Talk:Perversion
In psychoanalysis, particularly within the traditions established by Sigmund Freud and developed by Jacques Lacan, perversion refers to a specific clinical structure. Distinct from both neurosis and psychosis, the perverse structure is defined by a fundamental positioning of the subject in relation to the Symbolic order, the Law, and the enjoyment (jouissance) of the Other.
Psychoanalytic theory posits a rigorous distinction between perverse acts and the perverse structure. While everyday language and psychiatry often conflate perversion with "unnatural" or socially unacceptable sexual acts, a subject may engage in sexual practices traditionally labeled as perverse—such as fetishism, sadomasochism, or voyeurism—without occupying the clinical structure of perversion. Conversely, a subject structured as a pervert may strictly adhere to social conventions while maintaining a specific psychic economy characterized by the mechanism of disavowal (Verleugnung).
The concept evolved significantly throughout the history of psychoanalysis. Freud initially approached perversion in his 1905 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality as a deviation from the biological aim of reproduction. However, his discovery of the "polymorphous perversity" of infantile sexuality undermined the notion of a natural sexual norm, suggesting that perversion is a constituent element of all human sexuality. Lacan later reformulated these insights, shifting the definition from behavioral deviation to a structural logic defined by the subject's refusal to accept symbolic castration, utilizing disavowal to maintain an identification with the imaginary phallus.
Freudian foundation
The psychoanalytic theory of perversion begins with Sigmund Freud, who transformed the nineteenth-century psychiatric understanding of sexual pathology. Rather than viewing perversion as a sign of hereditary degeneration, Freud posited it as a lens for understanding the complex construction of human sexuality.
The Three Essays and the sexual norm
In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud defined perversion against the baseline of "normal" sexuality: the popular assumption that the sexual instinct awakens at puberty with an attraction to the opposite sex, aiming at genital union for reproduction.[1] Against this, he categorized perversions into two deviations:
- **Deviations in the sexual object:** Where the libido is directed toward an object other than a mature adult of the opposite sex (e.g., homosexuality, pedophilia, zoophilia).
- **Deviations in the sexual aim:** Where the sexual act transgresses anatomical regions intended for union (e.g., oral or anal sex) or halts at a preliminary stage (e.g., voyeurism, exhibitionism, sadism, masochism).[1]
Polymorphous perversity
Freud simultaneously destabilized the status of the "norm" through the concept of **polymorphous perversity**. He argued that the human drive (Trieb) lacks a pre-given object or fixed aim. Instead, infantile sexuality is characterized by a disposition where the child seeks pleasure from various erogenous zones indiscriminately.[1]
This led to the conclusion that adult sexuality is not a natural starting point but a precarious developmental achievement. Consequently, Freud viewed adult perversion as a **fixation** to, or a **regression** toward, these infantile partial drives. The perverse subject is one for whom the organization of the libido under the Oedipus complex has not fully succeeded.
Neurosis as the "negative" of perversion
A central tenet of Freud’s early theory is the dialectical relationship between perversion and neurosis. Freud declared that "the neuroses are, so to speak, the negative of the perversions."[2]
This implies a hydraulic relationship between repression and enactment. The neurotic subject represses the polymorphous impulses of childhood, which return as symptoms (e.g., hysterical blindness masking voyeurism). The perverse subject enacts these impulses consciously. While later theory would complicate this view by showing perversion to be a defense structure rather than merely uninhibited instinct, this formula established the structural link between the categories.
Fetishism and disavowal
In his 1927 paper Fetishism, Freud identified a specific psychic mechanism unique to the fetishist: **disavowal** (Verleugnung).[3]
Freud observed that the fetishist confronts the same traumatic perception as the neurotic: the realization of the mother's "castration" (absence of the penis). Unlike the neurotic who represses this, or the psychotic who forecloses it, the fetishist refuses to accept the reality of the perception while simultaneously retaining it. He erects a **fetish**—a symbolic substitute for the missing maternal phallus—as a monument to this denial. This results in a **splitting of the ego** (Ichspaltung), where two contradictory psychical attitudes coexist.
Lacanian reformulation
Jacques Lacan reoriented the concept by moving away from biological developmentalism. He conceptualized perversion as a distinct **clinical structure**—a stable mode of the subject’s relation to the Symbolic order, the Name-of-the-Father, and the desire of the Other.
Structure vs. acts
Lacanian theory distinguishes strictly between **perverse acts** and **perverse structure**.
- **Perverse acts:** Behaviors traditionally labeled "perverse" may be performed by subjects of any structure. A neurotic might employ a perverse scenario to sustain desire, yet their psychic economy remains organized by doubt and repression.
- **Perverse structure:** A fundamental position of the subject in relation to the Other. A subject with a perverse structure may never violate juridical laws, yet still function according to the logic of disavowal.[4]
This implies a universalist position: diagnosis is independent of social approval. For instance, pederasty in Ancient Greece was socially sanctioned, yet Lacan classifies it structurally as a configuration where desire bypasses the Oedipal prohibition.[5]
The subject and the Law
Clinical categories are determined by the subject's position regarding the Law—specifically the prohibition of incest. Unlike the neurotic, who is paralyzed by the ambiguity of the Other's desire, the pervert is characterized by "perverse certainty." They claim to know exactly what the Other needs for enjoyment. Furthermore, the pervert’s transgression is not a revolutionary attempt to overthrow the Law but a maneuver to sustain it. As Jean Clavreul formulated, the pervert resolves the conflict between desire and Law by "making desire the law of his acts."[6]
Identification with the imaginary phallus
The structural origin of perversion is located in the pre-Oedipal imaginary triangle (Mother—Child—Phallus). In the normative Oedipus complex, the intervention of the Father forces the child to renounce the fantasy of being the sole object of the mother's satisfaction. The perverse subject refuses this symbolic substitution. Instead of accepting the "lack" in the Other, the pervert identifies with the imaginary phallus. The subject positions themselves as the object that fills the mother's void, effectively "plugging" the hole in the Symbolic.[7]
Mechanisms
Disavowal
The constitutive mechanism of the perverse structure is **disavowal** (Verleugnung). It involves a simultaneous acknowledgment and denial of a traumatic perception—specifically, symbolic castration. This logic is summarized by the formula attributed to Octave Mannoni: "I know very well, but all the same..." (Je sais bien, mais quand même...).[8] The subject knows the Other is castrated (lacking), but "all the same," acts as if the Other is complete.
The fetish as veil
Fetishism serves as the paradigm for this logic. In the Lacanian framework, the **fetish** functions as a **veil**—a screen erected to cover the anxiety produced by the lack in the Other. By fixating on the fetish object, the subject arrests the movement of the signifier. Where neurotic desire is metonymic (sliding from object to object), the fetishist’s jouissance is "frozen" upon the fetish, allowing the subject to bypass the enigma of the Other's desire.
Metapsychology
The drive and instrumentalization
Lacan rejects the notion that perversion represents uninhibited instinct. Instead, the pervert is strictly subject to the drive. The subject abdicates agency to become the **instrument** of the Other's enjoyment, working to ensure the jouissance of the Big Other. Lacan encapsulates this in Écrits: "The subject here makes himself the instrument of the Other's jouissance."[9]
Inversion of fantasy
Lacan formalizes the structural difference between neurosis and perversion through the mathemes of fantasy.
- **Neurotic fantasy:** . The barred subject () relates to the object cause of desire ().
- **Perverse fantasy:** . The perverse subject occupies the position of the **object a** and confronts the **barred subject** ().[9]
This inversion implies that the pervert identifies with the partial object (gaze, voice) to produce a division ()—such as anxiety or shock—in the Other.
Clinical manifestations
Perversion manifests through specific configurations of the partial drive.
Scopophilia
Manifestations of the **scopic drive**:
- **Voyeurism:** The subject reduces themselves to a point of perception to sustain the illusion of the Other's wholeness, seeking the moment the Other betrays a lack.
- **Exhibitionism:** The subject identifies with the object-gaze ($a$) and exposes themselves to provoke division (shame/shock) in the Other, thereby capturing the Other's gaze.[10]
Invocatory drive
Manifestations of the **invocatory drive**:
- **Sadism:** The sadist identifies with the Law to inflict pain, but the ultimate object is the **voice** (the scream), which marks the Other's division.
- **Masochism:** The masochist identifies with the object "waste" ($a$) to force the Other to occupy the position of the cruel Master, generating anxiety in the Other to guarantee the Other's existence.[11]
Controversies
Norms vs. nature
Lacan argues that Freud occasionally conflated the normative requirements of the Oedipus complex with biological necessity. For Lacan, heterosexuality is "a question of norms and not of nature."[12] Since sexuality is constituted by language, there is no "natural" instinct. The ethical stance of the analyst is therefore one of **neutrality**; the analyst acts not as a "moral orthopedist" but analyzes the subject's defense against castration.
Homosexuality
In Seminar VIII, Lacan analyzed Ancient Greek pederasty as structurally perverse because it bypassed the Oedipal "No." However, in contemporary Lacanian practice, **homosexuality is not a clinical structure**. A subject’s object choice does not determine structure; a homosexual subject can be neurotic, psychotic, or perverse. Diagnosis depends solely on the mechanism of disavowal and identification with the imaginary phallus.[13]
Treatment
The treatment of the perverse subject is complicated by the rarity of the **demand** for analysis. Unlike the neurotic who questions their suffering, the pervert is characterized by **certainty** regarding enjoyment. When perverts enter analysis, it is often due to legal compulsion or the collapse of the fantasy.
While traditional views held that perverts could not establish transference, Lacan argued they are analysable. He cited **Alcibiades** in Plato's Symposium as an example of perverse transference toward Socrates. The goal of treatment is not normalization but **"hystericization"**: introducing a gap in the subject's certainty and shifting them from the position of the object ($a$) to the divided subject (), allowing them to confront the anxiety of castration.[5]
See also
- Ego psychology
- Foreclosure (psychoanalysis)
- Jacques-Alain Miller
- Kant with Sade
- Paraphilia
- Psychopathology
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Freud, S. (1905). Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Standard Edition, VII. London: Hogarth Press, p. 135.
- ↑ Freud, S. (1905). Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Standard Edition, VII. p. 165.
- ↑ Freud, S. (1927). Fetishism. Standard Edition, XXI. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 152–157.
- ↑ Fink, B. (1997). A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Lacan, J. (2015). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference (1960-1961). Cambridge: Polity, p. 43.
- ↑ Clavreul, J. (1980). "The Perverse Couple". In Returning to Freud. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- ↑ Lacan, J. (2020). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book IV: The Object Relation. Cambridge: Polity, p. 197-198.
- ↑ Mannoni, O. (1969). "Je sais bien, mais quand même." In Clefs pour l'imaginaire ou l'Autre Scène. Paris: Seuil.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Lacan, J. (2006). "Kant with Sade". In Écrits. New York: Norton, p. 648.
- ↑ Lacan, J. (1981). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. New York: Norton, p. 185.
- ↑ Lacan, J. (2014). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety (1962–1963). Cambridge: Polity, p. 112.
- ↑ Lacan, J. (2006). "On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis". In Écrits. New York: Norton, p. 464.
- ↑ Lacan, J. (1998). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: Encore (1972–1973). New York: Norton, p. 32.