Law
In psychoanalysis, the concept of Law refers to a fundamental symbolic function that structures subjectivity, desire, and social relations. Unlike juridical law or moral norms, psychoanalytic law does not designate a codified system of rules enforced externally. Rather, it names the symbolic operation through which limits are introduced, prohibitions are internalized, and desire is constituted.
The Law plays a central role in both Freudian and Lacanian theory. In Freud’s work, it is associated with the Oedipus complex, the incest taboo, and the formation of the superego. Lacan reformulated these ideas by conceptualizing the Law as a function of language and the Symbolic order, mediated by the Name-of-the-Father and the operation of castration. In psychoanalysis, the Law is not merely restrictive; it is productive, generating desire through the introduction of lack.
Law in Freudian Psychoanalysis
Freud introduced the problem of Law through his investigations of sexuality, kinship, and social organization. Although he did not define the Law as a distinct concept, it emerges implicitly in his account of the Oedipus complex and the prohibition of incest.
In Totem and Taboo (1912–1913), Freud proposed a speculative myth concerning the origin of social law. The collective murder of the primal father gives rise to guilt, leading to the establishment of prohibitions against incest and parricide[1]. Law thus emerges as an internalized effect of loss rather than an external command.
At the level of individual development, this logic is recapitulated in the Oedipus complex. The child’s desire for the parent of the opposite sex encounters a prohibition embodied by parental authority. Renunciation of this desire is the condition for entry into social and cultural life.
In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud formalized this internalization of law through the concept of the superego, which functions as an unconscious agency of prohibition, judgment, and self-observation[2]. The superego enforces the Law through guilt and anxiety, even in the absence of external authority.
Freud further linked law to repression and social renunciation in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), arguing that civilization requires the restriction of instinctual satisfaction, producing a permanent tension between individual desire and social order[3].
The Superego and Prohibition
In Freudian theory, the superego represents the internalized form of law. It originates through identification with parental authority and operates as an unconscious moral agency. Importantly, the superego is not purely rational or ethical; Freud emphasized its harsh and punitive character, which often exceeds external moral demands[2].
The superego’s function illustrates that psychoanalytic law cannot be reduced to conscious moral reasoning. Law operates unconsciously, shaping desire, guilt, and symptom formation. This insight prepared the ground for Lacan’s later distinction between Law and superego.
Lacan’s Concept of the Law
Jacques Lacan reformulated Freud’s insights by locating the Law within the Symbolic order. For Lacan, the Law is not a moral injunction but a symbolic function that introduces the subject into language and social relations.
Central to this reformulation is the concept of the Name-of-the-Father, the signifier that institutes the prohibition of incest and interrupts the imaginary dyad between child and mother. Through this intervention, the subject is subjected to the Law of language and symbolic exchange[4].
This operation is inseparable from castration, understood symbolically as the introduction of lack. Castration marks the impossibility of complete satisfaction and thereby produces desire. Law, in this sense, does not simply prohibit enjoyment; it structures desire by instituting lack as fundamental to subjectivity.
Lacan sharply distinguished the Law from the superego. While the Law belongs to the Symbolic order, the superego functions as an excessive and often cruel agency. Lacan famously described the superego as issuing the paradoxical command to “enjoy,” highlighting its divergence from symbolic law.
Law, Desire, and Jouissance
In Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argued that desire is constituted through prohibition rather than suppressed by it[5]. The Law introduces lack, and desire is oriented toward what is forbidden.
Lacan further explored the paradoxical relation between Law and jouissance in his essay Kant with Sade, where he showed how adherence to moral law can converge with an imperative to enjoy beyond limits[6]. In this perspective, transgression is not opposed to Law but structurally produced by it.
Law and Clinical Structures
In Lacanian theory, the Law functions differently across the three principal clinical structures.
In neurosis, the Law is operative but conflicted. The subject accepts castration but experiences desire through repression, guilt, and symptom formation.
In perversion, the Law is disavowed. The perverse subject recognizes the Law but follows it literally, positioning themselves as the instrument of the Other’s jouissance.
In psychosis, the Law is foreclosed through the absence of the Name-of-the-Father, resulting in a collapse of symbolic mediation and the return of the Law in the Real[7].
These distinctions are structural rather than moral and do not correspond to normative judgments about behavior.
Law in the Analytic Situation
In psychoanalytic practice, the analyst does not embody the Law or function as a moral authority. Instead, the analytic setting establishes a symbolic framework—through free association, transference, and interpretation—that allows the subject’s desire to be articulated.
Lacan emphasized that analytic ethics consist not in enforcing norms but in maintaining fidelity to desire[8]. Interpretation aims to clarify the subject’s relation to the Law and its effects, rather than reinforcing superego demands.
Reception and Influence
The psychoanalytic concept of Law has influenced fields beyond clinical theory, including ethics, political theory, and cultural studies. Jacques-Alain Miller emphasized the distinction between Law and superego as central to Lacanian clinical orientation[9]. Joan Copjec and Paul Verhaeghe have explored its implications for contemporary subjectivity and authority[10][11].
See Also
References
- ↑ Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, trans. James Strachey, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 141–158.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, trans. James Strachey, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 34–49.
- ↑ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. James Strachey, New York: Norton, 1961, pp. 44–73.
- ↑ Jacques Lacan, *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink, New York: W. W. Norton, 2006, pp. 229–231.
- ↑ Jacques Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: Seminar VII*, trans. Dennis Porter, New York: W. W. Norton, 1997, pp. 83–86.
- ↑ Jacques Lacan, “Kant with Sade,” in *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Fink, New York: W. W. Norton, 2006, pp. 645–674.
- ↑ Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: Seminar XI*, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: W. W. Norton, 1998, pp. 67–71.
- ↑ Bruce Fink, *The Lacanian Subject*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 206–210.
- ↑ Jacques-Alain Miller, *Extimité*, Paris: Navarin, 1988, pp. 45–49.
- ↑ Joan Copjec, *Read My Desire*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994, pp. 201–210.
- ↑ Paul Verhaeghe, *On Being Normal and Other Disorders*, New York: Other Press, 2004, pp. 131–145.