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{{Topp}}loi{{Bottom}}==dictionaryJacques Lacan=====Social Relations===[[Lacan]]'s discussions of the "[[Law]]" (which [[Lacan]] often writes with a [[capital]] "L") owe much to the [[work]] of [[Claude Lévi-Strauss]]. As in the work of [[Lévi-Strauss]], the [[Law]] in [[Lacan]]'s work refers not to a [[particular]] piece of legislation, but to ''the fundamental principles which underlie all [[social]] relations''. The [[law]] is the set of [[universal]] principles which make social [[existence]] possible, ''the [[structure]]s that govern all forms of [[anthropology|social exchange]]'', whether [[anthropology|gift-giving]], [[anthropology|kinship relations]] or the [[formation]] of pacts.

While psychoanalysis focuses on =====Symbolic Order=====Since the individual subjectmost basic [[form]] of [[anthropology|exchange]] is [[communication]] itself, the [[law refers to ]] is fundamentally a [[linguistic]] entity -- it is the collection [[law]] of guidelines for behavior directed at all members the [[signifier]]:<blockquote>This law, then, is revealed clearly enough as identical with an [[order]] of society[[language]]. There are challenges therefore in establishing a dialogue between two disciplines whose objectives and challenges are so far apart. Yet For without kinship nominations, no [[power]] is capable of instituting the necessity order of psychoanalysis engaging with preferences and taboos that [[bind]] and weave the human leads to its involvement with the foundations yarn of societal valueslineage through succeeding generations. It cannot therefore avoid taking an interest <ref>{{E}} p. 66</ref></blockquote>This [[legal]]-[[linguistic]] [[structure]] is in fact no more and no less than the law, which means it must ask the same questions differently. Moreover, the discovery of a Freud who expresses himself like a lawyer justifies a new interpretation of some of his writings[[symbolic order]] itself.

Although Freud ===Human===Following [[Lévi-Strauss]], [[Lacan]] argues that the [[law]] is essentially [[human]]; it is the [[law]] which separates [[man]] from time to time took an interest in aspects of the legal process (1906c[[other]] [[nature|animal]]s, by regulating [[sexual relationship|sexual relations]] that are, 1916damong [[nature|animal]]s, 1931dunregulated: <blockquote>"([[Human]] [[law]] is), he never tried to explain the possible interactions between law and psychoanalysisprimordial Law... Nonetheless, which in regulating [[marriage]] ties superimposes the questions kingdom of guilt and crime—primarily through the oedipal murder [[culture]] on that of the father and incest—are presented in a way that is so fundamental [[nature]] abandoned to his work that the confrontation law of the two disciplines becomes inevitable, crime—even though perpetrated by the unconscious—leading to trialmating. The prohibition of incest is merely its [[subjective]] pivot."<ref>{{E}} p.66</ref></blockquote>

=====Oedipus Complex=====It was when he abandoned a legal career to turn his attention to science that Freud, is the [[father]] who imposes this [[law]] on the [[subject]] in a letter to his friend Emil Fluss on May 1, 1873 the [[Oedipus complex]]; the [[Name-of-the-Father|paternal agency]] (1925dor [[Name-of-the-Father|paternal function]]), used is no more than the word Prozess (trial) [[name]] for this prohibitive and legislative [[role]]. In the first second [[time. Rather than getting involved in real trials ]] of the [[Oedipus complex]] the [[Prozessefather], he will study ] appears as the omnipotent "millennial cases father of naturethe [[primal]] [[horde]]" so he can bear witness to its "eternal trialsof ''[[Totem and Taboo]]''." The use <ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of this legal term Sigmund Freud|Totem and Taboo]]'', 1912-13. [[SE]] XIII, 1-161.</ref> This is the lawgiver who is not an isolated occurrence included in his own [[law]] because he ''is'' the Freudian corpus. The frequency and occurrence of its use justify seeing it as a kind of fetish word[[Law]], a wink at his youthful wish denying [[others]] access to become a lawyer. He went so far as the [[women]] of the tribe while he himself has access to talk about a "psychic trial" (1905d)[[them]] all. The focus, in In the Freudian corpus, on [[third]] time of the use of a specifically legal vocabulary (conflict [Konflikt[Oedipus complex], defense ] the [[Abwehrfather], conviction ] is included in his own [[Verurteilung or Urteilsverwerfunglaw]], punishment the [Stafbedürfnis[law]) demonstrates that the intersection of the two disciplines was not accidental] is revealed as a pact rather than an imperative.

If =====Regulation of Desire=====The [[Oedipus complex]] represents the psychic apparatus needs to organize a system regulation of defense and condemnation, it is because unconscious guilt engages [[desire]] by the subject in a continuous trial[[law]]. The operation of It is the psyche demonstrates concrete links with that [[law]] of the legal process once [[pleasure principle]], which commands the question of guilt is introduced. The appearance in Freud's work of references [[subject]] to a legal vocabulary, "[[Enjoy]] as well little as to functions that are part of legal workspossible!", can be seen clearly from an examination of and thus maintains the multiple roles attributed by the founder of psychoanalysis to the "agency" of the superego. We find that the image he presents is that of [[subject]] at a court that will entirely assume safe distance from the burden of all legal responsibilities[[Thing]]. The Freudian superego assumes [[relationship]] between the responsibility of legislator[[law]] and [[desire]] is, judgehowever, supreme court, attorney (for a [[dialectic]]al one; "desire is the id), public prosecutor, and even grief counselor. It also sometimes serves as a vigilante. Freud shows himself to be a skilled proceduralist by identifying reverse of the putative fatherhood referred to by lawyers (Pater incertus est law. "<ref>{{Ec}} p. .) and787</ref> If, when he points out on the "progress of civilization" that characterizes the "transition from mother to father" (1909done hand, 1939a [1934-1938[law]] imposes limits on [[desire]]), he borrows the specific vocabulary of it is also [[true]] that the [[law of evidence. The legal context ]] creates [[desire]] in his work is supported the first [[place]] by the explicit reference to Aeschylus's Oresteiacreating interdiction. It appears that [[Desire]] is essentially the reference [[desire]] to legal institutions [[transgress]], and for there to understand and attempt be [[transgression]] it is first necesary for there to resolve interior conflict does not exhaust the vision of Freud as jurist shown by his workbe [[prohibition]].<ref>{{S7}} p. But 83-4</ref> Thus it is with reference to not the murder of [[case]] that there is a pregiven [[desire]] which the father [[law]] then regulates, but that [[desire]] is [[born]] out of the field [[process]] of interaction regulation.<blockquote>"What we see here is the tight bond between law desire and psychoanalysis is the most fecundLaw."<ref>{{S7}} p.177</ref></blockquote>

Aside from <!-- =====[[Murder]] of the opportunities presented by Father===== --><!-- If the presence of a Freudian legal vocabulary[[law]] is closely connected to the [[father]], although frequently hidden by translations that systematically "delegalize" his languagethis is not only because the [[father]] is one who imposes the [[law]], but also because the fact that [[law]] is born out of the legal functions attributed by Freud to murder of the mental apparatus are visibly inspired by those attributed to the participants [[father]]. This is clearly illustrated in the Last Judgment enables us to hypothesize a possible scriptural origin to his legal conception [[myth]] of mental agencies—especially the superego—when he evokes the "judicial activity [[father]] of the moral conscience" (1933a [1932[primal horde]]). Another facet of which [[Freud]] recounts in 's work is revealed by his knowledge of Pauline thought '[[Totem andTaboo]]''. In this [[myth]], more generallythe murder of the [[father]], of far from freeing the sons from the Bible[[law]], only reinforces the book in [[law]] which Sigmund was taught to read by his father[[prohibit]]s [[incest]].-->

==definitionReferences ==Zižek is concerned to show the secret transgression that underpins and makes possible the symbolic law<div style="font-size: '11px" class="At the beginningreferences-small" of law, there is a transgression, a certain reality of violence, which coincides with the very act of the establishment of law' (p. 129). Or, as he will say> about the seemingly illicit rituals that appear to overturn the law: They<references/> are a satire on legal institutions. an inversion of public Power, yet</div>

they are a transgression that consolidates what it transgresses" (p. 264).[[Category:Psychoanalysis]] But, beyond this, the law itself possesses a certain obscene, unap-[[Category:Jacques Lacan]]peasable, superegoic dimension[[Category: "On the one hand, there is Law quaLinguistics]]symbolic Ego-Ideal. that is, Law in its pacifying function ... qua the[[Category:Dictionary]]intermediary Third that dissolves the impasse of imaginary aggressiv-[[Category:Language]]ity. On the other hand, there is law in its superego dimension, that is,[[Category:Symbolic]] law qua "irrational" pressure, the force of culpability, totally incom-[[Category:Concepts]] mensurable with our actual responsibility' (p. 157). In other words, law itself is its own transgression, and it is just this circularity that Žižek seeks to dissolve or overcome. As he says, repeating at once theproblem and the solution[[Category: 'The most appropriate form to indicate this curve of the point de capiton, of the "negation of negation," in ordinaryTerms]]language is, paradoxically, that of the tautology[[Category: "law is law"' (p. 127).OK]]

 ==def==In Lacan’s theory of childhood development, the traumatic moment of entry into the symbolic is not simply a spontaneous act on the part of the infant. It is also the originary advent of the law as an effect of the father’s interdiction. In the infant’s experience of his mother’s body as a site of enjoyment (producing warmth, food, comfort, etc.), he or she perceives this enjoyment as an integral part of the order of things as they are ambiguously organised through imaginary identifications. At some point, however, the infant becomes aware of the fact that the father has some degree of precedence over the infant’s right to enjoy the mother. Classically termed the Oedipus complex, this moment is part and parcel of the infant’s entry into the symbolic order, as this apprehension of the father’s precedence is conveyed as an originary verbal prohibition of access to the mother’s body which forces the infant to devise a compensatory presence, the symbol of the absent mother (the "da!" of the Freudian fort/da binary). This inaugural paternal interdiction is thus essential to the symbolic order and makes of it the very fibre of the law itself: This law, then, is revealed clearly enough as identical with an order of language. For without kinship nominations, no power is capable of instituting the order of preferences and taboos that bind and weave the yarn of lineage through succeeding generations. And it is indeed the confusion of generations which, in the Bible as in all traditional laws, is accused as being the abomination of the Word (verbe) and the desolation of the sinner. (Ecrits 66) "This legal-linguistic structure is in fact no more and no less than the symbolic order itself" (Evans 99). Clearly drawing on structural anthropology and, more obscurely, on speech act theory, Lacan positions the law in its broadest sense as "the set of universal principles which make social existence possible, the structures that govern all forms of social exchange, whether gift-giving, kinship relations or the formation of pacts. Since the most basic form of exchange is communication itself, the law is fundamentally a linguistic entity – it is the law of the signifier" (Evans 98). Growing out of the paternal interdiction that puts an end to the infant’s unproblematic imaginary identification with the mother and inaugurates the rivalry between infant and father that grounds the Oedipus complex, the law is coextensive with the symbolic order to such an extent that neither is conceivable without the other. Insofar as the law is essentially a process for regulating social relations, the symbolic order must henceforth be conceived of as a profoundly intersubjective structure. Just as there can be no need for, or effectiveness of, the law in the absence of something to regulate, so there can be no signification in the absence of someone to whom to signify. That is, the law actually invents that which it regulates, creating a lack by masking the impossibility of the imaginary relation behind the symbolic prohibition: "the law creates desire in the first place by creating interdiction. Desire is essentially the desire to transgress, and for there to be transgression it is first necessary for there to be prohibition […] desire is born out of the process of regulation" (Evans 99). By the same process, the symbolic order actually invents the subject as an effect of itself, generating the subject position of the speaking individual at the same moment as that individual seeks to signify the absence of someone or something to which it has suddenly been barred access (or the impossibility of access to which he or she has suddenly been made aware). In this regard, the entry into the symbolic makes of all signification an intersubjective situation as the speaking subject necessarily orients itself in relation to that which it symbolises; to do so, it must hold a position within that symbolic network – it must in essence be a signifier. The infant’s entry into the symbolic is thus a traumatic event in which the original sense of integrity, wholeness, presence, and identification (associated with the primary narcissism of the imaginary order) is lost forever. Even the imaginary compensations of ego formation now recede from consciousness as the irremediable gap between the individual and that which it desires (the ideal-ego, the mother’s body, plenitude) comes to the fore as the organising principle of the totalising force of the symbolic order. The repetitive automatism of the signifying chain is thus a compensatory gesture, an obsessive attempt by the symbolic order (and the subjects who live in and by it) to cover over the lack/absence which organises it. The signifying chain must always remain in motion, doubling back on itself and deferring any presence of meaning as content, in order to forestall the terrifying confrontation with this originary and constitutive absence. In effect, the symbolic order achieves a sustained deferral of this confrontation, proffering alternative signifiers as provisional substitutive compensations for the irremediable lack created in its radical reorganisation of the world. An analogous and consistent way of conceiving this compensatory response to the trauma of entering the symbolic is to consider the occurrence of repetition compulsion in victims of trauma. By repeating an action that is an effect of a traumatic episode, the obsessive neurotic effectively symbolises the traumatic kernel that organises his or her symptoms without ever approaching the truth of the motivating traumatic episode. The repetitive actions of the trauma victim are comparable to the repetition compulsion built into the incessant play of signifiers in the signifying chain. Just as the trauma victim’s actions constitute a series of symptoms that represent effects of the traumatic episode without symbolising it, so the series of signifiers in the signifying chain represent the traumatic loss or absence around which the symbolic order is organised without ever being able to signify it directly.  ==supplement==__NOTOC__