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enunciation (Ènonciation) In linguistic theory in Europe, one impor-
tant distinction is that between the enunciation and the statement (Fr. ÈnoncÈ).
The distinction concerns two ways of regarding linguistic production. When
linguistic production is analysed in terms of abstract grammatical units (such
as sentences), independent of the specific circumstances of occurrence, it is
referred to as a statement. On the other hand, when linguistic production is
analysed as an individual act performed by a particular speaker at a specific
time/place, and in a specific situation, it is referred to as an enunciation
(Ducrot and Todorov, 1972: 405-10).
Long before Lacan uses these terms, he is already making a similar
distinction. In 1936, for example, he stresses that the act of speaking contains
a meaning in itself, even if the words spoken are 'meaningless' (Ec, 83). Prior
to any function it may have in 'conveying a message', speech is an appeal to
the other. This attention to the act of speaking in itself, irrespective of the
content of the utterance, anticipates Lacan's attention to the dimension of the
enunciation.
When Lacan does come to use the term 'enunciation' in 1946, it is first of all
to describe strange characteristics of psychotic language, with its 'duplicity of
the enunciation' (Ec, 167). Later, in the 1950s, the term is used to locate the
subject of the unconscious. In the graph of desire, the lower chain is the
statement, which is speech in its conscious dimension, while the upper chain
is 'the unconscious enunciation' (E, 316). In designating the enunciation as
unconscious, Lacan affirms that the source of speech is not the ego, nor
consciousness, but the unconscious; language comes from the Other, and the
idea that 'I' am master of my discourse is only an illusion. The very word 'I'
(Je) is ambiguous; aS SHIFTER, it is both a signifier acting as subject of the
statement, and an index which designates, but does not signify, the subject of
the enunciation (E, 298). The subject is thus split between these two levels,
divided in the very act of articulating the I that presents the illusion of unity
(see Sll, 139).
tant distinction is that between the enunciation and the statement (Fr. ÈnoncÈ).
The distinction concerns two ways of regarding linguistic production. When
linguistic production is analysed in terms of abstract grammatical units (such
as sentences), independent of the specific circumstances of occurrence, it is
referred to as a statement. On the other hand, when linguistic production is
analysed as an individual act performed by a particular speaker at a specific
time/place, and in a specific situation, it is referred to as an enunciation
(Ducrot and Todorov, 1972: 405-10).
Long before Lacan uses these terms, he is already making a similar
distinction. In 1936, for example, he stresses that the act of speaking contains
a meaning in itself, even if the words spoken are 'meaningless' (Ec, 83). Prior
to any function it may have in 'conveying a message', speech is an appeal to
the other. This attention to the act of speaking in itself, irrespective of the
content of the utterance, anticipates Lacan's attention to the dimension of the
enunciation.
When Lacan does come to use the term 'enunciation' in 1946, it is first of all
to describe strange characteristics of psychotic language, with its 'duplicity of
the enunciation' (Ec, 167). Later, in the 1950s, the term is used to locate the
subject of the unconscious. In the graph of desire, the lower chain is the
statement, which is speech in its conscious dimension, while the upper chain
is 'the unconscious enunciation' (E, 316). In designating the enunciation as
unconscious, Lacan affirms that the source of speech is not the ego, nor
consciousness, but the unconscious; language comes from the Other, and the
idea that 'I' am master of my discourse is only an illusion. The very word 'I'
(Je) is ambiguous; aS SHIFTER, it is both a signifier acting as subject of the
statement, and an index which designates, but does not signify, the subject of
the enunciation (E, 298). The subject is thus split between these two levels,
divided in the very act of articulating the I that presents the illusion of unity
(see Sll, 139).
