Difference between revisions of "Defence"

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defence (dÈfense)              From his earliest works, Freud situated the concept of
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From his earliest works, [[Freud]] situated the concept of [[defence]] (''défense'') at the heart of his theory of [[neurosis]].
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Defence refers to the reaction of the [[ego]] to certain interior stimuli which the [[ego]] perceives as dangerous.
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Although Freud later came to argue that there were different "[[defense mechanisms|mechanisms of defence]]' in addition to [[repression]]<ref>see Freud, 1926d</ref>, he makes it clear that repression is unique in the sense that it is constitutive of the [[unconscious]].
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[[Anna Freud]] attempted to classify some of these mechanisms in her book [[The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence]]</u> (1936).
  
defence at the heart of his theory of neurosis. Defence refers to the reaction of
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Lacan is very critical of the way in which Anna Freud and [[ego-psychology]] interpret the concept of defence.
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He argues that they confuse the concept of defence with the concept of [[resistance]].<ref>Ec, 335</ref>
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For this reason, Lacan urges caution when discussing the concept of defence, and prefers not to centre his concept of psychoanalytic [[treatment]] around it.  
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When he does discuss defence, he opposes it to resistance; whereas resistances are transitory [[imaginary]] responses to intrusions of the [[symbolic]] and are on the side of the [[object]], defences are more permanent [[symbolic]]      [[structures]] of [[subjectivity]] (which Lacan usually calls [[fantasy]] rather than defence).
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This way of distinguishing between resistance and defence is quite different from that of other [[schools|schools of psychoanalysis]], which, if they have distinguished between defence and resistance at all, have generally tended to regard defences as transitory phenomena and resistances as more stable.
  
the ego to certain interior stimuli which the ego perceives              as dangerous.
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The opposition between desire and defence is, for Lacan, a dialectical one.
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Thus he argues in 1960 that, like the neurotic, the [[pervert]] "defends himself in his desire," since "desire is a defence (''défense''), a [[prohibition]] (défense) against going beyond a certain limit in ''jouissance''."<ref>E, 322</ref>
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In 1964 he goes on to argue: "To desire involves a defensive phase that makes it identical with not wanting to desire."<ref>Sll, 235</ref>
  
Although Freud later came to argue that there were different 'mechanisms
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==References==
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<references/>
  
of defence' in addition tO REPRESSION (see Freud, 1926d), he makes it clear that
 
  
repression is unique in the sense that it is constitutive of the unconscious. Anna
 
  
Freud attempted to classify some of these mechanisms in her book The Ego
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==See Also==
  
and the Mechanisms of Defence (1936).
 
  
      Lacan is very critical of the way in which Anna Freud and ego-psychology
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[[Category:Terms]]
 
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[[Category:Concepts]]
interpret the concept of defence. He argues that they confuse the concept of
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[[Category:Treatment]]
 
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[[Category:Freudian psychology]]
defence with the concept of RESISTANCE (Ec, 335). For this reason, Lacan urges
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[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
 
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[[Category:Jacques Lacan]]
caution when discussing the concept of defence, and prefers not to centre his
 
 
 
concept of psychoanalytic treatment around it. When he does discuss defence,
 
 
 
he opposes it to resistance; whereas resistances              are transitory imaginary
 
 
 
responses to intrusions of the symbolic and are            on the side of the object,
 
 
 
defences      are  more permanent symbolic      structures of subjectivity (which
 
 
 
Lacan usually callS FANTASY rather than defence). This way of distinguishing
 
 
 
between resistance and defence is quite different from that of other schools of
 
 
 
psychoanalysis, which, if they have distinguished between defence and resis-
 
 
 
  tance at all, have generally tended to regard defences as transitory phenomena
 
 
 
  and resistances as more stable.
 
 
 
      The opposition between desire and defence is, for Lacan, a dialectical one.
 
 
 
Thus he argues in 1960 that, like the neurotic, the pervert 'defends himself in
 
 
 
his desire', since 'desire is a defence (dÈfense), a prohibition (dÈfense) against
 
 
 
going beyond a certain limit in jouissance' (E, 322). In 1964 he goes on to
 
 
 
argue: 'To desire involves a defensive phase that makes it identical with not
 
 
 
wanting to desire' (Sll, 235).
 

Revision as of 03:31, 22 May 2006

From his earliest works, Freud situated the concept of defence (défense) at the heart of his theory of neurosis. Defence refers to the reaction of the ego to certain interior stimuli which the ego perceives as dangerous. Although Freud later came to argue that there were different "mechanisms of defence' in addition to repression[1], he makes it clear that repression is unique in the sense that it is constitutive of the unconscious. Anna Freud attempted to classify some of these mechanisms in her book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (1936).

Lacan is very critical of the way in which Anna Freud and ego-psychology interpret the concept of defence. He argues that they confuse the concept of defence with the concept of resistance.[2] For this reason, Lacan urges caution when discussing the concept of defence, and prefers not to centre his concept of psychoanalytic treatment around it. When he does discuss defence, he opposes it to resistance; whereas resistances are transitory imaginary responses to intrusions of the symbolic and are on the side of the object, defences are more permanent symbolic structures of subjectivity (which Lacan usually calls fantasy rather than defence). This way of distinguishing between resistance and defence is quite different from that of other schools of psychoanalysis, which, if they have distinguished between defence and resistance at all, have generally tended to regard defences as transitory phenomena and resistances as more stable.

The opposition between desire and defence is, for Lacan, a dialectical one. Thus he argues in 1960 that, like the neurotic, the pervert "defends himself in his desire," since "desire is a defence (défense), a prohibition (défense) against going beyond a certain limit in jouissance."[3] In 1964 he goes on to argue: "To desire involves a defensive phase that makes it identical with not wanting to desire."[4]

References

  1. see Freud, 1926d
  2. Ec, 335
  3. E, 322
  4. Sll, 235


See Also