Henri Bergson
| Henri Bergson | |
|---|---|
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Henri Bergson, c. 1927
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| Identity | |
| Lifespan | 1859–1941 |
| Nationality | French |
| Epistemic Position | |
| Tradition | Continental philosophy, Vitalism |
| Methodology | Philosophy of mind, Metaphysics, Epistemology |
| Fields | Philosophy, Psychology, Biology |
| Conceptual Payload | |
| Core Concepts | |
| Associated Concepts | Unconscious, Repetition, Symbolic, Imaginary, Real, Time, Subject |
| Key Works | Time and Free Will (1889), Matter and Memory (1896), Creative Evolution (1907), The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932) |
| Theoretical Cluster | Subjectivity, Temporality, Creativity |
| Psychoanalytic Relation | |
| Bergson’s theorization of duration and memory provided a framework for understanding psychic temporality and the non-linear structure of the unconscious. His distinction between lived time and spatialized time prefigured psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity, repetition, and trauma, and was explicitly engaged by Lacan in his seminars. | |
| To Lacan | Lacan cited Bergson’s concept of duration in discussions of the unconscious and temporality, notably in relation to the structure of the signifier and the logic of repetition. |
| To Freud | Freud’s work on memory and psychic time parallels Bergson’s distinction between mechanical and lived time, though there is no evidence of direct engagement. |
| Referenced By | |
| Lineage | |
| Influences | |
| Influenced | |
Henri Bergson (1859–1941) was a French philosopher whose innovative theories of time, memory, and creative evolution fundamentally reconfigured modern understandings of subjectivity and temporality. His conceptualization of duration (la durée), intuition, and the élan vital exerted a profound structural and mediated influence on psychoanalytic theory, especially in the work of Jacques Lacan, shaping debates on the unconscious, repetition, and the logic of psychic life.
Intellectual Context and Biography
Bergson’s philosophical project emerged at the intersection of late nineteenth-century vitalism, the crisis of mechanistic science, and the burgeoning fields of psychology and biology. His work responded to the limitations of positivist epistemology and the reduction of consciousness to quantitative, spatialized models.
Early Formation
Educated at the École Normale Supérieure, Bergson was trained in both classical philosophy and the emerging sciences. Early exposure to the works of Herbert Spencer and William James—as well as the French spiritualist tradition—shaped his resistance to mechanistic and deterministic accounts of mind. His doctoral thesis, Time and Free Will (1889), already articulated the distinction between lived duration and abstract, spatialized time, setting the stage for his lifelong critique of reductionism.
Major Turning Points
Bergson’s subsequent works, including Matter and Memory (1896) and Creative Evolution (1907), deepened his engagement with questions of consciousness, memory, and life. His election to the Collège de France and later receipt of the Nobel Prize in Literature (1927) marked his recognition as a central figure in European thought. Throughout his career, Bergson maintained a critical dialogue with contemporary psychology, biology, and metaphysics, positioning his philosophy as an alternative to both scientific materialism and idealism.
Core Concepts
Duration (la durée)
Bergson’s concept of duration (la durée) is foundational for his critique of spatialized, quantitative models of time. Duration refers to the qualitative, heterogeneous flow of lived experience, irreducible to discrete moments or measurable intervals. For Bergson, duration is the mode of temporality proper to consciousness and subjectivity, in contrast to the homogeneous time of science. This distinction would become central for psychoanalytic accounts of the unconscious, repetition, and trauma, where psychic time resists linear chronology.
Intuition
Intuition in Bergson’s philosophy is a method of apprehending reality from within, as opposed to the external, analytic approach of the intellect. Intuition allows access to the flux of duration and the creative movement of life, bypassing the distortions imposed by conceptual abstraction. This privileging of immediate, affective experience over rational analysis resonates with psychoanalytic explorations of the unconscious and the limits of representation.
Élan vital
The élan vital (vital impetus) is Bergson’s term for the creative, evolutionary force animating all life. Unlike mechanistic or teleological accounts, the élan vital is a principle of novelty, differentiation, and unpredictability. While psychoanalysis does not adopt this concept directly, the emphasis on creative processes, drive, and the emergence of new forms of subjectivity echoes Bergsonian themes.
Memory and Recollection
In Matter and Memory, Bergson distinguishes between habit memory (mechanical repetition) and pure memory (the preservation of the past in consciousness). This duality prefigures psychoanalytic distinctions between conscious recall and unconscious repetition, as well as the persistence of trauma and the return of the repressed. Bergson’s account of memory as virtual, layered, and non-linear provided a philosophical foundation for later theories of psychic temporality.
Creative Evolution
Creative Evolution articulates Bergson’s vision of life as an open, inventive process, marked by contingency and divergence rather than predetermined necessity. This notion of creativity as immanent to being influenced later psychoanalytic and post-structuralist accounts of subject formation, desire, and the emergence of the new.
Relation to Psychoanalysis
Bergson’s influence on psychoanalysis is primarily structural and mediated, rather than direct. While Sigmund Freud does not cite Bergson, their contemporaneous explorations of memory, time, and psychic causality reveal striking parallels. Both thinkers reject linear, mechanistic models of the mind in favor of layered, dynamic structures.
The most explicit engagement occurs in the work of Jacques Lacan, who references Bergson’s duration in his seminars to elucidate the temporality of the unconscious and the logic of repetition. Lacan’s distinction between the imaginary, symbolic, and real registers echoes Bergson’s critique of spatialization and his insistence on the irreducibility of lived experience. In Seminar XI, Lacan invokes Bergson to clarify the difference between the time of the signifier and the time of lived experience, arguing that the unconscious is structured not by chronological succession but by a logic of retroaction and repetition.[1]
Bergson’s influence also traveled through mediating figures such as Jean Hyppolite and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose readings of temporality and subjectivity informed the French reception of psychoanalysis. Gilles Deleuze’s engagement with both Bergson and Freud further exemplifies this mediated transmission, particularly in the theorization of desire, repetition, and difference.
Structurally, Bergson’s critique of spatialized time and his emphasis on the virtual, the actual, and the creative movement of becoming provided psychoanalysis with conceptual tools for thinking the unconscious as a dynamic, non-linear field. The psychoanalytic concepts of nachträglichkeit (deferred action), the compulsion to repeat, and the persistence of the past in the present all bear the imprint of Bergsonian temporality.
Reception in Psychoanalytic Theory
Bergson’s legacy in psychoanalytic theory is marked by both appropriation and contestation. Jacques Lacan’s seminars repeatedly reference Bergson, particularly in discussions of time, memory, and the structure of the unconscious. Lacan’s notion of logical time and the instant of the glance draw on Bergsonian distinctions between lived and measured time.[2]
Gilles Deleuze’s Bergsonism reactivates Bergson’s concepts for a post-structuralist psychoanalytic context, emphasizing the virtual, the actual, and the creative force of desire. Julia Kristeva and Paul Ricoeur also engage Bergson in their hermeneutic and semiotic readings of subjectivity and narrative temporality.
Debates persist regarding the compatibility of Bergson’s vitalism with psychoanalytic materialism. Some theorists, such as Slavoj Žižek, have critiqued Bergson’s emphasis on intuition and creativity as insufficiently attentive to the structural constraints of language and the symbolic order.[3] Nonetheless, Bergson’s influence endures in contemporary discussions of trauma, repetition, and the temporality of the subject.
Key Works
- Time and Free Will (1889): Introduces the distinction between duration and spatialized time, foundational for psychoanalytic theories of psychic temporality and the non-linear structure of the unconscious.
- Matter and Memory (1896): Explores the relationship between perception, memory, and consciousness, providing a philosophical framework for understanding the persistence of the past and the dynamics of recollection and repetition.
- Creative Evolution (1907): Articulates the concept of the élan vital and the open-ended, creative movement of life, influencing later theories of subjectivity, desire, and emergence.
- The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932): Examines the genesis of moral and religious forms, with implications for the psychoanalytic study of ethics, the superego, and collective identification.
Influence and Legacy
Bergson’s impact on psychoanalysis is both structural and conceptual. His critique of mechanistic models of mind and his theorization of duration, memory, and creativity provided psychoanalysis with a vocabulary for thinking the unconscious as a dynamic, non-linear field. Through figures such as Lacan, Deleuze, and Merleau-Ponty, Bergson’s ideas shaped twentieth-century debates on subjectivity, temporality, and the limits of representation.
Beyond psychoanalysis, Bergson’s influence extends to phenomenology, existentialism, and post-structuralism, informing the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gilles Deleuze. Contemporary theorists continue to draw on Bergson to address questions of trauma, repetition, and the creative emergence of the new.
See also
References
- ↑ Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964)
- ↑ Seminar II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory (1954–1955)
- ↑ Žižek, Slavoj. The Parallax View. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2006. p.202