Difference between revisions of "Imaginary (Compendium)"
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− | Imaginary | + | [[Imaginary]] |
− | The imaginary in Lacan's theory immediately invokes a set of characteristic | + | [[The imaginary]] in [[Lacan]]'s [[theory]] immediately invokes a set of characteristic |
− | terms, most of which are already present in his article on | + | [[terms]], most of which are already [[present]] in his article on |
− | the mirror stage (1949). | + | the [[mirror]] [[stage]] (1949). |
− | This set comprises the notions of Gestalt (ideal), ego and identification, | + | This set comprises the notions of [[Gestalt]] ([[ideal]]), ego and [[identification]], |
− | lure and | + | [[lure]] and mé[[connaissance]], reciprocity, [[counterpart]], [[object]], |
− | (paranoiac) knowledge and aggressivity. Of the three registers (or | + | ([[paranoiac]]) [[knowledge]] and [[aggressivity]]. Of the [[three]] [[registers]] (or |
− | orders) of the subject, the imaginary is the first to enter on stage | + | [[orders]]) of the [[subject]], the imaginary is the first to enter on stage |
− | both in Lacan's writings and teachings. It dominates his thinking | + | both in Lacan's writings and [[teachings]]. It dominates his [[thinking]] |
until the mid-1950s. | until the mid-1950s. | ||
− | The imaginary as such is not a Freudian concept, although Lacan | + | The imaginary as such is not a [[Freudian]] [[concept]], although Lacan |
− | cautions us not to think that the function of the imaginary is | + | cautions us not to [[think]] that the function of the imaginary is |
− | absent in Freud's texts. In his elaboration of the imaginary, Lacan | + | [[absent]] in [[Freud]]'s [[texts]]. In his elaboration of the imaginary, Lacan |
− | makes use of at least three major references, namely the notion of | + | makes use of at least three major references, namely the [[notion]] of |
− | Gestalt, animal ethology and Freud's early theory on narcissism. | + | Gestalt, [[animal]] [[ethology]] and Freud's early theory on [[narcissism]]. |
− | For Lacan, the function of the Gestalt in animal behaviour, | + | For Lacan, the function of the Gestalt in animal [[behaviour]], |
which presents itself par excellence in the behaviour of the animal | which presents itself par excellence in the behaviour of the animal | ||
− | couple, allows a much clearer structuring of the function of the | + | couple, allows a much clearer [[structuring]] of the function of the |
imaginary in man than was possible for Freud. To illustrate this | imaginary in man than was possible for Freud. To illustrate this | ||
function of the imaginary in animal behaviour, Lacan takes the | function of the imaginary in animal behaviour, Lacan takes the | ||
− | example of the stickleback (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 137). Gestalten | + | example of the stickleback ([[Seminar]] I, 1953-54, p. 137). Gestalten |
− | come into play in releasing the complementary sexual behaviour of | + | come into play in releasing the complementary [[sexual]] behaviour of |
− | the male and the female stickleback; the male or the female is captivated by a Gestalt. Typical for animal behaviour is that the animal subject is completely identical to the image governing the release of a specific motor behaviour. Man's relation to the unitary image (Gestalt) is fundamentally different. This is linked to the fact that man comes into the world in a structurally premature state, which | + | the [[male]] and the [[female]] stickleback; the male or the female is captivated by a Gestalt. Typical for animal behaviour is that the animal subject is completely identical to the [[image]] governing the release of a specific motor behaviour. Man's relation to the unitary image (Gestalt) is fundamentally different. This is linked to the fact that man comes into the [[world]] in a structurally premature [[state]], which |
− | is mastered at an early stage — the mirror stage — by means of the | + | is mastered at an early stage — the [[mirror stage]] — by means of the |
− | identification with the unitary image of the body. | + | identification with the unitary image of the [[body]]. |
− | The mirror stage constitutes a first structuring moment for the | + | [[The mirror stage]] constitutes a first structuring [[moment]] for the |
− | human subject. It also functions as the prime reference in distinguishing between the imaginary relation in animal and in man. 'In | + | [[human]] subject. It also functions as the prime reference in distinguishing between the imaginary relation in animal and in man. 'In |
− | man, the imaginary is reduced, specialized, centred on the specular | + | man, the imaginary is reduced, specialized, centred on the [[specular]] |
− | image' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 282). | + | image' ([[Seminar I]], 1953-54, p. 282). |
− | The assumption of the unitary image of the body, meaning that | + | The assumption of the unitary image of the body, [[meaning]] that |
− | the human subject recognizes the specular image as being its own, | + | the human subject recognizes the [[specular image]] as [[being]] its own, |
− | presents the anticipation of real mastery. Both anticipation and | + | presents the [[anticipation]] of [[real]] [[mastery]]. Both anticipation and |
− | recognition are crucial in man's relation to the specular image. | + | [[recognition]] are crucial in man's relation to the specular image. |
− | Combined, they typify the imaginary as illusory and alienating - | + | Combined, they typify the imaginary as [[illusory]] and [[alienating]] - |
− | one recognizes and assumes an attainable totality. It is important to | + | one recognizes and assumes an attainable [[totality]]. It is important to |
add that this recognition of the specular image is a function of | add that this recognition of the specular image is a function of | ||
− | something outside the imaginary relation, namely the symbolic. | + | something [[outside]] the imaginary relation, namely the [[symbolic]]. |
− | Lacan accentuates the difference between animal and man in | + | Lacan accentuates the [[difference]] between animal and man in |
− | still another way: | + | still [[another]] way: |
− | For the animal there is a limited number of pre-established correspondences | + | For the animal there is a limited [[number]] of pre-established correspondences |
− | between its imaginary structure and whatever | + | between its imaginary [[structure]] and whatever |
− | interests it in its Umwelt ... In man, by contrast, the reflection in | + | interests it in its [[Umwelt]] ... In man, by contrast, the [[reflection]] in |
the mirror indicates an original noetic possibility, and introduces | the mirror indicates an original noetic possibility, and introduces | ||
a second narcissism. Its fundamental pattern is immediately the | a second narcissism. Its fundamental pattern is immediately the | ||
− | relation to the other. (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 125) | + | relation to the [[other]]. (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 125) |
This takes us back to the Freudian reference of narcissism, including | This takes us back to the Freudian reference of narcissism, including | ||
− | both the formation of the ego and the object. In Lacan's view, the | + | both the [[formation]] of the ego and the object. In Lacan's view, the |
− | specular image as a total unity functions as a primordial form of the | + | specular image as a [[total]] [[unity]] functions as a primordial [[form]] of the |
− | ego, which 'simply because it is an image ... is ideal ego' (Seminar | + | ego, which 'simply because it is an image ... is [[ideal ego]]' (Seminar |
I, 1953-54, p. 282). | I, 1953-54, p. 282). | ||
At this point, Lacan also refers to the notion of specular Urbild. | At this point, Lacan also refers to the notion of specular Urbild. | ||
Conceived as such, the ego is constituted by an alienating identification | Conceived as such, the ego is constituted by an alienating identification | ||
with a Gestalt - of the body or the other - functioning as an | with a Gestalt - of the body or the other - functioning as an | ||
− | ideal image. The ego is an imaginary function serving (imaginary) | + | [[ideal image]]. The ego is an imaginary function serving (imaginary) |
− | mastery. In linking the constitution of the ego to the relation to the | + | mastery. In linking the [[constitution]] of the ego to the relation to the |
− | other, the ego is defined as the identification with the other. This | + | [[other, the]] ego is defined as the identification with the other. This |
has a certain implication for the relation to the object: | has a certain implication for the relation to the object: | ||
... [man] only perceives the unity of this specific image [of the | ... [man] only perceives the unity of this specific image [of the | ||
body] from the outside, and in an anticipated manner. Because | body] from the outside, and in an anticipated manner. Because | ||
− | of this double relation which he has with himself, all the objects | + | of this [[double]] relation which he has with himself, all the [[objects]] |
− | of his world are always structured around the wandering shadow | + | of his world are always [[structured]] around the wandering shadow |
− | of his own ego. (Seminar II, 1954-55, p. 166) | + | of his own ego. ([[Seminar II]], 1954-55, p. 166) |
Hence, the specular image (of the other) is both the framework of | Hence, the specular image (of the other) is both the framework of | ||
the ego and the object. | the ego and the object. | ||
Imaginary 89 | Imaginary 89 | ||
− | Lacan's further development of the dialectics between ego, other | + | Lacan's further [[development]] of the dialectics between ego, other |
− | and object as being a function of rivalry and competition is clearly | + | and object as being a function of [[rivalry]] and competition is clearly |
− | influenced by Hegel. Here the (Hegelian) notion of desire comes | + | influenced by [[Hegel]]. Here the ([[Hegelian]]) notion of [[desire]] comes |
into play. Since the ego is constituted in reference to the other, | into play. Since the ego is constituted in reference to the other, | ||
whatever the ego is oriented towards will depend on what this | whatever the ego is oriented towards will depend on what this | ||
Line 78: | Line 78: | ||
1954-55, p. 51). All this implies that the object of man's desire is | 1954-55, p. 51). All this implies that the object of man's desire is | ||
essentially an object desired by someone else. | essentially an object desired by someone else. | ||
− | Thus far, it has become apparent that the imaginary relation is | + | Thus far, it has become [[apparent]] that the imaginary relation is |
− | always a (specular) relation between similar or equal others. This | + | always a (specular) relation between similar or equal [[others]]. This |
− | means that in a certain sense the notion of 'sameness' is central. | + | means that in a certain [[sense]] the notion of 'sameness' is central. |
This is also invoked in the characterization of the imaginary in | This is also invoked in the characterization of the imaginary in | ||
terms of reciprocity, and symmetrical and interchangeable positions. | terms of reciprocity, and symmetrical and interchangeable positions. | ||
Lacan illustrates this by means of what he calls the | Lacan illustrates this by means of what he calls the | ||
− | phenomenon of transitivism, in which the infant takes as equivalent | + | phenomenon of [[transitivism]], in which the [[infant]] takes as equivalent |
− | his own action and that of the other. For instance, an infant | + | his own [[action]] and that of the other. For [[instance]], an infant |
− | saying 'Paul hit me', whereas it was he who hit Paul. In discussing | + | saying '[[Paul]] hit me', whereas it was he who hit Paul. In discussing |
transitivism, Lacan refers to the well-known 1927 study by | transitivism, Lacan refers to the well-known 1927 study by | ||
Charlotte Bühler. | Charlotte Bühler. | ||
With all this, the coordinates of the relation between the imaginary | With all this, the coordinates of the relation between the imaginary | ||
and aggressivity are given. Aggressivity always refers to the | and aggressivity are given. Aggressivity always refers to the | ||
− | imaginary register. In his 1948 article on aggressivity, Lacan posits | + | imaginary [[register]]. In his [[1948]] article on aggressivity, Lacan posits |
that aggressivity is the 'correlative tendency of a mode of identification | that aggressivity is the 'correlative tendency of a mode of identification | ||
− | that we call narcissistic' (Écrits, 1977, p. 16), thus linking | + | that we call [[narcissistic]]' ([[Écrits]], 1977, p. 16), thus linking |
− | aggressivity to the imaginary relation. This link can be interpreted | + | aggressivity to the imaginary relation. This link can be [[interpreted]] |
in two ways. | in two ways. | ||
− | First, the constitution of the ego implies a certain satisfaction as | + | First, the constitution of the ego implies a certain [[satisfaction]] as |
− | compensation for the original organic disarray of the human | + | [[compensation]] for the original [[organic]] disarray of the human |
subject. However, the tension implied in the relation between the | subject. However, the tension implied in the relation between the | ||
− | initial fragmentation (original disarray) and the unifying image also | + | initial [[fragmentation]] (original disarray) and the [[unifying]] image also |
becomes a source of aggressivity in the sense that the image that | becomes a source of aggressivity in the sense that the image that | ||
− | shapes the subject also structures the subject as rival for himself. | + | shapes the subject also [[structures]] the subject as rival for himself. |
Furthermore, since the narcissistic identification mediates the imaginary | Furthermore, since the narcissistic identification mediates the imaginary | ||
relation, rivalry is at the core of the imaginary relation to the | relation, rivalry is at the core of the imaginary relation to the | ||
Line 107: | Line 107: | ||
the similar other, which is perceived as ideal. The other is always one | the similar other, which is perceived as ideal. The other is always one | ||
step ahead of the subject, and is thus seen as a rival. At this point we | step ahead of the subject, and is thus seen as a rival. At this point we | ||
− | 90 A Compendium of Lacanian Terms | + | 90 A [[Compendium]] of [[Lacanian]] Terms |
can more clearly refer to animal ethology to render the functioning | can more clearly refer to animal ethology to render the functioning | ||
− | of aggressivity, as essentially different from aggression. The function | + | of aggressivity, as essentially different from [[aggression]]. The function |
− | of the imaginary in animals makes it possible that a struggle | + | of the imaginary in animals makes it possible that a [[struggle]] |
between two males, that is, between two rivals, is not turned into a | between two males, that is, between two rivals, is not turned into a | ||
− | real struggle which would lead to the destruction of one of the | + | real struggle which would lead to the [[destruction]] of one of the |
− | animals. By transposing the conflict on to the imaginary plane, real | + | animals. By transposing the [[conflict]] on to the imaginary plane, real |
destruction is prevented. Here it becomes clear that aggressivity has | destruction is prevented. Here it becomes clear that aggressivity has | ||
− | nothing to do with aggression. 'At the limit, virtually, aggressivity | + | [[nothing]] to do with aggression. 'At the [[limit]], virtually, aggressivity |
turns into aggression ... aggression is an existential act linked to an | turns into aggression ... aggression is an existential act linked to an | ||
imaginary relation' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 177). | imaginary relation' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 177). | ||
− | Second, aggressivity emerges in the situation of the ego encountering | + | Second, aggressivity emerges in the [[situation]] of the ego encountering |
another subject like itself, giving rise to a desire for the object | another subject like itself, giving rise to a desire for the object | ||
of this other's desire. Here also, the potential struggle is a function | of this other's desire. Here also, the potential struggle is a function | ||
of something the other has, namely the object of his desire. Thus, | of something the other has, namely the object of his desire. Thus, | ||
aggressivity is linked to the object which is always the object of a | aggressivity is linked to the object which is always the object of a | ||
− | counterpart, and therefore in the logic of the imaginary, an object | + | counterpart, and therefore in the [[logic]] of the imaginary, an object |
that belongs to the ego. According to Lacan, the human object | that belongs to the ego. According to Lacan, the human object | ||
differs fundamentally from the object of the animal in that it is | differs fundamentally from the object of the animal in that it is | ||
Line 129: | Line 129: | ||
the relation to the rival ... man's desire is the desire of the other' | the relation to the rival ... man's desire is the desire of the other' | ||
(Seminar I, 1953-54, pp. 176-7). Hence, aggressivity, rivalry and | (Seminar I, 1953-54, pp. 176-7). Hence, aggressivity, rivalry and | ||
− | desire are closely linked within the frame of the imaginary relation. | + | desire are closely linked within the [[frame]] of the imaginary relation. |
The imaginary is also linked by Lacan to knowledge (connaissance). | The imaginary is also linked by Lacan to knowledge (connaissance). | ||
This link, which is a function of Lacan's critique of the | This link, which is a function of Lacan's critique of the | ||
− | Cartesian cogito, is centred on the ego's relation to reality and is | + | [[Cartesian]] [[cogito]], is centred on the ego's relation to [[reality]] and is |
− | typified by Lacan as miscognition (méconnaissance) and as being | + | typified by Lacan as miscognition ([[méconnaissance]]) and as being |
− | paranoiac in nature. | + | paranoiac in [[nature]]. |
Although based on the recognition of the specular image, the | Although based on the recognition of the specular image, the | ||
ego can be conceived as 'a capacity to fail to recognize (méconnaissance)' | ego can be conceived as 'a capacity to fail to recognize (méconnaissance)' | ||
(Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 153). Indeed, one of the | (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 153). Indeed, one of the | ||
fundamental characteristics of the specular image is that the reflection | fundamental characteristics of the specular image is that the reflection | ||
− | in the mirror is an inversion of what stands before the mirror. | + | in the mirror is an [[inversion]] of what stands before the mirror. |
− | This implies that there is a primitive distortion and thus miscognition | + | This implies that there is a [[primitive]] [[distortion]] and thus miscognition |
− | in the ego's experience of reality. Another way to understand | + | in the ego's [[experience]] of reality. Another way to [[understand]] |
this miscognition, is to link it to the alienating nature of the ego. | this miscognition, is to link it to the alienating nature of the ego. | ||
− | In identifying with the image of the other, the subject inevitably | + | In [[identifying]] with the image of the other, the subject inevitably |
− | fails to recognize many things about itself. In the same sense, all | + | fails to recognize many things [[about]] itself. In the same sense, all |
knowledge deriving from the imaginary relation — the ego's relation | knowledge deriving from the imaginary relation — the ego's relation | ||
to the world of objects and similar others — is a function of miscog- | to the world of objects and similar others — is a function of miscog- | ||
Line 153: | Line 153: | ||
In his article on the mirror stage, Lacan speaks of human knowledge | In his article on the mirror stage, Lacan speaks of human knowledge | ||
as paranoiac in nature. The term 'paranoiac knowledge' refers | as paranoiac in nature. The term 'paranoiac knowledge' refers | ||
− | to what is found in paranoia (e.g., in the external persecution and | + | to what is found in [[paranoia]] (e.g., in the [[external]] [[persecution]] and |
observation) and which is also detectable in the imaginary relation, | observation) and which is also detectable in the imaginary relation, | ||
especially in the phenomenon of transitivism. It concerns the | especially in the phenomenon of transitivism. It concerns the | ||
− | captivation by the image of the other — one recognizes the image of | + | [[captivation]] by the image of the other — one recognizes the image of |
the other as one's own — and thus again reinforces the imaginary | the other as one's own — and thus again reinforces the imaginary | ||
− | alienation of the ego. | + | [[alienation]] of the ego. |
During the period 1953 to 1974, the imaginary maintained | During the period 1953 to 1974, the imaginary maintained | ||
− | importance, especially in relation to the signified and its effect; see | + | importance, especially in relation to the [[signified]] and its effect; see |
− | for example, 'The function and field of speech and language in | + | for example, 'The function and field of [[speech]] and [[language]] in |
− | psychoanalysis' (1953); 'On a question preliminary to any possible | + | [[psychoanalysis]]' (1953); 'On a question preliminary to any possible |
− | treatment of psychosis' (1955-56); 'The agency of the letter in the | + | [[treatment]] of [[psychosis]]' (1955-56); 'The [[agency]] of the [[letter]] in the |
− | unconscious or reason since Freud' (1957); 'The direction of the | + | [[unconscious]] or [[reason]] since Freud' (1957); 'The direction of the |
− | treatment and the principles of its power' (1958). All are published | + | treatment and the principles of its [[power]]' (1958). All are published |
− | in the English translation of Écrits (1977) and The Four Fundamental | + | in the [[English]] [[translation]] of Écrits (1977) and The Four Fundamental |
− | Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (1978). | + | [[Concepts]] of [[Psycho]]-[[Analysis]] (1978). |
− | However, from the late 1950s onwards the ideas of the symbolic | + | However, from the late 1950s onwards the [[ideas]] of [[the symbolic]] |
− | relation or the radical Other and the subject as subject of the signifier | + | relation or the radical Other and the subject as subject of the [[signifier]] |
− | occupy a more central position. This does not mean that Lacan | + | occupy a more central [[position]]. This does not mean that Lacan |
suddenly ceases to acknowledge the importance of the imaginary, | suddenly ceases to acknowledge the importance of the imaginary, | ||
or that the imaginary is depreciated or pushed aside. This should be | or that the imaginary is depreciated or pushed aside. This should be | ||
stressed, since the imaginary is often regarded in a pejorative way | stressed, since the imaginary is often regarded in a pejorative way | ||
− | for being pure 'illusion'. Although the imaginary is indeed essentially | + | for being pure '[[illusion]]'. Although the imaginary is indeed essentially |
− | linked to miscognition, to mirage and thus also to 'false | + | linked to miscognition, to mirage and thus also to '[[false]] |
reality', it is nonetheless a 'verified reality' (Seminar II, 1954-55, p. | reality', it is nonetheless a 'verified reality' (Seminar II, 1954-55, p. | ||
244), mediating man's relation to similar others and to the objects | 244), mediating man's relation to similar others and to the objects | ||
of his desire. | of his desire. | ||
− | One thing is certain: without the imaginary there can be no | + | One [[thing]] is certain: without the imaginary there can be no |
human reality as such. Moreover, the imaginary is the only 'consistency' | human reality as such. Moreover, the imaginary is the only 'consistency' | ||
man has. This is developed by Lacan in one of his later | man has. This is developed by Lacan in one of his later | ||
− | seminars, on R.S.I. (1974-75). As far as the imaginary is concerned, | + | [[seminars]], on R.S.I. (1974-75). As far as the imaginary is concerned, |
Lacan here refers to his earliest formulations on the subject, by | Lacan here refers to his earliest formulations on the subject, by | ||
defining it as essentially departing from the body as a reflection of | defining it as essentially departing from the body as a reflection of | ||
Line 188: | Line 188: | ||
of the imaginary does not fundamentally alter over the years. In | of the imaginary does not fundamentally alter over the years. In | ||
this sense, it indeed functions as a consistency. | this sense, it indeed functions as a consistency. | ||
− | 92 A Compendium of Lacanian Terms | + | 92 [[A Compendium of Lacanian Terms]] |
The function of the imaginary is always related to the other two | The function of the imaginary is always related to the other two | ||
registers used by Lacan, namely, the symbolic and the real. | registers used by Lacan, namely, the symbolic and the real. | ||
− | See also: aggressivity, desire, ideal ego, mirror stage, real, symbolic | + | See also: aggressivity, [[desire,]] ideal ego, mirror stage, real, symbolic |
Other terms: ego, identification | Other terms: ego, identification | ||
References | References | ||
− | Lacan, J. (1975-76) [1974-75] `Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Book | + | Lacan, J. (1975-76) [1974-75] `Le Séminaire de [[Jacques Lacan]], Book |
− | XXII: Réel, symbolique, imaginaire (Real, symbolic, imaginary)'. | + | XXII: [[Réel]], [[symbolique]], [[imaginaire]] (Real, symbolic, imaginary)'. |
− | In Ornicar? (2, 3, 4) 1975, (5) 1975-76. | + | In [[Ornicar]]? (2, 3, 4) 1975, (5) 1975-76. |
− | Lacan, J. (1977) [1948] 'Aggressivity in psychoanalysis'. In Écrits: A | + | Lacan, J. (1977) [1948] '[[Aggressivity in psychoanalysis]]'. In Écrits: A |
− | Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock. | + | Selection (trans. A. [[Sheridan]]). [[London]]: Tavistock. |
Lacan, J. (1977) [1949] `The mirror stage as formative of the | Lacan, J. (1977) [1949] `The mirror stage as formative of the | ||
− | function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience' in | + | function of the I as revealed in [[psychoanalytic]] experience' in |
− | Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock. | + | [[Écrits: A Selection]] (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock. |
Lacan, J. (1977) [1953] `The function and field of speech and | Lacan, J. (1977) [1953] `The function and field of speech and | ||
language in psychoanalyis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. | language in psychoanalyis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. | ||
Line 208: | Line 208: | ||
treatment of psychosis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). | treatment of psychosis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). | ||
London: Tavistock. | London: Tavistock. | ||
− | Lacan, J. (1977) [1957] `The agency of the letter in the unconscious | + | Lacan, J. (1977) [1957] `[[The agency of the letter]] in the unconscious |
or reason since Freud'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). | or reason since Freud'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). | ||
London: Tavistock. | London: Tavistock. | ||
Line 214: | Line 214: | ||
principles of its power'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). | principles of its power'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). | ||
London: Tavistock. | London: Tavistock. | ||
− | Lacan, J. (1978) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis | + | Lacan, J. (1978) The [[Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]] |
− | (trans. Alan Sheridan). New York: W.W. Norton. | + | (trans. [[Alan Sheridan]]). New York: W.W. Norton. |
− | Lacan, J. (1988) [1975] The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I. Freud's | + | Lacan, J. (1988) [1975] [[The Seminar]] of Jacques Lacan, Book I. Freud's |
− | Papers on Technique I953-I954. (ed. J. A. Miller; trans. J. | + | Papers on [[Technique]] I953-I954. (ed. J. A. [[Miller]]; trans. J. |
− | Forrester). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. | + | Forrester). Cambridge: Cambridge [[University]] Press. |
Lacan, J. (1988) [1978] The Seminar o fJacques Lacan. Book II. The Ego | Lacan, J. (1988) [1978] The Seminar o fJacques Lacan. Book II. The Ego | ||
in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis. | in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis. |
Latest revision as of 00:11, 25 May 2019
Imaginary The imaginary in Lacan's theory immediately invokes a set of characteristic terms, most of which are already present in his article on the mirror stage (1949). This set comprises the notions of Gestalt (ideal), ego and identification, lure and méconnaissance, reciprocity, counterpart, object, (paranoiac) knowledge and aggressivity. Of the three registers (or orders) of the subject, the imaginary is the first to enter on stage both in Lacan's writings and teachings. It dominates his thinking until the mid-1950s.
The imaginary as such is not a Freudian concept, although Lacan cautions us not to think that the function of the imaginary is absent in Freud's texts. In his elaboration of the imaginary, Lacan makes use of at least three major references, namely the notion of Gestalt, animal ethology and Freud's early theory on narcissism. For Lacan, the function of the Gestalt in animal behaviour, which presents itself par excellence in the behaviour of the animal couple, allows a much clearer structuring of the function of the imaginary in man than was possible for Freud. To illustrate this function of the imaginary in animal behaviour, Lacan takes the example of the stickleback (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 137). Gestalten come into play in releasing the complementary sexual behaviour of the male and the female stickleback; the male or the female is captivated by a Gestalt. Typical for animal behaviour is that the animal subject is completely identical to the image governing the release of a specific motor behaviour. Man's relation to the unitary image (Gestalt) is fundamentally different. This is linked to the fact that man comes into the world in a structurally premature state, which is mastered at an early stage — the mirror stage — by means of the identification with the unitary image of the body.
The mirror stage constitutes a first structuring moment for the human subject. It also functions as the prime reference in distinguishing between the imaginary relation in animal and in man. 'In man, the imaginary is reduced, specialized, centred on the specular image' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 282).
The assumption of the unitary image of the body, meaning that
the human subject recognizes the specular image as being its own,
presents the anticipation of real mastery. Both anticipation and
recognition are crucial in man's relation to the specular image.
Combined, they typify the imaginary as illusory and alienating -
one recognizes and assumes an attainable totality. It is important to
add that this recognition of the specular image is a function of
something outside the imaginary relation, namely the symbolic.
Lacan accentuates the difference between animal and man in
still another way:
For the animal there is a limited number of pre-established correspondences
between its imaginary structure and whatever
interests it in its Umwelt ... In man, by contrast, the reflection in
the mirror indicates an original noetic possibility, and introduces
a second narcissism. Its fundamental pattern is immediately the
relation to the other. (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 125)
This takes us back to the Freudian reference of narcissism, including
both the formation of the ego and the object. In Lacan's view, the
specular image as a total unity functions as a primordial form of the
ego, which 'simply because it is an image ... is ideal ego' (Seminar
I, 1953-54, p. 282).
At this point, Lacan also refers to the notion of specular Urbild.
Conceived as such, the ego is constituted by an alienating identification
with a Gestalt - of the body or the other - functioning as an
ideal image. The ego is an imaginary function serving (imaginary)
mastery. In linking the constitution of the ego to the relation to the
other, the ego is defined as the identification with the other. This
has a certain implication for the relation to the object:
... [man] only perceives the unity of this specific image [of the
body] from the outside, and in an anticipated manner. Because
of this double relation which he has with himself, all the objects
of his world are always structured around the wandering shadow
of his own ego. (Seminar II, 1954-55, p. 166)
Hence, the specular image (of the other) is both the framework of
the ego and the object.
Imaginary 89
Lacan's further development of the dialectics between ego, other
and object as being a function of rivalry and competition is clearly
influenced by Hegel. Here the (Hegelian) notion of desire comes
into play. Since the ego is constituted in reference to the other,
whatever the ego is oriented towards will depend on what this
other is oriented towards. 'An apprehended, desired object, it's
either he or I who will get it, it has to be one or the other. And
when the other gets it, it's because it belongs to me' (Seminar II,
1954-55, p. 51). All this implies that the object of man's desire is
essentially an object desired by someone else.
Thus far, it has become apparent that the imaginary relation is
always a (specular) relation between similar or equal others. This
means that in a certain sense the notion of 'sameness' is central.
This is also invoked in the characterization of the imaginary in
terms of reciprocity, and symmetrical and interchangeable positions.
Lacan illustrates this by means of what he calls the
phenomenon of transitivism, in which the infant takes as equivalent
his own action and that of the other. For instance, an infant
saying 'Paul hit me', whereas it was he who hit Paul. In discussing
transitivism, Lacan refers to the well-known 1927 study by
Charlotte Bühler.
With all this, the coordinates of the relation between the imaginary
and aggressivity are given. Aggressivity always refers to the
imaginary register. In his 1948 article on aggressivity, Lacan posits
that aggressivity is the 'correlative tendency of a mode of identification
that we call narcissistic' (Écrits, 1977, p. 16), thus linking
aggressivity to the imaginary relation. This link can be interpreted
in two ways.
First, the constitution of the ego implies a certain satisfaction as
compensation for the original organic disarray of the human
subject. However, the tension implied in the relation between the
initial fragmentation (original disarray) and the unifying image also
becomes a source of aggressivity in the sense that the image that
shapes the subject also structures the subject as rival for himself.
Furthermore, since the narcissistic identification mediates the imaginary
relation, rivalry is at the core of the imaginary relation to the
other as well. Thus, aggressivity is always present in the relation to
the similar other, which is perceived as ideal. The other is always one
step ahead of the subject, and is thus seen as a rival. At this point we
90 A Compendium of Lacanian Terms
can more clearly refer to animal ethology to render the functioning
of aggressivity, as essentially different from aggression. The function
of the imaginary in animals makes it possible that a struggle
between two males, that is, between two rivals, is not turned into a
real struggle which would lead to the destruction of one of the
animals. By transposing the conflict on to the imaginary plane, real
destruction is prevented. Here it becomes clear that aggressivity has
nothing to do with aggression. 'At the limit, virtually, aggressivity
turns into aggression ... aggression is an existential act linked to an
imaginary relation' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 177).
Second, aggressivity emerges in the situation of the ego encountering
another subject like itself, giving rise to a desire for the object
of this other's desire. Here also, the potential struggle is a function
of something the other has, namely the object of his desire. Thus,
aggressivity is linked to the object which is always the object of a
counterpart, and therefore in the logic of the imaginary, an object
that belongs to the ego. According to Lacan, the human object
differs fundamentally from the object of the animal in that it is
'originally mediated through rivalry, through the exacerbation of
the relation to the rival ... man's desire is the desire of the other'
(Seminar I, 1953-54, pp. 176-7). Hence, aggressivity, rivalry and
desire are closely linked within the frame of the imaginary relation.
The imaginary is also linked by Lacan to knowledge (connaissance).
This link, which is a function of Lacan's critique of the
Cartesian cogito, is centred on the ego's relation to reality and is
typified by Lacan as miscognition (méconnaissance) and as being
paranoiac in nature.
Although based on the recognition of the specular image, the
ego can be conceived as 'a capacity to fail to recognize (méconnaissance)'
(Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 153). Indeed, one of the
fundamental characteristics of the specular image is that the reflection
in the mirror is an inversion of what stands before the mirror.
This implies that there is a primitive distortion and thus miscognition
in the ego's experience of reality. Another way to understand
this miscognition, is to link it to the alienating nature of the ego.
In identifying with the image of the other, the subject inevitably
fails to recognize many things about itself. In the same sense, all
knowledge deriving from the imaginary relation — the ego's relation
to the world of objects and similar others — is a function of miscog-
J
Imaginary 91
nition, since this very relation is based on the ego's miscognition of
its own alienating nature.
In his article on the mirror stage, Lacan speaks of human knowledge
as paranoiac in nature. The term 'paranoiac knowledge' refers
to what is found in paranoia (e.g., in the external persecution and
observation) and which is also detectable in the imaginary relation,
especially in the phenomenon of transitivism. It concerns the
captivation by the image of the other — one recognizes the image of
the other as one's own — and thus again reinforces the imaginary
alienation of the ego.
During the period 1953 to 1974, the imaginary maintained
importance, especially in relation to the signified and its effect; see
for example, 'The function and field of speech and language in
psychoanalysis' (1953); 'On a question preliminary to any possible
treatment of psychosis' (1955-56); 'The agency of the letter in the
unconscious or reason since Freud' (1957); 'The direction of the
treatment and the principles of its power' (1958). All are published
in the English translation of Écrits (1977) and The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (1978).
However, from the late 1950s onwards the ideas of the symbolic
relation or the radical Other and the subject as subject of the signifier
occupy a more central position. This does not mean that Lacan
suddenly ceases to acknowledge the importance of the imaginary,
or that the imaginary is depreciated or pushed aside. This should be
stressed, since the imaginary is often regarded in a pejorative way
for being pure 'illusion'. Although the imaginary is indeed essentially
linked to miscognition, to mirage and thus also to 'false
reality', it is nonetheless a 'verified reality' (Seminar II, 1954-55, p.
244), mediating man's relation to similar others and to the objects
of his desire.
One thing is certain: without the imaginary there can be no
human reality as such. Moreover, the imaginary is the only 'consistency'
man has. This is developed by Lacan in one of his later
seminars, on R.S.I. (1974-75). As far as the imaginary is concerned,
Lacan here refers to his earliest formulations on the subject, by
defining it as essentially departing from the body as a reflection of
the organism. This seminar also illustrates that Lacan's conception
of the imaginary does not fundamentally alter over the years. In
this sense, it indeed functions as a consistency.
92 A Compendium of Lacanian Terms
The function of the imaginary is always related to the other two
registers used by Lacan, namely, the symbolic and the real.
See also: aggressivity, desire, ideal ego, mirror stage, real, symbolic
Other terms: ego, identification
References
Lacan, J. (1975-76) [1974-75] `Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Book
XXII: Réel, symbolique, imaginaire (Real, symbolic, imaginary)'.
In Ornicar? (2, 3, 4) 1975, (5) 1975-76.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1948] 'Aggressivity in psychoanalysis'. In Écrits: A
Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1949] `The mirror stage as formative of the
function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience' in
Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1953] `The function and field of speech and
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Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1957] 'On a question preliminary to any possible
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Lacan, J. (1977) [1957] `The agency of the letter in the unconscious
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London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1958] `The direction of the treatment and the
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London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1978) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis
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Katrien Libbrecht