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Social bond

From No Subject

In psychoanalysis, the social bond refers to the structural relation that binds subjects together through language, desire, and unconscious processes. Unlike sociological or psychological models of cohesion, which often emphasize empathy, shared norms, or adaptive functioning, the psychoanalytic concept highlights how subjectivity itself is constituted through symbolic relations with others.

The social bond is not seen as an interpersonal connection between already-formed individuals. Rather, it is a discursive and libidinal structure through which subjects emerge, speak, desire, and relate to the Other. The concept receives its most systematic articulation in the work of Jacques Lacan, particularly through his theory of the Four discourses, where the social bond is formalized as a stable configuration of positions within language.


Definition and Orientation

The psychoanalytic notion of the social bond designates the symbolic and unconscious structures that underlie all social relations. These structures:

  • precede individual intention;
  • organize relations through language and signifiers;
  • and generate both connection and division among subjects.

In this view, the social bond is not reducible to affective attachment, conscious agreement, or moral solidarity. Instead, it is a function of how the subject is inserted into the symbolic order, and how this insertion determines their relation to law, desire, knowledge, and jouissance.

Far from being an external framework in which subjects interact, the social bond is intrinsic to the formation of the subject. Psychoanalysis asks not how individuals form social ties, but how subjects are constituted within pre-existing symbolic and discursive structures.

Freudian Foundations

Although Sigmund Freud did not formalize the term “social bond,” he laid the groundwork for the concept in his theories of libidinal economy, group identification, and the role of the superego. In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Freud argued that collective life is sustained not by rational contracts, but by libidinal identifications with shared ideals or leader-figures.[1]

Here, the group functions as a field of narcissistic identifications, often centered around an idealized ego figure. The superego, emerging from internalized authority, plays a dual role—binding subjects to social norms while generating guilt, ambivalence, and repression.

Freud thus conceptualized social life as fundamentally ambivalent: held together by unconscious attachment and conflict, not by harmony.

Lacanian Reformulation

Jacques Lacan redefined the social bond in structural terms, moving away from affective or interpersonal interpretations. For Lacan, social bonds are effects of discourse—that is, of structured relations among language, knowledge, desire, and the subject.

Discourse theory

Lacan’s formalization of the Four discourses in The Seminar, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis (1969–70) marks a decisive reformulation. Each discourse defines a specific type of social bond by arranging four structural elements—the master signifier (S₁), knowledge (S₂), the barred subject ($), and objet petit a—into a fixed configuration of positions (agent, other, truth, product).[2]

The four primary discourses are:

Each discourse configures the social bond differently, determining how authority, knowledge, and desire circulate between subjects.

Subjectivity and the Social Bond

In Lacanian theory, the subject is not the source but the product of the social bond. Entry into the symbolic order through language entails a fundamental division of the subject (the barred subject, $), and introduces both lack and desire.

Far from being accidental, conflict, misrecognition, and dissatisfaction are constitutive of all social bonds. Subjects relate to one another through shared signifiers, ideals, and fantasies, yet these relations are always incomplete, marked by misunderstanding and impossibility.

The social bond, in this sense, is sustained not by fulfillment but by the structural failure of communication—a failure rooted in the non-coincidence of the subject and its speech.

This point is formalized in Lacan’s axiom that there is no sexual relation—a thesis that emphasizes the impossibility of a fully harmonious relation between two subjects.

Clinical and Ethical Implications

Although the concept of the social bond is often theoretical, it has direct relevance to clinical psychoanalysis. The analytic encounter itself constitutes a particular kind of social bond—one governed not by empathy or adaptation but by discourse.

The Discourse of the Analyst suspends mastery and knowledge in order to create space for the subject’s speech and confrontation with desire. The analyst occupies the position of objet petit a, not as a person to be understood or identified with, but as a cause that elicits the analysand’s relation to the unconscious.

From this perspective, analysis does not seek to normalize or reintegrate the subject into pre-existing social bonds, but to transform the subject's position within them—especially where those positions are structured by suffering or symptomatic impasses.

Misconceptions and Clarifications

The psychoanalytic concept of the social bond is often misunderstood. It does not refer to:

  • interpersonal empathy;
  • moral solidarity;
  • emotional attachment;
  • or successful social adaptation.

Instead, psychoanalysis insists that social bonds are structured by language, division, and enjoyment. They may be alienating, conflictual, or even oppressive. What binds subjects together is not always what harmonizes them—it may be shared lack, fantasy, or the structural impossibility of full understanding.

See also

References

  1. Freud, Sigmund. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 18, trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1955.
  2. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, trans. Russell Grigg. New York: W. W. Norton, 2007.