Difference between revisions of "Beyond the 'Reality Principle'"
(fixed references and a few typos) |
(The LinkTitles extension automatically added links to existing pages (<a rel="nofollow" class="external free" href="https://github.com/bovender/LinkTitles">https://github.com/bovender/LinkTitles</a>).) |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
* [[Au-delà du 'principe de réalité']] | * [[Au-delà du 'principe de réalité']] | ||
| − | The five pages analyzing the "revolution of the Freudian method" and "the phenomenological description of analytic experience" are enlightening."<ref>{{E}} pp. 81 - 85</ref> | + | The five pages analyzing the "[[revolution]] of the [[Freudian]] method" and "the [[phenomenological]] description of [[analytic]] [[experience]]" are enlightening."<ref>{{E}} pp. 81 - 85</ref> |
| − | Lacan's thinking here is as close as possible to analytic experience. | + | [[Lacan]]'s [[thinking]] here is as close as possible to [[analytic experience]]. |
| − | "Language, before signifying something, signifies for someone": this expression as well as others announce the famous 1953 declarations in Rome (24). | + | "[[Language]], before signifying something, signifies for someone": this expression as well as [[others]] announce the famous 1953 declarations in Rome (24). |
| − | Finally, Lacan attributes Freud's innovative exploration to "the dcsire to curc"; he even adopts the expression as his maxim. | + | Finally, Lacan attributes [[Freud]]'s innovative exploration to "the dcsire to curc"; he even adopts the expression as his maxim. |
| − | The rest of the text is a series of long didactic and polemical theoretical elaborations, related as always to the ambition to create a "new psychological science" that would integrate "the phenomenological achievements of Freudism." | + | The rest of the [[text]] is a series of long didactic and polemical [[theoretical]] elaborations, related as always to the [[ambition]] to create a "new [[psychological]] [[science]]" that would integrate "the phenomenological achievements of Freudism." |
| − | Written at the time of the setback in Marienbad, this composite text promises a second installment that never came to light. In 1966. Lacan made "gestaltism and phenomenology" responsible for the fact that it was never written. In fact, he had not yet found his own way to answer two qucstions that were already clearly raised here: How is reality constituted for the subject'? How is the I, in which the subject recognizes himself, constituted? | + | Written at the [[time]] of the setback in [[Marienbad]], this composite text promises a second installment that never came to light. In 1966. Lacan made "gestaltism and [[phenomenology]]" [[responsible]] for the fact that it was never written. In fact, he had not yet found his own way to answer two qucstions that were already clearly raised here: How is [[reality]] constituted for the [[subject]]'? How is the I, in which the subject recognizes himself, constituted? |
== References == | == References == | ||
Revision as of 21:00, 23 May 2019
The five pages analyzing the "revolution of the Freudian method" and "the phenomenological description of analytic experience" are enlightening."[1]
Lacan's thinking here is as close as possible to analytic experience.
"Language, before signifying something, signifies for someone": this expression as well as others announce the famous 1953 declarations in Rome (24). Finally, Lacan attributes Freud's innovative exploration to "the dcsire to curc"; he even adopts the expression as his maxim.
The rest of the text is a series of long didactic and polemical theoretical elaborations, related as always to the ambition to create a "new psychological science" that would integrate "the phenomenological achievements of Freudism."
Written at the time of the setback in Marienbad, this composite text promises a second installment that never came to light. In 1966. Lacan made "gestaltism and phenomenology" responsible for the fact that it was never written. In fact, he had not yet found his own way to answer two qucstions that were already clearly raised here: How is reality constituted for the subject'? How is the I, in which the subject recognizes himself, constituted?
References
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. pp. 81 - 85
