End of analysis
The end of analysis in psychoanalysis refers to the structural and subjective conclusion of the analytic process. It goes beyond the formal termination of sessions and instead indicates that the central aims of psychoanalysis—such as working through unconscious conflicts, transformation of fantasy, and changes in the relation to desire, symptom, and the analyst—have been sufficiently achieved. While various schools of psychoanalysis offer different models for understanding analytic completion, the term often denotes a decisive psychic shift rather than a return to adaptation or symptom relief.
The concept has been especially elaborated within Lacanian psychoanalysis, where the end of analysis is conceived as a logical endpoint in the structure of the treatment, culminating in transformations such as the traversal of the fundamental fantasy, subjective destitution, and, in Lacan’s later work, identification with the sinthome.
Definition and overview
In psychoanalytic practice, the end of analysis marks a moment when further sessions are no longer expected to yield essential new analytic change. Unlike general psychotherapy, which may conclude when symptoms remit or functional goals are met, psychoanalysis frames its ending in relation to how the subject confronts unconscious determination, especially as it is revealed in transference, fantasy, and repetition.
Thus, the end of analysis is not merely clinical but symbolic: it involves the analysand taking up a new relation to their symptom, the unconscious, and to the Other. It is also ethical, insofar as it entails the assumption of responsibility for one’s desire.
Freud’s perspective
The earliest sustained exploration of analytic completion appears in Sigmund Freud’s 1937 paper, Analysis Terminable and Interminable.[1] There, Freud asked whether psychoanalysis has a “natural” end and proposed clinical criteria for ending treatment:
- relief or transformation of symptoms;
- increased capacity for insight and affect regulation;
- reduction of inhibitions and anxiety;
- resolution of major transferential conflicts.
Freud acknowledged, however, that such criteria are provisional. Unconscious processes are persistent, defenses can be reactivated, and certain internal conflicts—especially those rooted in early narcissism or instinctual fixations—may remain structurally unresolvable. Hence his distinction between analysis as terminable in practice but interminable in principle.[1]
Freud did not claim that analysis leads to a final cure, but rather that it enables patients to manage psychic conflict more freely, having internalized analytic tools for ongoing reflective work.
Clinical criteria and process
In classical psychoanalysis, the process of reaching the end of analysis involves a gradual evolution rather than a fixed endpoint. Indicators include:
- diminished frequency or compulsion of neurotic symptoms;
- shifts in transference: from rigid repetition to more fluid and reflective dynamics;
- demonstrated capacity for working through previously unconscious conflicts;
- emergence of an “inner analyst”—a capacity to interpret and reflect without external analytic support;
- increased autonomy, tolerance for ambivalence, and resilience in the face of desire and loss.
Ending is often negotiated collaboratively, though not always symmetrically: some patients initiate termination prematurely, while others may resist it unconsciously. The emotional charge of ending—often involving mourning, gratitude, regression, and ambivalence—is viewed not as failure but as part of the analytic material to be worked through in the final phase.
Lacanian theory
Jacques Lacan offered one of the most radical reformulations of analytic ending, drawing a distinction between the aim and the end of analysis. For Lacan:
- The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is for the analysand to articulate the truth of their desire;
- The end of analysis is a logical and structural shift, not defined by symptom resolution or ego adaptation.
Multiple formulations
Across Lacan’s teaching, the end of analysis is conceptualized through several stages:
- Early 1950s — The end coincides with the emergence of true speech, when the analysand can speak to the analyst about themselves in a way that assumes subjectivity and history.[2]
- 1960s — Lacan presents the end as a confrontation with subjective destitution, the experience of anxiety and loss of fantasy-based identity, and as a traversal of the fundamental fantasy that organizes unconscious desire.[3]
- Late teaching — The end is reframed as identification with the sinthome, a unique mode of jouissance that structures the subject’s relation to enjoyment and meaning beyond the ego or symptom.[4]
Shift in subjective positions
The end of analysis involves transformations in the respective positions of:
- The analysand, who undergoes subjective destitution, giving up the fantasy of a complete or knowable self and recognizing the non-existence of the Other as guarantor of meaning;
- The analyst, who relinquishes the position of the subject-supposed-to-know, reduced to the function of objet petit a, the cause of the analysand’s desire.
Institutionalization of the end: the pass
In 1967, Lacan introduced the procedure of the pass as a way to institutionalize the transmission of the end of analysis. Through the pass, an analysand testifies to their experience of analytic transformation before a jury of analysts. The procedure was designed not to verify success but to foreground the singular subjective logic of analytic completion.
While the pass remains controversial and is only practiced in certain Lacanian schools, it reflects Lacan’s insistence that the end of analysis is inherently unverifiable by external standards, yet must be transmitted within psychoanalytic discourse.
Misconceptions and debates
Common misconceptions about the end of analysis include:
- that it marks psychological wholeness or happiness;
- that it is defined by identification with the analyst;
- that it involves the eradication of transference or the disappearance of the symptom;
- that it culminates in ego strengthening or normative adjustment.
Lacan opposed these views, arguing that they confuse psychoanalysis with suggestion, adaptation, or psychotherapy. For Lacan, analysis is not aimed at curing but at confronting the truth of desire, lack, and the symbolic order—a process that is not always therapeutic in the conventional sense.[5]
Contemporary perspectives
Contemporary psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians recognize that the end of analysis must be approached pluralistically, varying according to theoretical orientation, cultural context, and treatment modality. In some brief or relational models, analytic ending is structured from the outset; in others, it emerges organically over time.
Despite differences, most traditions agree that:
- analytic ending is not identical with cure;
- unconscious conflict persists beyond treatment;
- the goal is to foster reflective capacity, resilience, and a changed relation to desire.
The enduring challenge remains how to end analysis without betraying its commitment to ongoing unconscious processes.
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Freud, Sigmund. “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 23, trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1964.
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977, p. 88.
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (Seminar XI), trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1978, p. 273.
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Le Sinthome (Seminar XXIII), 1975–1976. Unpublished seminar.
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Other Side of Psychoanalysis (Seminar XVII), trans. Russell Grigg. New York: Norton, 2007, p. 122.