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cogito Lacan's works abound in references to the famous phrase by
Descartes, cogito ergo sum ('I think, therefore I am' - see Descartes, 1637:
54). This phrase (which Lacan often refers to simply as 'the cogito') comes to
stand, in Lacan's work, for Descartes's entire philosophy. Lacan's attitude to
Cartesianism is extremely complex, and only a few of the most important
points can be summarised here.
1. On one level, the cogito comes to stand for the modern western concept of
the EGo, based as it is on the notions of the self-sufficiency and self-transpar-
ency of CONSCIOUSNEss, and the autonomy of the ego (see E, 6). Although Lacan
does not believe that the modern western concept of the ego was invented by
Descartes or by any other individual, he argues that it was born in the same era
m which Descartes was writing (the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth
century), and is particularly clearly expressed by Descartes (see S2, 6-7).
Thus, although this concept of the ego seems so natural and eternal to western
man today, it is in fact a relatively recent cultural construct; its eternal-natural
appearance is in fact an illusion produced by retroaction (S2, 4-5).
Lacan argues that the experience of psychoanalytic treatment 'is an
experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from
the Cogito' (E, 1; see S2, 4). Freud's discovery of the unconscious subverts
the Cartesian concept of subjectivity because it disputes the Cartesian
equation subject = ego = consciousness. One of Lacan's main criticisms of
ego-psychology and object-relations theory is that these schools betrayed
Freud's discovery by returning to the pre-Freudian concept of the subject
as an autonomous ego (S2, l 1).
2. On another level, Lacan's views can be seen not only as a subversion of
the cogito, but also as an extension of it, for the cogito not only encapsulates
the false equation subject = ego = consciousness which Lacan opposes, but
also focuses attention on the concept of the SUBJECT, which Lacan wishes to
retain. Thus the cogito contains within itself the seeds of its own subversion,
by putting forward a concept of subjectivity which undermines the modern
concept of the ego. This concept of subjectivity refers to what Lacan calls 'the
subject of science': a subject who is denied all intuitive access to knowledge
and is thus left with reason as the only path to knowledge (Ec, 831; see Ec,
858).
By opposing the subject to the ego, Lacan proposes that the subject of the
Cartesian cogito is in fact one and the same as the subject of the unconscious.
Psychoanalysis can thus operate with a Cartesian method, advancing from
doubt to certainty, with the crucial difference that it does not start from the
statement 'I think' but from the affirmation 'it thinks' (Áa pense) (Sll, 35--6).
Lacan rewrites Descartes's phrase in various ways, such as 'I think where I am
not, therefore I am where I do not think' (E, 166). Lacan also uses the cogito to
distinguish between the subject of the statement and the subject of the
ENUNCIATION (see Sll, 138-42; see Sl7, 180-4).
Descartes, cogito ergo sum ('I think, therefore I am' - see Descartes, 1637:
54). This phrase (which Lacan often refers to simply as 'the cogito') comes to
stand, in Lacan's work, for Descartes's entire philosophy. Lacan's attitude to
Cartesianism is extremely complex, and only a few of the most important
points can be summarised here.
1. On one level, the cogito comes to stand for the modern western concept of
the EGo, based as it is on the notions of the self-sufficiency and self-transpar-
ency of CONSCIOUSNEss, and the autonomy of the ego (see E, 6). Although Lacan
does not believe that the modern western concept of the ego was invented by
Descartes or by any other individual, he argues that it was born in the same era
m which Descartes was writing (the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth
century), and is particularly clearly expressed by Descartes (see S2, 6-7).
Thus, although this concept of the ego seems so natural and eternal to western
man today, it is in fact a relatively recent cultural construct; its eternal-natural
appearance is in fact an illusion produced by retroaction (S2, 4-5).
Lacan argues that the experience of psychoanalytic treatment 'is an
experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from
the Cogito' (E, 1; see S2, 4). Freud's discovery of the unconscious subverts
the Cartesian concept of subjectivity because it disputes the Cartesian
equation subject = ego = consciousness. One of Lacan's main criticisms of
ego-psychology and object-relations theory is that these schools betrayed
Freud's discovery by returning to the pre-Freudian concept of the subject
as an autonomous ego (S2, l 1).
2. On another level, Lacan's views can be seen not only as a subversion of
the cogito, but also as an extension of it, for the cogito not only encapsulates
the false equation subject = ego = consciousness which Lacan opposes, but
also focuses attention on the concept of the SUBJECT, which Lacan wishes to
retain. Thus the cogito contains within itself the seeds of its own subversion,
by putting forward a concept of subjectivity which undermines the modern
concept of the ego. This concept of subjectivity refers to what Lacan calls 'the
subject of science': a subject who is denied all intuitive access to knowledge
and is thus left with reason as the only path to knowledge (Ec, 831; see Ec,
858).
By opposing the subject to the ego, Lacan proposes that the subject of the
Cartesian cogito is in fact one and the same as the subject of the unconscious.
Psychoanalysis can thus operate with a Cartesian method, advancing from
doubt to certainty, with the crucial difference that it does not start from the
statement 'I think' but from the affirmation 'it thinks' (Áa pense) (Sll, 35--6).
Lacan rewrites Descartes's phrase in various ways, such as 'I think where I am
not, therefore I am where I do not think' (E, 166). Lacan also uses the cogito to
distinguish between the subject of the statement and the subject of the
ENUNCIATION (see Sll, 138-42; see Sl7, 180-4).
