Difference between revisions of "Reality Principle"
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| + | [[Real]]ity principle (principe de rÈalitÈ) According to Freud, the | ||
| + | psyche is at first regulated entirely by the PLEASURE PRINCIPLE, Which seeks to | ||
| + | experience satisfaction via a hallucinatory cathexis of a memory of prior | ||
| + | |||
| + | satisfaction. However, the subject soon discovers that hallucinating does not | ||
| + | |||
| + | relieve his needs, and is thus forced 'to form a conception of the [[Real]] | ||
| + | |||
| + | circumstances in the external world' (Freud, 1911b: SE XII, 219). A new | ||
| + | |||
| + | 'principle of mental functioning' is thus introduced (the '[[Real]]ity principle'), | ||
| + | |||
| + | which modifies the pleasure principle and forces the subject to take more | ||
| + | |||
| + | circuitous routes to satisfaction. Since, however, the ultimate aim of the | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Real]]ity principle is still the satisfaction of the drives, it can be said that 'the | ||
| + | |||
| + | substitution of the [[Real]]ity principle for the pleasure principle implies no | ||
| + | |||
| + | deposing of the pleasure principle, but only a safeguarding of it' (Freud, | ||
| + | |||
| + | 1911b: SE XII, 223). | ||
| + | |||
| + | From early on, Lacan is opposed to what he calls 'a naive conception of the | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Real]]ity principle' (1951b: ll). That is, he rejects any account of human | ||
| + | |||
| + | development based on an unproblematic notion of '[[Real]]ity' as an objective | ||
| + | |||
| + | and self-evident given. He emphasises Freud's position that the [[Real]]ity prin- | ||
| + | |||
| + | ciple is still ultimately in the service of the pleasure principle; 'the [[Real]]ity | ||
| + | |||
| + | principle is a delayed action pleasure principle' (S2, 60). Lacan thus chal- | ||
| + | |||
| + | lenges the idea that the subject has access to an infallible means of distinguish- | ||
| + | |||
| + | ing between [[Real]]ity and [[Fantasy]]. '[R]eality isn't just there so that we bump our | ||
| + | |||
| + | heads up against the false paths along which the functioning of the pleasure | ||
| + | |||
| + | principle leads us. In truth, we make [[Real]]ity out of pleasure' (S7, 225). | ||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | == def == | ||
Respectively, the desire for immediate gratification vs. the deferral of that gratification. Quite simply, the pleasure-principle drives one to seek pleasure and to avoid pain. However, as one grows up, one begins to learn the need sometimes to endure pain and to defer gratification because of the exigencies and obstacles of reality: "An ego thus educated has become 'reasonable'; it no longer lets itself be governed by the pleasure principle, but obeys the reality principle, which also at bottom seeks to obtain pleasure, but pleasure which is assured through taking account of reality, even though it is pleasure postponed and diminished" (Introductory Lectures 16.357). | Respectively, the desire for immediate gratification vs. the deferral of that gratification. Quite simply, the pleasure-principle drives one to seek pleasure and to avoid pain. However, as one grows up, one begins to learn the need sometimes to endure pain and to defer gratification because of the exigencies and obstacles of reality: "An ego thus educated has become 'reasonable'; it no longer lets itself be governed by the pleasure principle, but obeys the reality principle, which also at bottom seeks to obtain pleasure, but pleasure which is assured through taking account of reality, even though it is pleasure postponed and diminished" (Introductory Lectures 16.357). | ||
Revision as of 22:19, 27 April 2006
Reality principle (principe de rÈalitÈ) According to Freud, the
psyche is at first regulated entirely by the PLEASURE PRINCIPLE, Which seeks to
experience satisfaction via a hallucinatory cathexis of a memory of prior
satisfaction. However, the subject soon discovers that hallucinating does not
relieve his needs, and is thus forced 'to form a conception of the Real
circumstances in the external world' (Freud, 1911b: SE XII, 219). A new
'principle of mental functioning' is thus introduced (the 'Reality principle'),
which modifies the pleasure principle and forces the subject to take more
circuitous routes to satisfaction. Since, however, the ultimate aim of the
Reality principle is still the satisfaction of the drives, it can be said that 'the
substitution of the Reality principle for the pleasure principle implies no
deposing of the pleasure principle, but only a safeguarding of it' (Freud,
1911b: SE XII, 223).
From early on, Lacan is opposed to what he calls 'a naive conception of the
Reality principle' (1951b: ll). That is, he rejects any account of human
development based on an unproblematic notion of 'Reality' as an objective
and self-evident given. He emphasises Freud's position that the Reality prin-
ciple is still ultimately in the service of the pleasure principle; 'the Reality
principle is a delayed action pleasure principle' (S2, 60). Lacan thus chal-
lenges the idea that the subject has access to an infallible means of distinguish-
ing between Reality and Fantasy. '[R]eality isn't just there so that we bump our
heads up against the false paths along which the functioning of the pleasure
principle leads us. In truth, we make Reality out of pleasure' (S7, 225).
def
Respectively, the desire for immediate gratification vs. the deferral of that gratification. Quite simply, the pleasure-principle drives one to seek pleasure and to avoid pain. However, as one grows up, one begins to learn the need sometimes to endure pain and to defer gratification because of the exigencies and obstacles of reality: "An ego thus educated has become 'reasonable'; it no longer lets itself be governed by the pleasure principle, but obeys the reality principle, which also at bottom seeks to obtain pleasure, but pleasure which is assured through taking account of reality, even though it is pleasure postponed and diminished" (Introductory Lectures 16.357).
