End of analysis

end of analysis (fin d'analyse)

In 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', Freud discusses the question of whether it is ever possible to conclude an analysis, or whether all analyses are necessarily incomplete

(Freud, 1937c). Lacan's answer to this question is that it is indeed possible

  to speak of concluding      an analysis. Although not all analyses are carried

through to their conclusion, analytic treatment is a logical process which has

  an end, and Lacan designates this end-point by the term 'end of analysis'.

      Given that many analyses      are broken off before the end of analysis is

reached, the question arises as to whether such analyses can be considered

  succesful or not. To answer this question it is necessary to distinguish between

  the end of analysis and the aim of psychoanalytic treatment. The aim of

psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to articulate the truth about

  his desire. Any analysis, however incomplete, may be regarded as successful

   when it achieves this aim. The question of the end of analysis is therefore

something more than whether a course of analytic treatment has or has not

   achieved its aim; it is a question of whether or not the treatment has reached its

logical end-point.

      Lacan conceives of this end-point in various ways.

      l. In the early 1950s, the end of analysis is described as 'the advent of a true

speech and the realisation by the subject of his history' (E, 88) (see SPEECH).

'The subject . . . begins the analysis by speaking about himself without

speaking to you, or by speaking to you without speaking about himself.

When he can speak to you about himself, the analysis will be over' (Ec,

373, n. 1). The end of analysis is also described as coming to terms with

one's own mortality (E, 104-5).

     2. In 1960, Lacan describes the end of analysis as a state of anxiety and

abandonment, and compares it to the HELPLESSNEss of the human infant.

     3. In 1964 he describes it as the point when the analysand has 'traversed the

radical fantasy' (Sll, 273) (see FANTASY).

     4. In the last decade of his teaching, he describes the end of analysis as

'identification with the sinthome', and as 'knowing what to do with the

sinthome' (see SINTHOME).

     Common to all these formulations is the idea that the end of analysis

involves a change in the subjective position of the analysand (the analysand's

'subjective destitution'), and a corresponding change in the position of the

analyst (the loss of being [Fr. dÈsÍtre] of the analyst, the fall of the analyst

from the position of the subject-supposed-to-know). At the end of the analysis,

the analyst is reduced to a mere surplus, a pure objet petit a, the cause of the

analysand's desire.

     Since Lacan argues that all psychoanalysts should have experienced the

process of analytic treatment from beginning to end, the end of analysis is

also the passage from analysand to analyst. 'The true termination of an

analysis' is therefore no more and no less than that which 'prepares you to

become an analyst' (S7, 303).

     In 1967, Lacan introduced the procedure of the PAss as a means of testifying

  to the end of one's analysis. By means of this procedure, Lacan hoped to avoid

the dangers of regarding the end of analysis as a quasi-mystical, ineffable

experience. Such a view is antithetical to psychoanalysis, which is all about

putting things into words.

     Lacan criticises those psychoanalysts who have seen the end of analysis in

  terms of identification with the analyst. In opposition to this view of psycho-

analysis, Lacan states that the 'crossing of the plane of identification is

possible' (Sll, 273). Not only is it possible to go beyond identification, but

it is necessary, for otherwise it is not psychoanalysis but suggestion, which is

the antithesis of psychoanalysis; 'the fundamental mainspring of the analytic

operation is the maintenance of the distance between the I - identification -

and the a' (S11, 273).

     Lacan also rejects the idea that the end of analysis involves the 'liquidation'

of the transference (see S11, 267). The idea that the transference can be

'liquidated' is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the transference,

according to which the transference is viewed as a kind of illusion which can

be transcended. Such a view is erroneous because it entirely overlooks the

symbolic nature of the transference; transference is part of the essential

  structure of speech. Although analytic treatment involves the resolution of

the particular transference relationship established with the analyst, transfer-

  ence itself still subsists after the end of analysis.

     Other misconceptions of the end of analysis which Lacan rejects               are:

'strengthening the ego', 'adaptation to reality' and 'happiness'. The end of

analysis is not the disappearance of the symptom, nor the cure of an underlying

disease (e.g. neurosis), since analysis is not essentially a therapeutic process

but a search for truth, and the truth is not always beneficial (Sl7, 122).

== def ==

Lacan conceives of this end-point in various ways.

1. In the early 1950s, the end of anlaysis is described as "the advent of a true speech and the realization by the subject of his history."(See Speech)

"The subject ... begins the analysis by speaking about himslef without speaking to you, or by speaking to you without speaking about himself. When he can speak to you about himself, the analysis will be over."

The end of analysis is also described as coming to terms with one's own mortality.

2. In 1960 Lacan describes the end of analysis as a state of anxiety and abandonment, and copares it to the helplessness of the human infant.

3. In 1964 he describes it as the point when the analysand has "traversed the radical fantasy." (See Fantasy)

4. In the last decade of his teaching, he describes the end of analysis as "identification with the sinthome, and as "knowing what to do with the sinthome'. (See Sinthome)

Common to all these formulations is the idea that the end of analysis involves a change in the subjective position of the analysand (the analysand's "subjective destitution"), and a corresponding change in the position of the analyst (the loss of being [Fr. désêtre] of the analyst, the fall of the analyst from the position of the subect-supposed-to-know).

at the end of the analysis, the analyst is reduced to a mere surplus, a pure objet petit a, the cause of the analysand's desire.

Since Lacan argues that all psychoanalysts should have experienced the process of analytic treatment form beginning to end, the end of analysis is also the passage from analysand to analyst.

'the true termination of an analysis" is therefore no more and no less than that which "prepares you to become ann analyst."

In 1967 Lacan introduced the procedure of the Pass as a means of testifying to the end of one's analysis.

By means of this procedure, Lacan hoped to avoid the dangers of regarding the end of analysis as a quasi-mystical, ineffable experience.

Such a view is antithetical to psychoanalysi, which is all about putting things into words.

Lacan criticizes those psychoanalysts who have seen the end of analysis in terms of identification with the analyst.

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