Changes

For [[Lacan]], however, the opposition between the [[affective ]] and the [[intellectual ]] is not valid in the psychoanalytic field.

Thus, in response to those who accuse [[Lacan ]] of being over-[[intellectual ]] and of neglecting the role of [[affect]], it can be pointed out that this [[criticism ]] is based on what [[Lacan ]] saw as a false opposition (Lacan also argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy thinking - see E,171).

Psychoanalytic ([[treatmentLacan]] is based on the symbolic order, which transcends the opposition between affect and intellectalso argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy thinking. <ref>{{E}} p.171</ref>

On [[Psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is based on the one hand[[symbolic]] [[order]], psychoanalytic experience 'is not that of an affective smoochy-woochy' (Sl, 55)which transcends the opposition between [[affect]] and [[intellect]].

On the other one hand, nor is [[psychoanalytic treatment an intellectual affair; ]] experience 'we are is not dealing here with that of an intellectual dimensionaffective smoochy-woochy' (Sl, 27455).

On the other hand, nor is [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] an intellectual affair; 'we are not dealing here with an intellectual dimension' (Sl, 274).  The Lacanian [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalyst ]] must thus be aware of the ways in which both 'affective smoochy-woochy' and intellectualisation can be resistances [[resistance]]s to [[analysis]], [[imaginary lures ]] [[lure]]s of the [[ego]].

[[Lacan]] is opposed to those [[analyst]]s who have taken the affective [[affect]]ive realm as primary, for the affective [[affect]]ive is not a separate realm opposed to the [[intellectual]].

'The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a mythical beyond of the production of the symbol which would precede the discursive formulation.' (<ref>Sl, 57). </ref>

However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of [[affect]], pointing to the fact that a whole year of the [[seminar ]] is dedicated precisely to discussing [[anxiety ]] (Lacan, 1973a: 38).

He insists on the relationship of [[affect ]] to the [[symbolic ]] [[order]]; [[affect ]] means that the [[subject ]] is affected by his relation with the [[Other]].

He argues that affects [[affect]]s are not signifiers [[signifier]]s but signals [[signal]]s (S7, 102-3), and emphasises [[Freud]]'s position that [[repression ]] does not bear upon the [[affect ]] (which can only be transformed or [[displacement|displaced]]) but upon the ideational representative (which is, in [[Lacan]]'s terms, the [[signifier]]) (Ec, 714).

[[Lacan]]'s comments on the concept of [[affect ]] have important implications in [[clinical ]] [[practice]].

This does not mean that the [[analyst ]] must disregard his own feelings for the [[patient]], but simply that he must know how to make adequate use of them (see COUNTERTRANSFERENCE).

Finally, it follows that the aim of [[psychoanalytic ]] [[treatment ]] is not the reliving of [[past ]] experiences, nor the [[abreaction ]] of [[affect]], but the articulation in [[speech ]] of the [[truth ]] about [[desire]].

Another term in [[Lacan]]'s [[discourse]], related to but distinct from '[[affect]]', is the term '[[passion]]'. Lacan speaks of the 'three fundamental passions': love, hate and ignorance (Sl, 271); this is a reference to Buddhist thought (E, 94).

[[Lacan]] speaks of the 'three fundamental passions': [[love]], [[hate]] and [[ignorance]] (Sl, 271); this is a reference to [[Buddhist]] thought (E, 94). These passions [[passion]]s are not [[imaginary ]] phenomena, but located at the junctions between the three orders[[order]]s.

Loan-word borrowed from the [[German ]] ''Affekt''.  In nineteenth-century [[psychology ]] the term is synonymous with [[emotion ]] or [[excitement]].  Borrowing from that tradition, [[psychoanalysis]] defines [[afect ]] as a quantity of [[psychic ]] [[energy ]] or a sum of [[excitation ]] accompanying events that take place in the [[life ]] of the [[psyche]].  [[Affect ]] is not a direct emotional [[emotion]]al [[representation ]] of an [[event]], but a [[trace ]] or residue that is aroused or reactivated through the [[repetition ]] of that [[event ]] of by some equivalent to it.  Like [[libido]], [[affect ]] is quantifiable and both [[drives]] and iamges [[image]]s are therefore said to have a quota of affect. In [[Freud]]'s earliest theory of [[hysteria]] (the so-called [[seduction thoery]]), the blocking of the [[affect]] correspodning to a [[trauma]]tic [[event]] has a causal role; because it cannot be expressed or discharged in [[word]]s, it takes the form of a [[somatic]] [[symptom]].  In his later writings [[Freud]] consistently makes a distinction between [[affect]] and [[representation]]s, which may be either [[verbal]] or [[visual]].  The [[verbalization]] of the [[talking cure]] thus becomes an intellectualized way of [[discharging]] [[affect]]s relating to [[childhood]] [[experience]]s.

In [[Freud]]'s earliest theory One of [[hysteria]] (the so-called [[seduction thoerycriticism]]), the blocking of the affect correspodning to a traumatic event has a causal role; because it cannot be expressed or discharged in words, it takes the form of a somatic symptom. In his later writings Freud consistently makes a distinction between affect and representations, which may be either verbal or visual. The verbalization of the [[talking cure]] thus becomes an intellectualized way of discharging affects relating to childhood experiences.One of the criticisms s levelled at [[Lacan]] by certain of his fellow psychoanalysts (for examle Green 1977) [[psychoanalyst]]s is that he tends to pay little attention to [[affect]].