically the I must surrender in order to modify and defend its positions, failing which it would be unable to turn towards or invest in its own identificatory space" (1984, [[treatment]] itself.<ref>{{Ec}} p. 147).144</ref>
The notion of truth [[Lacan]] argues, in psychoanalysis is tied opposition to the history the subjecttraditions of classical [[philosophy]], in the same way as it is to humanity, because it that [[truth]] is not simply a case of a balance between understanding [[beautiful]]<ref>{{S7}} p.217</ref> and the thing, but of a narrative that it is reconstructed using not necessarily beneficial to learn the residues left behind by legend[[truth]].<ref>{{Sl7}} p.122</ref>
[[Lacan]] speaks about '[[truth]]' in the singular, not as a single [[universal]] [[truth]], but as [[particular]] [[truth]], unique to each [[subject]].<ref>{{S7}} p.24</ref>
==definitionTruth versus exactitude==Sigmund FreudExactitude is a question of 's notion of truth evolved from a factual conception introducing measurement into a relativistic method where the true and the false are defined both in relation to a conventional and bounded space (that of the cure) and the dynamic effects that "plausible" constructions might have on the psyche. Truth as an objective no longer remains "the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis" (1914g, ppreal'. 147, 150)<ref>{{E}} p. It inclines towards 74</ref> and constitutes the notion aim of reality testing that demands that the subject partially abandon their illusions. Truth as an ideal is inseparable from psychoanalytic inquiry and is unattainable, except partially in the "nuclei" of truth present within individual and collective distortionsexact [[science]]s.
The search for factors that cause psychic suffering can be confused with the search for truth inasmuch as they are both repressed, misrepresented[[Truth]], displacedhowever, represented by their opposite, and the like. Initially Freud imagined rediscovering the traumatic events in the histories of his patients themselvesconcerns [[desire]], but promptly noticing "that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between the truth and fiction that is cathected with affect" (letter to Wilhelm Fleiss, 21 September 1897), he ended up privileging the psychical reality of the subject, wherein a dynamic verisimilitude was elaborated which would take on the value of truth. This relativization of truth seems to coincide with a Pirandellian conception of it (Each in His Own Way). In fact, truth as a value has not disappeared from the Freudian purview but it has become subtler. Thus interpretation is not about a matter for the exhumation of truth exact [[science]]s but rather construction through for the adoption [[science]]s of a coherent paradigm (Viderman, 1970), originating from the unperceived formulations of the subject's free associations or dreams[[subjectivity]].
Thus for Jacques Lacan, Therefore [[truth extricates itself from reality]] is only a meaningful concept in the context of [[language]]: "In psychoanalytic anamnesis, it It is not a question of reality, but of truth, because with the effect appearance of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them language that the sense dimension of necessities to cometruth emerges." (1956, <ref>{{E}} p. 48). Truth is not precisely being true to reality, rather it speaks and stutters through its symptomatic distortions.172</ref>
The analyst has to engage with these "nuclei" of truth, then; Freud, for instance, defined them in relation to [[Psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is based on the sexual theories of children, which despite being untrue nonetheless each contain "a fragment of real truth" (1908c, p. 215). This fundamental premise that [[speech]] is an adult, intellectual mode the only means of investigation whose results, because they are limited to revealing the possibilities of human understanding, would have been false in relation to a broader perspective, but which include nevertheless "inspired" partial but significant interpretations[[truth]] about [[desire]].
The quest for truth proceeds from a "truth fantasy" (Mijolla-Mellor, 1985), which relates to an image of lost harmony (transparency, luminosity) within the I, the others, and one's self. Truth, in terms of hollows its way into the demand for truthfulness, is central real thanks to the fundamental rule that requires the abandonment dimension of secrecy; however, it also guides the behavior of the analyst in their relationship with the patient, in their vision of the world, and in their research, requiring them speech. There is neither true nor false prior to relinquish personal illusions for the construction of a coherent schemaspeech. Challenging illusion and narcissistic comfort, truth, according to Freud, is a force in its own right: "The hardest truths are heard and recognized at last, after the interests they have injured and the emotions they have roused have exhausted their fury" (1910d, <ref>{{Sl}} p. 215).228</ref>
Piera Aulagnier gives truth a central place in relation to the identity of the subject. It is the object of a "battle never definitively won nor lost to which periodically the I must surrender in order to modify and defend its positions, failing which it would be unable to turn towards or invest in its own identificatory space" (1984, p. 147).
The notion of ==Truth and [[Science]]==From [[Lacan]]'s earliest writings, the term '[[truth in psychoanalysis is tied to the history the subject]]' has metaphysical, even mystical, in the same way as it is nuances which problematise any attempt to humanity, because it is not simply a case of a balance between understanding articulate [[truth]] and the thing, but of a narrative that is reconstructed using the residues left behind by legend[[science]].
ALAIN DE MIJOLLABibliographyIt is not that [[Lacan]] denies that [[science]] aims to know the [[truth]], but simply that [[science]] cannot claim to monopolise [[truth]] as its exclusive property.<ref>{{Ec}} p.79</ref>
* Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). L'Apprenti-historien et le maîtresorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. * ——. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and working-through (Further recommendations [[Lacan]] later argues that [[science]] is in fact based on the technique a [[foreclosure]] of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. * Freud, Sigmund. (1908c). On the sexual theories concept of children. SE, 9: 205-226. * ——. 1910d). The future prospects of psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 11: 139-151. * ——. (1950a [1887-1902[truth]] as [[cause]]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. * Lacan, Jacques. (1989). Ecrits: A Selection. (Alan Sheridan<ref>Ec, Trans.) 5th ed. London: Tavistock874</Routledge.ref>
Further ReadingThe concept of [[truth]] is essential for understanding [[madness]], and modern [[science]] renders [[madness]] meaningless by ignoring the concept of [[truth]].<ref>{{Ec}} p.153-4</ref>
* Reed, Gail S. (1995). Clinical truth and contemporary relativism: Meaning, narration. Journal of the American Psycho-Analytic Association, 43, 713-740.
* Sass, L. A., and Woolfolk, R. L. (1988). Psychoanalysis and the hermeneutic turn: On "Narrative truth." Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36, 429-454.
* Schafer, Roy. (1992). Retelling a life. In Narration and dialogue in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.
* Spence, Donald. (1982). Narrative truth and historical truth. Meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
* Spezzano, Charles. (1993). A relational model of inquiry and truth: Conversation. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 3, 177-208.
==Truth, lies and deception==
[[Truth]] is intimately connected with [[deception]], since lies can often reveal the [[truth]] about [[desire]] more eloquently than honest statements.
[[Deception]] and lies are not the opposite of [[truth]]: on the contrary, they are inscribed in the text of [[truth]].
==new==The [[analyst]]'s role is to reveal the [[truth]] inscribed in the [[deception]] of the [[analysand]]'s [[speech]].
63Although the [[analysand]] may in effect be saying to the [[analyst]] "I am deceiving you," the [[analyst]] says to the [[analysand]] "In this I am deceiving to you, what you are sending as message is what I express to you, and in doing so you are telling the truth.<ref>{{S11}} p.139-540; {{S4}} p.107-8)</ref> ==Truth versus false appearances==The false [[appearance]]s presented by the [[analysand]] are not merely obstacles that the [[analyst]] must expose and discard in order to discover the [[truth]]; on the contrary, 141-3 Conversationsthe [[analyst]] must take them into account (see [[semblance]]).
==Truth, error and mistakes==
[[Psychoanalysis]] has shown that the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is often revealed by mistakes (parapraxes).
Truth (''vérité'') is one of the most centralThe complex relations between [[truth]], mistakes, error and yet most complex terms [[deception]] are evoked by [[Lacan]] in Lacan's discourse. A few basic points are clear and constant a typically elusive phrase when he describes "the structuration of speech in Lacan's concept search of truth; truth always refers to truth about desire, " as "error taking flight in deception and the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to articulate this truthrecaptured by mistake."<ref>{{Sl}} p. 273</ref>
==Truth and fiction==[[Lacan]] does not await, use the term '[[fiction]]' in some preformed state the sense of fullness, to be revealed to the analysand by the analyst; on the contrary'a falsehood', it is gradually constructed but in the dialectical movement sense of the treatment itselfa [[scientific]] construct.<ref>Ec, 144{{S7}} p.12</ref>
Thus Lacan argues's term '[[fiction]]' corresponds to [[Freud]]'s term ''Konvention'', in opposition to the traditions of classical philosophyconvention, that truth is not beautiful<ref>S7, 217{{S11}} p.163</ref> and that it is not necessarily beneficial to learn the has more in common with [[truth]] than falsehood.<ref>Sl7, 122</ref>
While Indeed, [[Lacan always speaks about ']] states that [[truth' in the singular, this ]] is not [[structure]]d like a single universal truth, but an absolutely particular truth, unique to each subject[[fiction]].<ref>see S7, 24{{E}} 306; {{Ec}} 808</ref>
==Truth and the real==
The opposition which [[Lacan]] draws between [[truth]] and the [[real]] dates back to his pre-war writings,<ref>{{Ec}} p.75</ref> and is taken up at various points; "We are used to the real. The truth we repress."<ref>{{E}} p.169</ref>
However, beyond these few simple [[Lacan]] also points, out that [[truth]] is similar to the [[real]]; it is impossible to give a univocal definition of the way Lacan uses articulate the termwhole [[truth]], since it functions in multiple contexts simultaneouslyand "[p]recisely because of this impossibility, in opposition truth aspires to a wide variety of terrnsthe real. "<ref>Lacan, 1973a: 83</ref>
All that will be attempted here, therefore, is a general indication of some of the contexts in which it functions.
==Truth versus exactitudedefinition==Exactitude is Sigmund Freud's notion of truth evolved from a question factual conception into a relativistic method where the true and the false are defined both in relation to a conventional and bounded space (that of 'introducing measurement into the real',cure) and the dynamic effects that "plausible" constructions might have on the psyche. Truth as an objective no longer remains "the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis."<ref>E1914g, pp. 147, 74150</ref> and constitutes It inclines towards the aim notion of reality testing that demands that the exact sciencessubject partially abandon their illusions.
Truthas an ideal is inseparable from psychoanalytic inquiry and is unattainable, however, concerns desire, which is not a matter for the exact sciences but for except partially in the sciences "nuclei" of subjectivitytruth present within individual and collective distortions.
Therefore truth is only a meaningful concept in the context of language: 'It is The search for factors that cause psychic suffering can be confused with the appearance of language that search for truth inasmuch as they are both repressed, misrepresented, displaced, represented by their opposite, and the dimension of truth emergeslike.'<ref>E, 172</ref>
Psychoanalytic treatment is based on Initially Freud imagined rediscovering the traumatic events in the histories of his patients themselves, but promptly noticing "that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between the fundamental premise truth and fiction that speech is cathected with affect" (letter to Wilhelm Fleiss, 21 September 1897), he ended up privileging the only means psychical reality of revealing the subject, wherein a dynamic verisimilitude was elaborated which would take on the value of truth about desire.
'Truth hollows its way into the real thanks This relativization of truth seems to the dimension coincide with a Pirandellian conception of speech. There is neither true nor false prior to speechit (Each in His Own Way).'<ref>Sl, 228</ref>
In fact, truth as a value has not disappeared from the Freudian purview but it has become subtler.
==Truth and [[Science]]==From Lacan's earliest writings, Thus interpretation is not about the term 'exhumation of truth' has metaphysicalbut rather construction through the adoption of a coherent paradigm (Viderman, even mystical1970), nuances which problematise any attempt to articulate truth and scienceoriginating from the unperceived formulations of the subject's free associations or dreams.
It is not that Thus for Jacques Lacan denies that science aims to know the truth, but simply that science cannot claim to monopolise truth as its exclusive property.<ref>Ec, 79</ref> extricates itself from reality:
Lacan later argues that science "In psychoanalytic anamnesis, it is in fact based on not a foreclosure question of reality, but of truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the concept sense of truth as causenecessities to come."<ref>Ec1956, 874p. 48</ref>
The concept of truth Truth is essential for understanding madnessnot precisely being true to reality, rather it speaks and modern science renders madness meaningless by ignoring the concept of truthstutters through its symptomatic distortions.<ref>Ec, 153-4</ref>
==TruthThe analyst has to engage with these "nuclei" of truth, then; Freud, lies and deception==Truth is intimately connected with deceptionfor instance, since lies can often reveal defined them in relation to the sexual theories of children, which despite being untrue nonetheless each contain "a fragment of real truth about desire more eloquently than honest statements. "<ref>1908c, p. 215</ref>
Deception and lies are not the opposite This is an adult, intellectual mode of truth: on the contraryinvestigation whose results, because they are inscribed in limited to the text possibilities of truthhuman understanding, would have been false in relation to a broader perspective, but which include nevertheless "inspired" partial but significant interpretations.
The analyst's role is quest for truth proceeds from a "truth fantasy" (Mijolla-Mellor, 1985), which relates to reveal the truth inscribed in an image of lost harmony (transparency, luminosity) within the deception of I, the analysandothers, and one's speechself.
Although Truth, in terms of the analysand may in effect be saying demand for truthfulness, is central to the analyst 'I am deceiving you'fundamental rule that requires the abandonment of secrecy; however, it also guides the behavior of the analyst says to in their relationship with the analysand 'In this I am deceiving to youpatient, what you are sending as message is what I express to youin their vision of the world, and in doing so you are telling their research, requiring them to relinquish personal illusions for the truthconstruction of a coherent schema.<ref>(S11,139-40; see S4, 107-8)</ref>
Challenging illusion and narcissistic comfort, truth, according to Freud, is a force in its own right:
==Truth versus false appearances=="The false appearances presented by the analysand hardest truths are not merely obstacles that heard and recognized at last, after the analyst must expose interests they have injured and discard in order to discover the truth; on the contraryemotions they have roused have exhausted their fury."<ref>1910d, the analyst must take them into account (see [[semblance]])p.215</ref>
==Truth, error and mistakes==Psychoanalysis has shown that the Piera Aulagnier gives truthabout desire is often revealed by mistakes (parapraxes).<ref>see [[Act]]</ref> The complex relations between truth, mistakes, error and deception are evoked by Lacan a central place in a typically elusive phrase when he describes 'relation to the structuration identity of speech in search of truth' as 'error taking flight in deception and recaptured by mistakethe subject.'<ref>Sl, 273</ref>
==Truth and fiction==Lacan does not use It is the term 'fiction' in the sense object of 'a falsehood', but "battle never definitively won nor lost to which periodically the I must surrender in the sense of a scientific construct (Lacan takes his cue here from Bentham).<ref>see S7order to modify and defend its positions, 12</ref> Thus Lacan's term 'fiction' corresponds failing which it would be unable to Freud's term Konvention, convention,<ref>see S11, 163</ref> and has more turn towards or invest in common with truth than falsehood. Indeed, Lacan states that truth is structured like a fictionits own identificatory space."<ref>E1984, 306; Ec, 808p. 147</ref>
==Truth and the real==The opposition which Lacan draws between notion of truth and the real dates back to his pre-war writings,<ref>e.g. Ec, 75</ref> and in psychoanalysis is taken up at various points; 'We are used tied to the real. The truth we repress.'<ref>E, 169</ref>Howeverhistory the subject, Lacan also points out that truth is similar to in the real; same way as it is impossible to articulate the whole truthhumanity, and '[p]recisely because it is not simply a case of this impossibilitya balance between understanding and the thing, truth aspires to but of a narrative that is reconstructed using the realresidues left behind by legend.'<ref>Lacan, 1973a: 83</ref>
==See Also==
# ——. (1950a [1887-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280.
# Lacan, Jacques. (1989). Ecrits: A Selection. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.) 5th ed. London: Tavistock/Routledge.
63-5, 141-3 Conversations
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