Difference between revisions of "From Proto-Reality to the Act"
(The LinkTitles extension automatically added links to existing pages (https://github.com/bovender/LinkTitles).) |
|||
(2 intermediate revisions by one other user not shown) | |||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
− | + | {{BSZ}} | |
− | irreconcilable gap in all its guises-the distance that forever separates the radically inert, | + | |
− | ahistorical Real from its ultimately delusive historicizations, the non-coincidence | + | Peter Dews' basic criticism of my [[reading]] of [[Schelling]] is that, by way of asserting the |
− | between the subject and the signifier, etc. - I remain blind to Schelling's basic thrust | + | [[irreconcilable]] gap in all its guises-the distance that forever separates the radically inert, |
− | towards the deeper affinity between spirit and nature, and thus towards the possibility of | + | ahistorical [[Real]] from its ultimately delusive historicizations, the non-coincidence |
+ | between the [[subject]] and the [[signifier]], etc. - I remain blind to Schelling's basic thrust | ||
+ | towards the deeper affinity between spirit and [[nature]], and thus towards the possibility of | ||
reconciliation: the ultimate horizon of my reading is the incompatibility between the inert | reconciliation: the ultimate horizon of my reading is the incompatibility between the inert | ||
− | Real of the ground and the subject's freedom, while, already in his early philosophy of | + | Real of the ground and the subject's [[freedom]], while, already in his early [[philosophy]] of |
− | identity, Schelling's ultimate goal is to bring the two together, demonstrating how nature | + | [[identity]], Schelling's ultimate [[goal]] is to bring the two together, demonstrating how nature |
− | is the spirit unconscious of itself and spirit nature conscious of itself. The ultimate motif | + | is the spirit [[unconscious]] of itself and spirit nature [[conscious]] of itself. The ultimate motif |
− | of this criticism is political: since my final horizon is that of an irreducible gap and | + | of this criticism is [[political]]: since my final horizon is that of an irreducible gap and |
− | tension, I am, despite my 'ostensibly left-wing stance', condemned to a vision of social | + | tension, I am, despite my 'ostensibly [[left]]-wing stance', condemned to a [[vision]] of [[social]] |
− | life which is 'ultimately indistinguishable from the familiar forms of conservative | + | [[life]] which is 'ultimately indistinguishable from the familiar forms of [[conservative]] |
− | <i>Kulturkritik</i>'. <a name="1"></a><a href="#1x">1</a> Say, when I formulate today's tension between capitalist globalism and the fundamentalist/particularist reactions to it in the terms of the Schellingian opposition | + | <i>Kulturkritik</i>'. <a [[name]]="1"></a><a href="#1x">1</a> Say, when I formulate today's tension between [[capitalist]] globalism and the fundamentalist/particularist reactions to it in the [[terms]] of the Schellingian opposition |
between expansion and contraction, I thereby condone a pessimist vision of the social life | between expansion and contraction, I thereby condone a pessimist vision of the social life | ||
− | caught in a repetitious deadlock, without any prospect for the resolution of this tension. | + | caught in a repetitious deadlock, without any prospect for the [[resolution]] of this tension. |
− | (Incidentally, this political sting, repeatedly made by Dews and propagated by others | + | (Incidentally, this political sting, repeatedly made by Dews and propagated by [[others]] |
− | close to <i>Radical Philosophy</i>, this double suspicion or, rather, to put it bluntly, unproven | + | close to <i>Radical Philosophy</i>, this [[double]] suspicion or, rather, to put it bluntly, unproven |
− | insinuation that 1) in contrast to my 'official' leftist stance that I display in the Anglo- | + | insinuation that 1) in contrast to my '[[official]]' [[leftist]] stance that I display in the Anglo- |
− | American West, parading there as a marxisant globetrotter, I show my true political | + | American West, parading there as a marxisant globetrotter, I show my [[true]] political |
− | colours in Slovenia, where I am advocating some dark irrationalist nationalism, and that | + | colours in [[Slovenia]], where I am advocating some dark irrationalist [[nationalism]], and that |
− | 2) this irrationalist nationalism is philosophically grounded in (my version of) Lacanian | + | 2) this irrationalist nationalism is philosophically grounded in (my version of) [[Lacanian]] |
− | theory, is the blind spot of Dews' philosophical argumentation, the point at which a | + | [[theory]], is the blind spot of Dews' [[philosophical]] argumentation, the point at which a |
− | disavowed, non-thematized, political passion erupts in the midst of philosophical | + | disavowed, non-thematized, political [[passion]] erupts in the midst of philosophical |
argumentation.)<br><br> | argumentation.)<br><br> | ||
However, it is this very example (of today's tension between capitalist globalism and the | However, it is this very example (of today's tension between capitalist globalism and the | ||
fundamentalist/particularist reactions to it) which, when put in its context, belies Dews' | fundamentalist/particularist reactions to it) which, when put in its context, belies Dews' | ||
− | criticism. The whole point of the chapter of <i>The Indivisible Remainder</i> <a name="2"></a><a href="#2x">2</a> in which I deploy this example is that the tension/oscillation between expansion and contraction is not | + | criticism. The [[whole]] point of the chapter of <i>The Indivisible [[Remainder]]</i> <a name="2"></a><a href="#2x">2</a> in which I deploy this example is that the tension/oscillation between expansion and contraction is not |
− | Schelling's last word: Schelling's notion of <i>Ent-Scheidung</i>, of the primordial | + | Schelling's last [[word]]: Schelling's [[notion]] of <i>Ent-Scheidung</i>, of the primordial |
− | decision/differentiation, designates precisely the act which breaks this vicious cycle of | + | decision/differentiation, designates precisely the act which breaks this [[vicious cycle]] of |
− | expansion/contraction. And my interpretation focuses on why Schelling repeatedly failed | + | expansion/contraction. And my [[interpretation]] focuses on why Schelling repeatedly failed |
− | at this key point. Therein, perhaps, resides the central misunderstanding: the 'synthesis' | + | at this key point. Therein, perhaps, resides the central misunderstanding: the '[[synthesis]]' |
− | between being and its ground is a pseudo-problem (in exactly the same way in which, | + | between [[being]] and its ground is a pseudo-problem (in exactly the same way in which, |
− | from a strict Freudian view, it is meaningless to supplement psychoanalysis with | + | from a strict [[Freudian]] view, it is meaningless to [[supplement]] [[psychoanalysis]] with |
'psychosynthesis', as some revisionists tried to do). The problem Schelling was | 'psychosynthesis', as some revisionists tried to do). The problem Schelling was | ||
− | struggling with, the point of failure of the three consecutive drafts of <i>Weltalter</i>, was the | + | struggling with, the point of failure of the [[three]] consecutive drafts of <i>Weltalter</i>, was the |
− | very emergence of logos out of the vortex of the pre-ontological Real of drives, not the | + | very emergence of [[logos]] out of the vortex of the pre-[[ontological]] Real of [[drives]], not the |
problem of how to bring the two dimensions together again.<br><br> | problem of how to bring the two dimensions together again.<br><br> | ||
It is here that we have to look for the central ambiguity of Schelling's thought: apropos of | It is here that we have to look for the central ambiguity of Schelling's thought: apropos of | ||
− | his claim that man's consciousness arises from the primordial act which separates the | + | his [[claim]] that man's [[consciousness]] arises from the primordial act which separates the |
− | present/actual consciousness from the spectral, shadowy realm of the unconscious, one | + | [[present]]/actual consciousness from the [[spectral]], shadowy realm of the unconscious, one |
has to ask a seemingly naive, but crucial, question: what, precisely, is here unconscious? | has to ask a seemingly naive, but crucial, question: what, precisely, is here unconscious? | ||
− | 'Unconscious' is not primarily the rotary motion of drives ejected into the eternal past; | + | 'Unconscious' is not primarily the rotary motion of drives ejected into the eternal [[past]]; |
'unconscious' is rather the very act of <i>Ent-Scheidung</i> by means of which drives were | 'unconscious' is rather the very act of <i>Ent-Scheidung</i> by means of which drives were | ||
ejected into the past. Or, to put it in slightly different terms: what is truly 'unconscious' in | ejected into the past. Or, to put it in slightly different terms: what is truly 'unconscious' in | ||
− | man is not the immediate opposite of consciousness, the obscure and confused 'irrational' | + | man is not the immediate opposite of consciousness, the obscure and confused '[[irrational]]' |
vortex of drives, but the very founding gesture of consciousness, the act of decision by | vortex of drives, but the very founding gesture of consciousness, the act of decision by | ||
− | means of which I 'choose myself', i.e., combine this multitude of drives into the unity of | + | means of which I 'choose myself', i.e., combine this [[multitude]] of drives into the [[unity]] of |
− | my self. 'Unconscious' is not the passive stuff of inert drives to be used by the creative | + | my [[self]]. 'Unconscious' is not the [[passive]] stuff of inert drives to be used by the creative |
− | 'synthetic' activity of the conscious ego; 'unconscious' in its most radical dimension is | + | 'synthetic' [[activity]] of the conscious ego; 'unconscious' in its most radical [[dimension]] is |
rather the highest deed of my self-positing, or, to resort to later 'existentialist' terms, the | rather the highest deed of my self-positing, or, to resort to later 'existentialist' terms, the | ||
− | choice of my fundamental 'project' which, in order to remain operative, must be | + | [[choice]] of my fundamental '[[project]]' which, in [[order]] to remain operative, must be |
− | 'repressed', kept out of the light of day-or, to quote from the admirable last pages of the | + | '[[repressed]]', kept out of the light of day-or, to quote from the admirable last pages of the |
second draft of <i>Weltalter</i>:</font></p> | second draft of <i>Weltalter</i>:</font></p> | ||
<font size="3"> | <font size="3"> | ||
Line 60: | Line 62: | ||
<font size="3">The decision that in some manner is truly to begin must not be brought back to | <font size="3">The decision that in some manner is truly to begin must not be brought back to | ||
consciousness; it must not be called back, because this would amount to being | consciousness; it must not be called back, because this would amount to being | ||
− | taken back. If, in making a decision, somebody retains the right to reexamine his | + | taken back. If, in making a decision, somebody retains the [[right]] to reexamine his |
choice, he will never make a beginning at all. <a name="3"></a><a href="#3x">3</a> </font></p> | choice, he will never make a beginning at all. <a name="3"></a><a href="#3x">3</a> </font></p> | ||
</blockquote><font size="3"> | </blockquote><font size="3"> | ||
Line 66: | Line 68: | ||
</font><p align="justify"> | </font><p align="justify"> | ||
− | <font size="3">What we encounter here is, of course, the logic of the 'vanishing mediator': of the | + | <font size="3">What we [[encounter]] here is, of course, the [[logic]] of the 'vanishing mediator': of the |
− | founding gesture of differentiation which must sink into invisibility once the difference | + | founding gesture of differentiation which must sink into invisibility once the [[difference]] |
− | between the 'irrational' vortex of drives and the universe of logos is in place. The | + | between the 'irrational' vortex of drives and the [[universe]] of logos is in [[place]]. The |
− | category of 'vanishing mediator' was introduced by Fredric Jameson apropos of Max | + | [[category]] of 'vanishing mediator' was introduced by Fredric [[Jameson]] apropos of Max |
− | Weber. <a name="4"></a><a href="#4x">4</a> In political theory, the exemplary case of a 'vanishing mediator' is provided by the Hegelian notion of the historical hero who resolves the deadlock of the passage from | + | Weber. <a name="4"></a><a href="#4x">4</a> In political theory, the exemplary [[case]] of a 'vanishing mediator' is provided by the [[Hegelian]] notion of the historical hero who resolves the deadlock of the passage from |
− | the natural state of violence to the civil state of peace guaranteed by legitimate power. | + | the [[natural]] [[state]] of [[violence]] to the civil state of peace guaranteed by legitimate [[power]]. |
This passage cannot take place directly, in a continuous line, since there is no common | This passage cannot take place directly, in a continuous line, since there is no common | ||
ground, no intersection, between the state of natural violence and the state of civil peace; | ground, no intersection, between the state of natural violence and the state of civil peace; | ||
− | what is therefore needed is a paradoxical agent who, by means of violence itself, | + | what is therefore needed is a paradoxical [[agent]] who, by means of violence itself, |
− | overcomes violence, i.e., the paradox of an act which retroactively establishes the | + | overcomes violence, i.e., the [[paradox]] of an act which [[retroactively]] establishes the |
− | conditions of its own legitimacy and thereby obliterates its violent character, | + | [[conditions]] of its own legitimacy and thereby obliterates its violent [[character]], |
transforming itself into a solemn founding act.<br><br> | transforming itself into a solemn founding act.<br><br> | ||
However, the supreme example of the 'vanishing mediator' is provided by the Jewish | However, the supreme example of the 'vanishing mediator' is provided by the Jewish | ||
− | assertion of the unconditional iconoclastic monotheism: God is One, totally Other, with | + | assertion of the unconditional iconoclastic [[monotheism]]: God is One, totally [[Other]], with |
− | no human form. The commonplace position is here that pagan (pre-Jewish) gods were | + | no [[human]] [[form]]. The commonplace [[position]] is here that pagan (pre-[[Jewish]]) gods were |
anthropomorphic (say, old Greek gods fornicated, cheated, and engaged in other ordinary | anthropomorphic (say, old Greek gods fornicated, cheated, and engaged in other ordinary | ||
− | human passions), while the Jewish religion, with its iconoclasm, was the first to | + | human passions), while the Jewish [[religion]], with its iconoclasm, was the first to |
thoroughly de-anthropomorphize divinity. What, however, if things are the exact | thoroughly de-anthropomorphize divinity. What, however, if things are the exact | ||
− | opposite? What if the very need to prohibit man making images of God bears witness to | + | opposite? What if the very [[need]] to [[prohibit]] man making [[images]] of God bears [[witness]] to |
− | the personification of God discernible in 'Let us make humankind in our image, | + | the personification of God discernible in 'Let us make humankind in our [[image]], |
according to our likeness' (Genesis 1.26) - what if the true target of Jewish iconoclastic | according to our likeness' (Genesis 1.26) - what if the true target of Jewish iconoclastic | ||
− | prohibition is not previous pagan religions, but rather its own anthropomorphization/ | + | [[prohibition]] is not previous pagan [[religions]], but rather its own anthropomorphization/ |
− | personification of God? What if Jewish religion itself generates the excess it has to | + | personification of God? What if Jewish religion itself generates the [[excess]] it has to |
prohibit? It is the Jewish God who is the first fully personified God, a God who says 'I | prohibit? It is the Jewish God who is the first fully personified God, a God who says 'I | ||
− | am who I am'. In other words, iconoclasm and other Jewish prohibitions do not relate to | + | am who I am'. In other [[words]], iconoclasm and other Jewish prohibitions do not relate to |
− | the pagan Otherness, but to the violence of Judaism's own imaginary excess-in pagan | + | the pagan [[Otherness]], but to the violence of [[Judaism]]'s own [[imaginary]] excess-in pagan |
religions, such prohibition would have been simply meaningless. Making images has to | religions, such prohibition would have been simply meaningless. Making images has to | ||
− | be prohibited not because of the pagans; its true reason is the premonition that, if the | + | be prohibited not because of the pagans; its true [[reason]] is the premonition that, if the |
− | Jews were to do the same as the pagans, something horrible would have emerged (a hint | + | [[Jews]] were to do the same as the pagans, something horrible would have emerged (a hint |
− | of this horror is given in Freud's hypothesis about the murder of Moses, this traumatic | + | of this [[horror]] is given in [[Freud]]'s hypothesis [[about]] the [[murder]] of [[Moses]], this [[traumatic]] |
− | event on the denial of which the Jewish identity is raised). The prohibition to make | + | [[event]] on the [[denial]] of which the Jewish identity is raised). The prohibition to make |
− | images is therefore equivalent to the Jewish disavowal of the primordial crime: the | + | images is therefore equivalent to the Jewish [[disavowal]] of the primordial crime: the |
− | primordial parricide is the ultimate fascinating image. <a name="5"></a><a href="#5x">5</a> (What, then, does the Christian assertion of the unique image of the crucified Christ stand for?) <a name="6"></a><a href="#6x">6</a> <br><br> | + | primordial [[parricide]] is the ultimate fascinating image. <a name="5"></a><a href="#5x">5</a> (What, then, does the [[Christian]] assertion of the unique image of the crucified [[Christ]] stand for?) <a name="6"></a><a href="#6x">6</a> <br><br> |
Anthropomorphism and iconoclasm are thus not simple opposites: it is not that pagan | Anthropomorphism and iconoclasm are thus not simple opposites: it is not that pagan | ||
religions depict gods as simple larger-than-life human persons, while Judaism prohibits | religions depict gods as simple larger-than-life human persons, while Judaism prohibits | ||
such a depiction. It is only with Judaism that God is fully anthropomorphized, that the | such a depiction. It is only with Judaism that God is fully anthropomorphized, that the | ||
− | encounter with Him is the encounter with another person in the fullest sense of the | + | encounter with Him is the encounter with [[another]] person in the fullest [[sense]] of the |
− | term-the Jewish God experiences full wrath, revengefulness, jealousy, etc., as every | + | term-the Jewish God experiences [[full]] wrath, revengefulness, [[jealousy]], etc., as every |
human being. This is why one is prohibited to make images of Him: not because an | human being. This is why one is prohibited to make images of Him: not because an | ||
image would humanize the purely spiritual Entity, but because it would render it all too | image would humanize the purely spiritual Entity, but because it would render it all too | ||
− | faithfully, as the ultimate neighbour-Thing. <a name="7"></a><a href="#7x">7</a> Christianity only goes to the end in this | + | faithfully, as the ultimate neighbour-[[Thing]]. <a name="7"></a><a href="#7x">7</a> [[Christianity]] only goes to the end in this |
direction by asserting not only the likeness of God and man, but their direct identity in | direction by asserting not only the likeness of God and man, but their direct identity in | ||
− | the figure of Christ: no wonder man looks like God, since a man - Christ - is God. With | + | the [[figure]] of Christ: no wonder man looks like God, since a man - Christ - is God. With |
its central notion of Christ as man-God, Christianity just makes 'for itself' the | its central notion of Christ as man-God, Christianity just makes 'for itself' the | ||
personification of God in Judaism. According to the standard notion, pagans were | personification of God in Judaism. According to the standard notion, pagans were | ||
anthropomorphic, Jews were radically iconoclastic, and Christianity accomplishes a kind | anthropomorphic, Jews were radically iconoclastic, and Christianity accomplishes a kind | ||
− | of synthesis, a partial regression to paganism, by introducing the ultimate icon-to-erase- | + | of synthesis, a [[partial]] [[regression]] to [[paganism]], by introducing the ultimate [[icon]]-to-erase- |
− | all-other-icons, that of the suffering Christ. Against this commonplace, one should assert | + | all-other-icons, that of the [[suffering]] Christ. Against this commonplace, one should assert |
− | that it is the Jewish religion that remains an 'abstract/immediate' negation of | + | that it is the Jewish religion that remains an 'abstract/immediate' [[negation]] of |
anthropomorphism, and, as such, attached to it, determined by it in its very direct | anthropomorphism, and, as such, attached to it, determined by it in its very direct | ||
negation, whereas it is only Christianity that effectively 'sublates' paganism. The | negation, whereas it is only Christianity that effectively 'sublates' paganism. The | ||
Christian stance is here: instead of prohibiting the image of God, why not, precisely, | Christian stance is here: instead of prohibiting the image of God, why not, precisely, | ||
allow it, and thus render Him as just another human being, as a miserable man | allow it, and thus render Him as just another human being, as a miserable man | ||
− | indiscernible from other humans with regard to his intrinsic properties? If one is | + | indiscernible from other [[humans]] with [[regard]] to his intrinsic properties? If one is |
− | permitted to indulge in a sacrilegious parallel, science-fiction horror movies practise two | + | permitted to indulge in a sacrilegious parallel, [[science]]-[[fiction]] horror movies practise two |
− | modes to render the alien Thing: either the Thing is wholly Other, a monster whose sight | + | modes to render the [[alien]] Thing: either the Thing is wholly Other, a monster whose [[sight]] |
− | one cannot endure, usually a mixture of reptile, octopus and machine (like, precisely, the | + | one cannot endure, usually a mixture of reptile, octopus and [[machine]] (like, precisely, the |
− | alien from Ridley Scott's film of the same name), or it is exactly the same as we, ordinary | + | alien from Ridley Scott's [[film]] of the same name), or it is exactly the same as we, ordinary |
− | humans - with, of course, some 'barely nothing' which allows us to identify Them (the | + | humans - with, of course, some 'barely [[nothing]]' which allows us to [[identify]] [[Them]] (the |
strange glimpse in their eyes; too much skin between their fingers...). Christ is fully a | strange glimpse in their eyes; too much skin between their fingers...). Christ is fully a | ||
man only in so far as he takes upon himself the excess/remainder, the 'too much' on | man only in so far as he takes upon himself the excess/remainder, the 'too much' on | ||
− | account of which a man, precisely, is never fully a man: his formula is not man = God, | + | account of which a man, precisely, is never fully a man: his [[formula]] is not man = God, |
but man = man, where the divine dimension intervenes only as that 'something' which | but man = man, where the divine dimension intervenes only as that 'something' which | ||
− | prevents the full identity of man to himself. In this sense, Christ's appearance itself | + | prevents the full identity of man to himself. In this sense, Christ's [[appearance]] itself |
− | effectively stands for God's death: with it, it becomes clear that God is nothing but the | + | effectively stands for God's [[death]]: with it, it becomes clear that God is nothing but the |
excess of man, the 'too much' of life which cannot be contained in any life form, which | excess of man, the 'too much' of life which cannot be contained in any life form, which | ||
violates the shape (<i>morphe</i>) of anthropomorphism.<br><br> | violates the shape (<i>morphe</i>) of anthropomorphism.<br><br> | ||
Line 139: | Line 141: | ||
To put it in an even more pointed way: pagans were not celebrating images, they were | To put it in an even more pointed way: pagans were not celebrating images, they were | ||
well aware that the images they were making remained inadequate copies of the true | well aware that the images they were making remained inadequate copies of the true | ||
− | divinity (recall the old Hindu statues of gods with dozens of hands, etc. - a clear example | + | divinity ([[recall]] the old Hindu statues of gods with dozens of hands, etc. - a clear example |
of how any attempt to render divinity in a sensual/material form fails by way of turning | of how any attempt to render divinity in a sensual/material form fails by way of turning | ||
into a half-ridiculous exaggeration). In contrast to the pagans, it was the Jews themselves | into a half-ridiculous exaggeration). In contrast to the pagans, it was the Jews themselves | ||
who believed/assumed that the (sensual/material) image of the divine Person would show | who believed/assumed that the (sensual/material) image of the divine Person would show | ||
− | too much, rendering visible some horrifying secret better left in shadow, which is why | + | too much, rendering [[visible]] some horrifying [[secret]] better left in shadow, which is why |
they had to prohibit it - the Jewish prohibition only has sense against the background of | they had to prohibit it - the Jewish prohibition only has sense against the background of | ||
− | this fear that the image would reveal something shattering, that, in an unbearable way, it | + | this [[fear]] that the image would reveal something shattering, that, in an unbearable way, it |
would be true and adequate. The same goes for the Christians: when already Saint | would be true and adequate. The same goes for the Christians: when already Saint | ||
− | Augustine opposed Christianity, the religion of love, to Judaism, the religion of anxiety, | + | [[Augustine]] opposed Christianity, the religion of [[love]], to Judaism, the religion of [[anxiety]], |
when he conceived of the passage from Judaism to Christianity as the passage from | when he conceived of the passage from Judaism to Christianity as the passage from | ||
anxiety to love, he (again) projected onto Judaism the disavowed founding gesture of | anxiety to love, he (again) projected onto Judaism the disavowed founding gesture of | ||
Christianity itself - what Christianity endeavours to overcome through the reconciliation | Christianity itself - what Christianity endeavours to overcome through the reconciliation | ||
− | in love is its own constitutive excess, the unbearable anxiety opened up by the experience | + | in love is its own [[constitutive excess]], the unbearable anxiety opened up by the [[experience]] |
− | of the impotent God who failed in His work of creation, i.e., to refer yet again to Hegel, | + | of the impotent God who failed in His [[work]] of creation, i.e., to refer yet again to [[Hegel]], |
the traumatic experience of how the enigma of God is also the enigma for God Himself - | the traumatic experience of how the enigma of God is also the enigma for God Himself - | ||
our failure to comprehend God is what Hegel called a 'reflexive determination' of the | our failure to comprehend God is what Hegel called a 'reflexive determination' of the | ||
Line 158: | Line 160: | ||
And the same goes for the standard opposition between the Cartesian self-transparent | And the same goes for the standard opposition between the Cartesian self-transparent | ||
− | subject of thought and the Freudian subject of the unconscious, which is perceived as | + | subject of [[thought]] and the Freudian [[subject of the unconscious]], which is perceived as |
− | anti-Cartesian, as undermining the Cartesian 'illusion' of rational identity. One should | + | anti-[[Cartesian]], as undermining the Cartesian '[[illusion]]' of [[rational]] identity. One should |
− | bear in mind that the opposite by reference to which a certain position asserts itself is this | + | bear in [[mind]] that the opposite by reference to which a certain position asserts itself is this |
− | position's own presupposition, its own inherent excess (as is the case with Kant: the | + | position's own presupposition, its own inherent excess (as is the case with [[Kant]]: the |
− | notion of diabolical evil which he rejects is only possible within the horizon of his own | + | notion of diabolical [[evil]] which he rejects is only possible within the horizon of his own |
− | transcendental revolution). The point here is not so much that the Cartesian <i>cogito</i> is the | + | [[transcendental]] [[revolution]]). The point here is not so much that the Cartesian <i>[[cogito]]</i> is the |
presupposed 'vanishing mediator' of the Freudian subject of the unconscious (a thought | presupposed 'vanishing mediator' of the Freudian subject of the unconscious (a thought | ||
− | worth pursuing), but that the subject of the unconscious is already operative in the | + | worth pursuing), but that [[the subject of the unconscious]] is already operative in the |
Cartesian <i>cogito</i> as its own inherent excess: in order to assert the <i>cogito</i> as the self- | Cartesian <i>cogito</i> as its own inherent excess: in order to assert the <i>cogito</i> as the self- | ||
− | transparent 'thinking substance', one has to pass through the excessive point of madness | + | [[transparent]] '[[thinking]] substance', one has to [[pass]] through the excessive point of [[madness]] |
which designates the <i>cogito</i> as the vanishing abyss of substanceless thought. Along the | which designates the <i>cogito</i> as the vanishing abyss of substanceless thought. Along the | ||
− | same lines, the Jewish/Christian openness to the Other ('Love thy neighbour!') is | + | same lines, the Jewish/Christian [[openness]] to the Other ('Love thy neighbour!') is |
thoroughly different from the pagan tribal hospitality: while the pagan hospitality relies | thoroughly different from the pagan tribal hospitality: while the pagan hospitality relies | ||
− | on the clear opposition between the self-enclosed domain of my community and the | + | on the clear opposition between the self-enclosed [[domain]] of my [[community]] and the |
− | external Other, what reverberates in the Jewish/Christian openness is a reaction against | + | [[external]] Other, what reverberates in the Jewish/Christian openness is a reaction against |
− | the traumatic recognition of the neighbour as the unfathomable abyssal Thing-the alien | + | the traumatic [[recognition]] of the neighbour as the unfathomable abyssal Thing-the alien |
Thing is my closest neighbour himself, not the foreigner visiting my home. In Hegelese, | Thing is my closest neighbour himself, not the foreigner visiting my home. In Hegelese, | ||
the Jewish/Christian openness involves the logic of 'positing its presuppositions': it | the Jewish/Christian openness involves the logic of 'positing its presuppositions': it | ||
Line 180: | Line 182: | ||
− | Kant and Freud both claim to repeat the Copernican turn in their respective domains. | + | Kant and Freud both claim to [[repeat]] the Copernican turn in their respective domains. |
− | With regard to Freud, the meaning of this reference seems clear and simple: in the same | + | With regard to Freud, the [[meaning]] of this reference seems clear and simple: in the same |
− | way Copernicus demonstrated that our earth is not the centre of the universe, but a planet | + | way [[Copernicus]] demonstrated that our earth is not the centre of the universe, but a planet |
− | revolving around the sun, and in this sense 'decentred', turning around another centre, | + | revolving around the sun, and in this sense '[[decentred]]', [[turning around]] another centre, |
− | Freud also demonstrated that the (conscious) ego is not the centre of the human psyche, | + | Freud also demonstrated that the (conscious) ego is not the centre of the human [[psyche]], |
but ultimately an epiphenomenon, a satellite turning around the true centre, the | but ultimately an epiphenomenon, a satellite turning around the true centre, the | ||
unconscious or the id. With Kant, things are more ambiguous-at first, it cannot but | unconscious or the id. With Kant, things are more ambiguous-at first, it cannot but | ||
appear that he actually did the exact opposite of the Copernican turn: is not the key | appear that he actually did the exact opposite of the Copernican turn: is not the key | ||
premise of his transcendental approach that the conditions of possibility of our experience | premise of his transcendental approach that the conditions of possibility of our experience | ||
− | of the objects are at the same time the conditions of possibility of these objects | + | of the [[objects]] are at the same [[time]] the conditions of possibility of these objects |
themselves, so that, instead of a subject which, in its cognition, has to accommodate itself | themselves, so that, instead of a subject which, in its cognition, has to accommodate itself | ||
− | to some external, 'decentred', measure of truth, the objects have to follow the subject, | + | to some external, 'decentred', measure of [[truth]], the objects have to follow the subject, |
i.e., it is the subject itself which, from its central position, constitutes the objects of | i.e., it is the subject itself which, from its central position, constitutes the objects of | ||
− | knowledge? However, if one reads Kant's reference to Copernicus closely, one cannot | + | [[knowledge]]? However, if one reads Kant's reference to Copernicus closely, one cannot |
fail to notice how Kant's emphasis is not on the shift of the substantial fixed centre, but | fail to notice how Kant's emphasis is not on the shift of the substantial fixed centre, but | ||
on something quite different-on the status of the subject itself:</font></p> | on something quite different-on the status of the subject itself:</font></p> | ||
Line 200: | Line 202: | ||
<p align="justify"><font size="3"> | <p align="justify"><font size="3"> | ||
We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the | We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the | ||
− | celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming | + | celestial movements. When he found that he could make no [[progress]] by assuming |
− | that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, | + | that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the [[spectator]], he reversed the [[process]], |
and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars | and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars | ||
remained at rest. <a name="8"></a><a href="#8x">8</a></font></p> | remained at rest. <a name="8"></a><a href="#8x">8</a></font></p> | ||
Line 207: | Line 209: | ||
</font><p align="justify"> | </font><p align="justify"> | ||
− | <font size="3">The precise German terms (<i>die Zuschauer sich drehen</i> - not so much 'turn around | + | <font size="3">The precise [[German]] terms (<i>die Zuschauer sich drehen</i> - not so much 'turn around |
− | another centre' as 'turn/rotate around themselves' <a name="9"></a><a href="#9x">9</a>) make it clear what interests Kant: the subject loses its substantial stability/identity and is reduced to the pure substanceless void | + | another centre' as 'turn/rotate around themselves' <a name="9"></a><a href="#9x">9</a>) make it clear what interests Kant: the subject loses its substantial [[stability]]/identity and is reduced to the pure substanceless [[void]] |
of the self-rotating abyssal vortex called 'transcendental apperception'. And it is against | of the self-rotating abyssal vortex called 'transcendental apperception'. And it is against | ||
− | this background that one can locate Lacan's 'return to Freud': to put it as succinctly as | + | this background that one can locate [[Lacan]]'s '[[return]] to Freud': to put it as succinctly as |
possible, what Lacan does is to read the Freudian reference to the Copernican turn in the | possible, what Lacan does is to read the Freudian reference to the Copernican turn in the | ||
− | original Kantian sense, as asserting not the simple displacement of the centre from the | + | original Kantian sense, as asserting not the simple [[displacement]] of the centre from the |
ego to the id or the unconscious as the 'true' substantial focus of the human psyche, but | ego to the id or the unconscious as the 'true' substantial focus of the human psyche, but | ||
the transformation of the subject itself from the self-identical substantial ego, the | the transformation of the subject itself from the self-identical substantial ego, the | ||
− | psychological subject full of emotions, instincts, dispositions, etc., to what Lacan called | + | [[psychological]] subject full of emotions, [[instincts]], dispositions, etc., to what Lacan called |
− | the 'barred subject ($)', the vortex of the self-relating negativity of desire. In this precise | + | the '[[barred]] subject ($)', the vortex of the [[self-relating]] negativity of [[desire]]. In this precise |
sense, the subject of the unconscious is none other than the Cartesian <i>cogito</i>. | sense, the subject of the unconscious is none other than the Cartesian <i>cogito</i>. | ||
The same logic of 'reflexive determination' is at work in the passage from revolutionary | The same logic of 'reflexive determination' is at work in the passage from revolutionary | ||
− | terror (absolute freedom) to the Kantian moral subject in Hegel's <i>Phenomenology</i> | + | [[terror]] (absolute freedom) to the Kantian [[moral]] subject in Hegel's <i>[[Phenomenology]]</i> |
− | (582ff.): the revolutionary subject experiences itself as mercilessly exposed to the whim | + | (582ff.): the [[revolutionary subject]] experiences itself as mercilessly exposed to the whim |
− | of the terrorist regime-anyone can at any moment be arrested and put to death as | + | of the terrorist [[regime]]-anyone can at any [[moment]] be arrested and put to death as |
− | 'traitor'. Of course, the passage to moral subjectivity occurs when this external terror is | + | 'traitor'. Of course, the passage to moral [[subjectivity]] occurs when this external terror is |
− | internalized by the subject as the terror of the moral law, of the voice of conscience. | + | internalized by the subject as the terror of the moral law, of the [[voice]] of [[conscience]]. |
− | However, what is often overlooked is that, for this internalization to take place, the | + | However, what is often overlooked is that, for this [[internalization]] to take place, the |
− | subject has to profoundly transform its identity: the subject has to renounce the very | + | subject has to profoundly transform its identity: the subject has to [[renounce]] the very |
− | kernel of its contingent individuality, and to accept that the centre of its identity resides in | + | kernel of its [[contingent]] individuality, and to accept that the centre of its identity resides in |
− | its universal moral consciousness. In other words, it is only in so far as I cling to my | + | its [[universal]] moral consciousness. In other words, it is only in so far as I cling to my |
contingent idiosyncratic identity as to the core of my being that I experience the universal | contingent idiosyncratic identity as to the core of my being that I experience the universal | ||
law as the abstract negativity of an alien power that threatens to annihilate me; in this | law as the abstract negativity of an alien power that threatens to annihilate me; in this | ||
precise sense, the internalization of the law is merely the 'reflexive determination' of the | precise sense, the internalization of the law is merely the 'reflexive determination' of the | ||
shift that affects the core of my own identity. It is not the law which changes from the | shift that affects the core of my own identity. It is not the law which changes from the | ||
− | agency of external politcal terror to the pressure of the inner voice of conscience; this | + | [[agency]] of external politcal terror to the pressure of the inner voice of conscience; this |
− | change merely reflects the change in my identity. Perhaps, something similar occurs in | + | [[change]] merely reflects the change in my identity. Perhaps, something similar occurs in |
− | the passage from Judaism to Christianity: what changes in this passage is not the content | + | the passage from Judaism to Christianity: what changes in this passage is not the [[content]] |
(the status of God), but primarily the identity of the believer him- or herself, and the | (the status of God), but primarily the identity of the believer him- or herself, and the | ||
change in God (no longer the transcendent Other, but Christ) is just the 'reflexive | change in God (no longer the transcendent Other, but Christ) is just the 'reflexive | ||
Line 241: | Line 243: | ||
Is this not also the implicit lesson of Thomas Hobbes' key insight apropos of the social | Is this not also the implicit lesson of Thomas Hobbes' key insight apropos of the social | ||
− | contract? In order to be effective, the limitation of individuals' sovereignty - when they | + | contract? In order to be effective, the limitation of individuals' [[sovereignty]] - when they |
agree to transpose it onto the figure of the sovereign and thus end the state of war and | agree to transpose it onto the figure of the sovereign and thus end the state of war and | ||
introduce civic peace-must bestow unlimited power to the person of the sovereign. It is | introduce civic peace-must bestow unlimited power to the person of the sovereign. It is | ||
Line 248: | Line 250: | ||
characterizes the state of nature: for the laws to be operative, there must be a One, a | characterizes the state of nature: for the laws to be operative, there must be a One, a | ||
person with the unlimited power to decide what the laws are. Mutually recognized rules | person with the unlimited power to decide what the laws are. Mutually recognized rules | ||
− | are not enough-there must be a master to enforce them. Therein resides the properly | + | are not enough-there must be a [[master]] to enforce them. Therein resides the properly |
− | dialectical paradox of Hobbes: he starts with the individual's unlimited right to self- | + | [[dialectical]] paradox of [[Hobbes]]: he starts with the [[individual]]'s unlimited right to self- |
preservation, contained by no duties (I have the unalienable right to cheat, steal, lie, kill... | preservation, contained by no duties (I have the unalienable right to cheat, steal, lie, kill... | ||
if my survival is at stake), and he ends up with the sovereign who has the unlimited | if my survival is at stake), and he ends up with the sovereign who has the unlimited | ||
power to dispose of my life, the sovereign whom I experience not as the extension of my | power to dispose of my life, the sovereign whom I experience not as the extension of my | ||
− | own will, as the personification of my ethical substance, but as an arbitrary foreign force. | + | own will, as the personification of my [[ethical]] substance, but as an [[arbitrary]] foreign force. |
This external unlimited power is precisely the 'reflexive determination' of my egotist | This external unlimited power is precisely the 'reflexive determination' of my egotist | ||
− | subjective stance-the way to overcome it is to change my own identity...<br><br> | + | [[subjective]] stance-the way to overcome it is to change my own identity...<br><br> |
However, back to Schelling, the radical breakthrough of his philosophy resides in the | However, back to Schelling, the radical breakthrough of his philosophy resides in the | ||
very notion of the proto-ontological domain of drives: this domain is not simply nature, | very notion of the proto-ontological domain of drives: this domain is not simply nature, | ||
− | but the spectral domain of the not-yet-fully-constituted reality. Schelling's opposition of | + | but the spectral domain of the not-yet-fully-constituted [[reality]]. Schelling's opposition of |
− | the Real of drives (the ground of being) and being itself thus radically displaces the | + | [[the Real]] of drives (the ground of being) and being itself thus radically displaces the |
− | standard philosophical couples of nature and spirit, the real and the idea, existence and | + | standard philosophical couples of nature and spirit, the real and the [[idea]], [[existence]] and |
− | essence, etc. This notion is crucial not only with regard to the history of ideas, but even | + | [[essence]], etc. This notion is crucial not only with regard to the [[history]] of [[ideas]], but even |
with regard to art and our daily experience of reality. Recall the extended stains which | with regard to art and our daily experience of reality. Recall the extended stains which | ||
− | 'are' the yellow sky in late Van Gogh or the water or grass in Munch: this uncanny | + | 'are' the yellow sky in late Van Gogh or the water or grass in [[Munch]]: this [[uncanny]] |
'massiveness' pertains neither to the direct materiality of the colour stains nor to the | 'massiveness' pertains neither to the direct materiality of the colour stains nor to the | ||
materiality of the depicted objects-it dwells in a kind of intermediate spectral domain | materiality of the depicted objects-it dwells in a kind of intermediate spectral domain | ||
Line 271: | Line 273: | ||
Perhaps the most fruitful reverberations of this notion are to be found in the topic of | Perhaps the most fruitful reverberations of this notion are to be found in the topic of | ||
alternate realities in modem narratives. Say, the universe of alternate realities in | alternate realities in modem narratives. Say, the universe of alternate realities in | ||
− | Krzysztof Kieslowski's films is thoroughly ambiguous. On the one hand, its lesson seems | + | Krzysztof [[Kieslowski]]'s [[films]] is thoroughly ambiguous. On the one hand, its lesson seems |
− | to be that we live in a world of alternate realities in which, as in a cyberspace game, when | + | to be that we live in a [[world]] of alternate realities in which, as in a [[cyberspace]] [[game]], when |
one choice leads to a catastrophic ending, we can return to the starting point and make | one choice leads to a catastrophic ending, we can return to the starting point and make | ||
− | another, better, choice - what was the first time a suicidal mistake, can be the second | + | another, better, choice - what was the [[first time]] a suicidal mistake, can be the second |
time done in the correct way, so that the opportunity is not missed. In <i>The Double Life of | time done in the correct way, so that the opportunity is not missed. In <i>The Double Life of | ||
Veronique</i>, Veronique learns from Weronika, avoids the suicidal choice of singing and | Veronique</i>, Veronique learns from Weronika, avoids the suicidal choice of singing and | ||
survives; in <i>Red</i>, Auguste avoids the mistake of the judge; even <i>White</i> ends with the | survives; in <i>Red</i>, Auguste avoids the mistake of the judge; even <i>White</i> ends with the | ||
− | prospect of Karol and his French bride getting a second chance and remarrying. The very | + | prospect of Karol and his [[French]] bride getting a second [[chance]] and remarrying. The very |
− | title of Annette Insdorf's recent book on Kieslowski (<i>Double Lives, Second Chances</i>) | + | title of Annette Insdorf's [[recent]] book on Kieslowski (<i>Double Lives, Second Chances</i>) |
− | points in this direction: the other life is here to give us a second chance, i.e., 'repetition | + | points in this direction: the other life is here to give us a second chance, i.e., '[[repetition]] |
− | becomes accumulation, with a prior mistake as a base for successful action'. <a name="10"></a><a href="#10x">10</a> However, while this universe sustains the prospect of repeating past choices and thus retrieving | + | becomes accumulation, with a prior mistake as a base for successful [[action]]'. <a name="10"></a><a href="#10x">10</a> However, while this universe sustains the prospect of [[repeating]] past choices and thus retrieving |
− | missed opportunities, it can also be interpreted in the opposite, much darker, way. There | + | missed opportunities, it can also be [[interpreted]] in the opposite, much darker, way. There |
− | is a material feature of Kies_lowski's films which has long attracted the attention of | + | is a [[material]] feature of Kies_lowski's films which has long attracted the attention of |
perspicacious critics; suffice it to recall the use of filters in <i>A Short Film about Killing</i>:</font></p><font size="3"> | perspicacious critics; suffice it to recall the use of filters in <i>A Short Film about Killing</i>:</font></p><font size="3"> | ||
Line 298: | Line 300: | ||
</font><p align="justify"> | </font><p align="justify"> | ||
<font size="3">Furthermore, in <i>A Short Film about Killing</i>, the filters are used 'as a kind of mask, | <font size="3">Furthermore, in <i>A Short Film about Killing</i>, the filters are used 'as a kind of mask, | ||
− | darkening parts of the image which Kies_lowski and Idziak did not wish to show'. <a name="12"></a><a href="#12x">12</a> This procedure of having 'large chunks smogged out' <a name="13"></a><a href="#13x">13 - </a> not as part of the formulaic depiction of a dream or a vision, but in shots rendering the grey everyday reality-directly evokes the Gnostic notion of the universe which was created imperfect and is as such not yet | + | darkening parts of the image which Kies_lowski and Idziak did not [[wish]] to show'. <a name="12"></a><a href="#12x">12</a> This procedure of having 'large chunks smogged out' <a name="13"></a><a href="#13x">13 - </a> not as part of the formulaic depiction of a [[dream]] or a vision, but in shots rendering the grey everyday reality-directly evokes the Gnostic notion of the universe which was created imperfect and is as such not yet |
fully constituted. The closest one can get to this notion in reality is, perhaps, the | fully constituted. The closest one can get to this notion in reality is, perhaps, the | ||
countryside in extreme places like Iceland or the Land of Fire at the southernmost point | countryside in extreme places like Iceland or the Land of Fire at the southernmost point | ||
− | of Latin America: patches of grass and wild hedges are interspersed by barren raw earth | + | of [[Latin]] America: patches of grass and wild hedges are interspersed by barren raw earth |
or gravel, fissures out of which sulphuric steam and fire gush out, as if the pre- | or gravel, fissures out of which sulphuric steam and fire gush out, as if the pre- | ||
ontological primordial chaos is still able to penetrate the cracks of the imperfectly | ontological primordial chaos is still able to penetrate the cracks of the imperfectly | ||
Line 308: | Line 310: | ||
Kieslowski's universe is a Gnostic universe, a not-yet-fully-constituted universe created | Kieslowski's universe is a Gnostic universe, a not-yet-fully-constituted universe created | ||
− | by a perverse and confused, idiotic God who screwed up the work of creation, producing | + | by a [[perverse]] and confused, idiotic God who screwed up the work of creation, producing |
an imperfect world, and then trying to save whatever can be saved by repeated new | an imperfect world, and then trying to save whatever can be saved by repeated new | ||
− | attempts-we are all 'children of a lesser God'. In mainstream Hollywood itself, this | + | attempts-we are all '[[children]] of a lesser God'. In mainstream Hollywood itself, this |
uncanny in-between dimension is clearly discernible in what is arguably the most | uncanny in-between dimension is clearly discernible in what is arguably the most | ||
− | effective scene in <i>Alien 4: Resurrection</i>: the cloned Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) enters the | + | effective [[scene]] in <i>Alien 4: Resurrection</i>: the cloned Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) enters the |
laboratory room in which the previous seven aborted attempts to clone her are on | laboratory room in which the previous seven aborted attempts to clone her are on | ||
display-here she encounters the ontologically failed, defective versions of herself, up to | display-here she encounters the ontologically failed, defective versions of herself, up to | ||
the almost successful version with her own face, but with some of her limbs distorted so | the almost successful version with her own face, but with some of her limbs distorted so | ||
that they resemble the limbs of the alien Thing-this creature asks Ripley to kill her, and, | that they resemble the limbs of the alien Thing-this creature asks Ripley to kill her, and, | ||
− | in an outburst of violent rage, Ripley effectively destroys the entire horror show... This | + | in an [[outburst]] of violent rage, Ripley effectively destroys the entire horror show... This |
idea of multiple imperfect universes can be discerned at two levels in Kies_lowski's | idea of multiple imperfect universes can be discerned at two levels in Kies_lowski's | ||
oeuvre: 1) the botched character of reality is depicted in his films, as well as the ensuing | oeuvre: 1) the botched character of reality is depicted in his films, as well as the ensuing | ||
repeated attempts to (re-)create a new, better, reality; 2) with regard to Kieslowski | repeated attempts to (re-)create a new, better, reality; 2) with regard to Kieslowski | ||
− | himself as author, we also have the repeated attempts to tell the same story in a slightly | + | himself as [[author]], we also have the repeated attempts to tell the same story in a slightly |
different way (not only the difference between TV and movie versions of <i>Dekalog 5</i> and | different way (not only the difference between TV and movie versions of <i>Dekalog 5</i> and | ||
6, but also his idea to make 20 different versions of <i>Veronique</i> and play them in different | 6, but also his idea to make 20 different versions of <i>Veronique</i> and play them in different | ||
− | theatres in Paris - a different version for each theatre). In this eternally repeated | + | theatres in [[Paris]] - a different version for each theatre). In this eternally repeated |
− | rewriting, the 'quilting point' is forever missing: there never is a final version, the work is | + | rewriting, the '[[quilting point]]' is forever [[missing]]: there never is a final version, the work is |
− | never done and actually put in circulation, delivered from the author to the big Other of | + | never done and actually put in [[circulation]], delivered from the author to the [[big Other]] of |
− | the public. (Is the recent fashion of the later release of the allegedly more authentic | + | the [[public]]. (Is the recent fashion of the later release of the allegedly more authentic |
− | 'director's cut' not also part of the same economy?) What does this absence of the final | + | 'director's cut' not also part of the same [[economy]]?) What does this [[absence]] of the final |
version mean - this everlasting deferral of the moment when, like God after His six days | version mean - this everlasting deferral of the moment when, like God after His six days | ||
of work, the author can say 'It's done!' and take a rest?<br><br> | of work, the author can say 'It's done!' and take a rest?<br><br> | ||
Line 335: | Line 337: | ||
reality into the multitude of parallel lives, is strictly correlative to the assertion of the | reality into the multitude of parallel lives, is strictly correlative to the assertion of the | ||
proto-cosmic abyss of chaotic, ontologically not-yet-fully-constituted reality-this | proto-cosmic abyss of chaotic, ontologically not-yet-fully-constituted reality-this | ||
− | primordial, pre-symbolic, inchoate 'stuff' is the very neutral medium in which the | + | primordial, pre-[[symbolic]], inchoate 'stuff' is the very neutral medium in which the |
multitude of parallel universes can coexist. In contrast to the standard notion of one, fully | multitude of parallel universes can coexist. In contrast to the standard notion of one, fully | ||
determined and ontologically constituted reality, with regard to which all other realities | determined and ontologically constituted reality, with regard to which all other realities | ||
are its secondary shadows, copies, reflections, 'reality' itself is thus multiplied into the | are its secondary shadows, copies, reflections, 'reality' itself is thus multiplied into the | ||
− | spectral plurality of virtual realities, beneath which lurks the pre-ontological proto-reality, | + | spectral [[plurality]] of [[virtual]] realities, beneath which lurks the pre-ontological proto-reality, |
the Real of the unformed ghastly matter-and, as we have seen, the first to clearly | the Real of the unformed ghastly matter-and, as we have seen, the first to clearly | ||
articulate this pre-ontological dimension was Schelling with his notion of the | articulate this pre-ontological dimension was Schelling with his notion of the | ||
Line 347: | Line 349: | ||
<font size="2">This paper was first published <i>Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities</i> 5 (2000), | <font size="2">This paper was first published <i>Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities</i> 5 (2000), | ||
141-48; it was written in response to Peter Dews, 'The Eclipse of Coincidence', | 141-48; it was written in response to Peter Dews, 'The Eclipse of Coincidence', | ||
− | <i>Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities</i> 4 (1999), 13-23.<br><br> | + | <i>Angelaki: Journal of the [[Theoretical]] Humanities</i> 4 (1999), 13-23.<br><br> |
− | Notes: <br><br> | + | [[Notes]]: <br><br> |
<a name="1x"></a><a href="#1">1</a> Dews, 'The Eclipse of Coincidence', 22. <br> | <a name="1x"></a><a href="#1">1</a> Dews, 'The Eclipse of Coincidence', 22. <br> | ||
− | <a name="2x"></a><a href="#2">2</a> Slavoj Zizek, <i>The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related | + | <a name="2x"></a><a href="#2">2</a> Slavoj [[Zizek]], <i>[[The Indivisible Remainder]]: An Essay on Schelling and Related |
− | Matters</i> (London and New York: Verso, 1996), 13-91.<br> | + | Matters</i> ([[London]] and New York: Verso, 1996), 13-91.<br> |
− | <a name="3x"></a><a href="#3">3</a> F.W.J. von Schelling, <i>Die Weltalter</i> (second draft 1813), trans. Judith Norman, in Slavoj Zizek and F.W.J. von Schelling, <i>The Abyss of Freedom / Ages of the | + | <a name="3x"></a><a href="#3">3</a> F.W.J. von Schelling, <i>Die Weltalter</i> (second draft 1813), trans. [[Judith]] Norman, in [[Slavoj Zizek]] and F.W.J. von Schelling, <i>[[The Abyss of Freedom]] / Ages of the |
− | World</i> (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 182.<br> | + | World</i> (Ann Arbor: [[University]] of Michigan Press, 1997), 182.<br> |
− | <a name="4x"></a><a href="#4">4</a> Fredric Jameson, 'The Vanishing Mediator; or, Max Weber as Storyteller', in | + | <a name="4x"></a><a href="#4">4</a> [[Fredric Jameson]], 'The [[Vanishing Mediator]]; or, [[Max Weber]] as Storyteller', in |
− | <i>The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986. Volume 2: Syntax of History</i> | + | <i>The [[Ideologies]] of Theory: Essays 1971-1986. Volume 2: Syntax of History</i> |
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 3-34.<br> | (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 3-34.<br> | ||
− | <a name="5x"></a><a href="#5">5</a> See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, <i>Musica Ficta: Figures of Wagner</i>, trans. Felicia | + | <a name="5x"></a><a href="#5">5</a> See [[Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe]], <i>Musica Ficta: [[Figures]] of [[Wagner]]</i>, trans. Felicia |
McCarren (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).<br> | McCarren (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).<br> | ||
<a name="6x"></a><a href="#6">6</a> Similar is the case of Nazi anti-Semitism: the standard (pseudo-) explanation for | <a name="6x"></a><a href="#6">6</a> Similar is the case of Nazi anti-Semitism: the standard (pseudo-) explanation for | ||
− | the growing acceptance of Nazi ideology in the Germany of the 1920s is that the | + | the growing acceptance of [[Nazi]] [[ideology]] in the [[Germany]] of the 1920s is that the |
− | Nazis were deftly manipulating ordinary middle-class people's fears and | + | [[Nazis]] were deftly manipulating ordinary middle-[[class]] [[people]]'s fears and |
− | anxieties generated by the economic crisis and fast social changes. The problem | + | [[anxieties]] generated by the [[economic]] crisis and fast social changes. The problem |
with this explanation is that it overlooks the self-referential circularity at work | with this explanation is that it overlooks the self-referential circularity at work | ||
here: yes, the Nazis certainly did deftly manipulate fears and anxieties- | here: yes, the Nazis certainly did deftly manipulate fears and anxieties- | ||
− | however, far from being simple pre-ideological facts, these fears and anxieties | + | however, far from being simple pre-[[ideological]] facts, these fears and anxieties |
were already the product of a certain ideological perspective. In other words, | were already the product of a certain ideological perspective. In other words, | ||
Nazi ideology itself (co-)generated anxieties and fears against which it then | Nazi ideology itself (co-)generated anxieties and fears against which it then | ||
Line 381: | Line 383: | ||
<a name="7x"></a><a href="#7">7</a> Along these lines, one is tempted to claim that Judaism is caught in the paradox | <a name="7x"></a><a href="#7">7</a> Along these lines, one is tempted to claim that Judaism is caught in the paradox | ||
− | of prohibiting what is already in itself impossible: if one cannot render God | + | of prohibiting what is already in itself [[impossible]]: if one cannot render God |
through images, why prohibit images? To claim that, by making images of Him, | through images, why prohibit images? To claim that, by making images of Him, | ||
− | we do not show a proper respect for Him, is all too simple, since, as we know | + | we do not show a proper respect for Him, is all too simple, since, as we [[know]] |
from psychoanalysis, respect is ultimately the respect for the Other's weakness - | from psychoanalysis, respect is ultimately the respect for the Other's weakness - | ||
to treat someone with respect means that one maintains a proper distance towards | to treat someone with respect means that one maintains a proper distance towards | ||
− | him/her, avoiding acts which, if accomplished, would unmask his/her stance as | + | him/her, avoiding [[acts]] which, if accomplished, would unmask his/her stance as |
− | an imposture. Say, when a father boasts to his son that he could run fast, the | + | an imposture. Say, when a [[father]] boasts to his son that he could run fast, the |
respectful thing to do is not to defy him to do it, since this would reveal his | respectful thing to do is not to defy him to do it, since this would reveal his | ||
− | impotence. In other words, the idea that iconoclasm expresses respect for the | + | [[impotence]]. In other words, the idea that iconoclasm expresses respect for the |
divine Other makes sense only as the indication of the divine Other's impotence | divine Other makes sense only as the indication of the divine Other's impotence | ||
or limitation.<br> | or limitation.<br> | ||
− | <a name="8x"></a><a href="#8">8</a> Immanuel Kant, <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (London: | + | <a name="8x"></a><a href="#8">8</a> [[Immanuel Kant]], <i>[[Critique of Pure Reason]]</i>, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (London: |
J.M. Dent & Sons, 1934), 12.<br> | J.M. Dent & Sons, 1934), 12.<br> | ||
− | <a name="9x"></a><a href="#9">9</a> For a good account of the incorrect translations of this key passage, see Gerard | + | <a name="9x"></a><a href="#9">9</a> For a [[good]] account of the incorrect translations of this key passage, see Gerard |
Guest, <i>La tournure de l'événement</i> (Berlin: Duncker und Humboldt, 1994).<br> | Guest, <i>La tournure de l'événement</i> (Berlin: Duncker und Humboldt, 1994).<br> | ||
Line 407: | Line 409: | ||
<a name="12x"></a><a href="#12">12</a> Charles Eidsvik, 'Dekalog 5 and 6 and the Two Short Films', in <i>Lucid Dreams: | <a name="12x"></a><a href="#12">12</a> Charles Eidsvik, 'Dekalog 5 and 6 and the Two Short Films', in <i>Lucid Dreams: | ||
− | The Films of Krzysztof Kieslowski</i>, ed. Paul Coates (Trowbridge: Flick, 1999), 85.<br> | + | The Films of [[Krzysztof Kieslowski]]</i>, ed. [[Paul]] Coates (Trowbridge: Flick, 1999), 85.<br> |
<a name="13x"></a><a href="#13">13</a> Eidsvik, 'Dekalog 5 and 6 and the Two Short Films', 85. | <a name="13x"></a><a href="#13">13</a> Eidsvik, 'Dekalog 5 and 6 and the Two Short Films', 85. | ||
− | http://www.lacan.com/zizproto.htm | + | ==Source== |
− | + | * [[From Proto-Reality to the Act]]. ''Centre for [[Theology]] and [[Politics]]''. <http://www.lacan.com/zizproto.htm> | |
[[Category:Articles by Slavoj Žižek]] | [[Category:Articles by Slavoj Žižek]] | ||
[[Category:Works]] | [[Category:Works]] | ||
[[Category:Articles]] | [[Category:Articles]] |
Latest revision as of 08:09, 24 May 2019
|