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Perversion

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In psychoanalysis, particularly within the traditions established by Sigmund Freud and developed by Jacques Lacan, perversion refers not to a moral judgment, a legal category, or a simple catalogue of deviant behaviors, but to a specific clinical structure. Distinct from both neurosis and psychosis, the perverse structure is defined by a fundamental positioning of the subject in relation to the symbolic order, the Law, and the enjoyment (jouissance) of the Other.

While everyday language and pre-psychoanalytic psychiatry often conflate perversion with "unnatural" or socially unacceptable sexual acts, psychoanalytic theory posits a rigorous distinction between perverse acts and the perverse structure. A subject may engage in sexual practices traditionally labeled as perverse—such as fetishism, sadomasochism, or voyeurism—without occupying the clinical structure of perversion; conversely, a subject structured as a pervert may strictly adhere to social conventions while maintaining a specific psychic economy characterized by the mechanism of disavowal (Verleugnung).

The concept has evolved significantly throughout the history of psychoanalysis. Freud initially approached perversion in his 1905 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality as a deviation from the biological aim of reproduction and the object of genital heterosexuality. However, his discovery of the "polymorphous perversity" of infantile sexuality undermined the notion of a natural sexual norm, suggesting that perversion is a constituent element of all human sexuality. Lacan later reformulated these insights, shifting the definition from behavioral deviation to a structural logic. For Lacan, perversion is defined by the subject's refusal to accept symbolic castration, utilizing disavowal to maintain an identification with the imaginary phallus and acting as an instrument of the Other's enjoyment.

This entry examines the metapsychological definition of perversion, tracing its trajectory from Freud’s developmental model to Lacan’s structural algebra, distinguishing it from moral or juridical concepts of sexual deviance.


The Freudian Foundation

The psychoanalytic theory of perversion begins with Sigmund Freud, who fundamentally transformed the nineteenth-century psychiatric understanding of sexual pathology. Rather than viewing perversion as a sign of hereditary degeneration or moral corruption, Freud posited it as a magnifying glass for understanding the complex construction of human sexuality in general.

The Three Essays and the Sexual Norm

In his foundational work, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud provided the first systematic psychoanalytic definition of perversion. He established a conceptual baseline for "normal" sexuality, defined by the popular opinion of his time: the sexual instinct is popularly assumed to be absent in childhood, awakening at puberty with an irresistible attraction to the opposite sex, aiming at genital union for the purpose of reproduction.[1]

Against this baseline, Freud categorized perversions into two distinct types of deviation:

  • Deviations in the Sexual Object: This category includes instances where the libido is directed toward an object other than a mature adult of the opposite sex. This encompasses "inversion" (Freud's term for homosexuality), pedophilia, and zoophilia.
  • Deviations in the Sexual Aim: This category includes instances where the sexual act transgresses the anatomical regions intended for sexual union (e.g., the misuse of the mouth or anus) or where the sexual process halts at a preliminary stage (e.g., voyeurism, exhibitionism, or sadism/masochism), replacing the final aim of intercourse.[1]

Freud noted that perversions are rarely isolated; they frequently appear as composite phenomena, often combining deviations of both aim and object.

Polymorphous Perversity

While Freud used the language of "deviation," he simultaneously destabilized the status of the "norm" through his concept of polymorphous perversity. Freud argued that the human drive (Trieb) is not born with a pre-given object or a fixed aim. Instead, infantile sexuality is characterized by a "polymorphous" disposition, where the child seeks pleasure from various erogenous zones (oral, anal, phallic) indiscriminately and without regard for reproduction or propriety.[1]

This insight led to a radical conclusion: "normal" adult sexuality is not a natural starting point but a precarious developmental achievement, attained only through the repression and organization of these partial drives under genital primacy. Consequently, Freud viewed adult perversion not as a foreign intrusion into the mind, but as a fixation to, or a regression toward, these infantile partial drives. The perverse subject is one for whom the organization of the libido under the Oedipal law has not fully succeeded, allowing the component instincts of childhood to persist into adult life as the primary source of satisfaction.

Neurosis as the "Negative" of Perversion

A central tenet of Freud’s early structural theory is the dialectical relationship between perversion and neurosis. In a famous formulation, Freud declared that "the neuroses are, so to speak, the negative of the perversions."[2]

This dictum suggests a hydraulic relationship between repression and enactment. The neurotic subject (e.g., the hysteric or obsessional) represses the polymorphous sexual impulses of childhood; these repressed drives then return in the form of symptoms. The perverse subject, by contrast, does not repress these impulses but enacts them consciously. For example, a repressed desire to look (voyeurism) might manifest in a neurotic as a hysterical blindness, whereas in a pervert, it manifests as the sexual activity of voyeurism itself. While later psychoanalytic theory (particularly Lacan's) would complicate this view by showing that perversion is also a rigorous defense structure and not merely uninhibited instinct, Freud's formula established the essential structural link between the two clinical categories.

The Turning Point: Fetishism and Disavowal

In his 1927 paper Fetishism, Freud introduced a theoretical innovation that laid the groundwork for the modern structural understanding of perversion. Moving beyond the classification of acts, Freud identified a specific psychic mechanism unique to the fetishist: disavowal (Verleugnung).[3]

Freud observed that the fetishist is confronted with the same traumatic perception as the neurotic: the realization of the mother's "castration" (the absence of the penis). While the neurotic represses this perception and the psychotic forecloses it (rejecting it from reality), the fetishist adopts a paradoxical third path. He refuses to accept the reality of the perception, yet simultaneously retains it. He disavows the fact of castration and erects a fetish—a symbolic substitute for the missing maternal phallus—to act as a monument to this denial.

This operation results in a splitting of the ego (Ichspaltung). Two contradictory psychical attitudes coexist within the subject: one that recognizes the reality of castration, and another that denies it. This shift from "behavioral deviation" to "defense mechanism" marked the transition toward a structural definition of perversion.

Freud on Homosexuality

Freud’s treatment of homosexuality (which he termed "inversion") within the category of perversion has historically been a subject of debate. While he cataloged it as a deviation of the sexual object, Freud explicitly rejected the degeneracy theories popular in his time. He argued that inversion was found in people of high intellectual and ethical standing (referencing the Ancient Greeks) and was not an illness.

In a famous 1935 letter to an American mother asking for treatment for her homosexual son, Freud wrote: "Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation, it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider it to be a variation of the sexual function produced by a certain arrest of sexual development."[4] While Freud maintained a developmental view that positioned heterosexuality as the endpoint of the Oedipus complex, his refusal to pathologize homosexuality in moral or medical terms anticipated the later Lacanian separation of object choice from clinical structure.

Lacan’s Structural Reformulation

The intervention of Jacques Lacan marks a decisive epistemological shift in the psychoanalytic theory of perversion. While retaining Sigmund Freud’s fundamental insights regarding the ubiquity of infantile sexuality and the mechanism of disavowal, Lacan fundamentally reoriented the concept by moving away from biological developmentalism and behavioral classification. Instead, Lacan conceptualized perversion as a specific clinical structure—a distinct, stable mode of the subject’s relation to the Symbolic order, the Name-of-the-Father, and the desire of the Other.

Critique of Adaptation and Normativity

Lacan’s reformulation began with a rigorous critique of post-Freudian ego psychology and object relations theory, which had increasingly equated psychoanalytic "cure" with the subject's adaptation to social reality and the attainment of "genital oblativity" (a reciprocal, reproductive maturation). Lacan argued that defining mental health through biological norms or social conformity betrayed the radical core of Freud's discovery, reducing the subject to a biological organism rather than a being of language.[5]

In Lacanian theory, human sexuality is viewed as inherently denaturalized by the subject's entry into language. Because the drive is "acephalic" (headless) and circular, possessing no natural teleology toward reproduction, there is no pre-established harmony between the sexes (a position Lacan summarized with the aphorism "There is no sexual relationship"). Consequently, perversion cannot be rigorously defined as a deviation from nature, because sexuality itself is a deviation from biological instinct. Lacan explicitly stripped the concept of its moral baggage, asserting:

"What is perversion? It is not simply an aberration in relation to social criteria, an anomaly contrary to good morals... nor is it an atypicality according to natural criteria... It is something else in its very structure."[5]

Structure vs. Acts

A cornerstone of the Lacanian approach is the strict distinction between perverse acts (or traits) and the perverse structure. This distinction resolves the ambiguity in Freud’s observation that neurotics repress perverse impulses.

  • Perverse Acts: Sexual behaviors traditionally labeled "perverse" (e.g., bondage, roleplay, fixation on objects) may be performed by subjects of any clinical structure. A neurotic, for example, might employ a perverse scenario to sustain desire or transgress a specific repression, yet their psychic economy remains organized by doubt and repression.
  • Perverse Structure: This designates a fundamental, unchanging position of the subject in relation to the Other. A subject with a perverse structure may live an outwardly conventional life, never violating juridical laws or engaging in scandalous behavior, yet still function according to the logic of disavowal.[6]

This distinction implies a universalist position: the diagnosis of perversion is independent of social approval. The fact that pederasty was socially sanctioned in Ancient Greece does not alter its structural status in psychoanalysis; it remains a configuration where desire bypasses the Oedipal prohibition, regardless of its legality.[7]

The Subject and the Law

In Lacan's structural topology, clinical categories are determined by the subject's position vis-à-vis the Law—specifically the prohibition of incest instituted by the Name-of-the-Father.

  • The Neurotic represses the traumatic nature of the Law and the desire of the Other, resulting in guilt and a structural "question" (e.g., "What does the Other want of me?").
  • The Psychotic forecloses the Law entirely, leaving them outside the symbolic order.
  • The Pervert, however, occupies a paradoxical position. The pervert does not ignore the Law; on the contrary, the pervert "knows" it very well.

Unlike the neurotic, who is paralyzed by the ambiguity of the Other's desire, the perverse subject is characterized by a "perverse certainty." They claim to know exactly what the Other needs for enjoyment. Furthermore, the pervert’s transgression is not a revolutionary attempt to overthrow the Law but a maneuver to sustain it. There is no transgression without a Law to prohibit it; thus, the pervert dedicates themselves to the Law's existence to enjoy the act of subverting it. As Jean Clavreul formulated: "As far as the pervert is concerned, this conflict [between desire and Law] is resolved by making desire the law of his acts."[8]

Identification with the Imaginary Phallus

The structural origin of perversion is located in the subject’s navigation of the pre-Oedipal imaginary triangle (Mother—Child—Phallus). In the normative Oedipus complex, the intervention of the Father forces the child to renounce the fantasy of being the sole object of the mother's satisfaction—the child must accept that they *have* (or do not have) the phallus, but cannot *be* it.

The perverse subject refuses this symbolic substitution. Instead of accepting the "lack" in the Other (the fact that the mother desires implies she is incomplete), the pervert identifies with the imaginary phallus. The subject positions themselves as the object that fills the mother's void, effectively "plugging" the hole in the Symbolic.[9] Lacan describes this as the pervert’s fundamental project: to ensure the consistency of the Other by denying the Other's castration. This identification creates a rigid subjective stance, where the subject acts as the guarantor of the Other’s wholeness.

Mechanisms: Disavowal and the Veil

While repression (Verdrängung) defines neurosis and foreclosure (Verwerfung) defines psychosis, the constitutive mechanism of the perverse structure is disavowal (Verleugnung). Though Freud discovered this mechanism in his study of fetishism, Lacan universalized it as the logical operation defining the perverse subject's relation to reality and the signifier.

The Logic of Disavowal

Disavowal is a splitting of the subject's stance toward the Real. It involves a simultaneous acknowledgment and denial of a traumatic perception—specifically, the perception of the mother’s lack of a phallus (symbolic castration). The perverse subject registers the reality of sexual difference but refuses to accept its symbolic consequences.

This logic is best summarized by the formula attributed to Octave Mannoni: "I know very well, but all the same..." (Je sais bien, mais quand même...).[10] The subject knows very well that the Other is castrated (lacking), but "all the same," acts, believes, and constructs a fantasy in which the Other is complete. This is not a psychotic hallucination; the pervert does not lose touch with reality but maintains two parallel, contradictory attitudes. This splitting allows the pervert to maintain a relation to the Law (acknowledgment) while neutralizing its prohibitory effects (denial).

The Function of the Fetish

Fetishism serves as the paradigm for this structural logic, which Lacan termed the "perversion of perversions."[9] In the Lacanian framework, the fetish is not merely a displaced object of desire, but a structural necessity that sustains the subject's sexual reality.

The fetish functions as a veil. It is a screen erected by the subject to cover the "horror" of castration—the anxiety produced by the lack in the Other. By fixating on the fetish object (e.g., the shoe, the shine on the nose), the subject arrests the movement of the signifier. Where neurotic desire is metonymic (constantly sliding from one object to another in search of the lost object), the fetishist’s jouissance is "frozen" or fixed upon the fetish.

This veil allows the subject to bypass the enigma of the Other's desire. The fetishist does not need to ask "What does the partner want?"; the fetish object provides a guaranteed, mechanical access to enjoyment that renders the partner's subjectivity irrelevant. The fetish is thus the "sign of the triumph of the subject over the threat of castration," a monument to the pervert’s refusal to submit to the symbolic lack that constitutes human subjectivity.[3]

Metapsychology: Fantasy, Drive, and Object a

In his later teaching, Jacques Lacan moved beyond the imaginary identifications of the Oedipus complex to articulate perversion through the registers of the Real, the drive, and the logic of fantasy. While the concept of disavowal describes the pervert’s defense against symbolic castration, the metapsychological specificity of the perverse structure is found in how the subject navigates jouissance and the object a.

The Drive and Instrumentalization

A central tenet of Lacan’s theory is the rejection of the notion that perversion represents a liberation of natural instincts. Unlike the neurotic, whose relation to the drive is mediated by repression and the screen of fantasy, the perverse subject is often mistakenly viewed as having uninhibited access to sexual satisfaction. Lacan contests this, arguing that the pervert is strictly subject to the drive—which is not a biological instinct but a circular, acephalic force structured by the signifier.[11]

In the perverse structure, the subject does not situate themselves as the active agent of desire. Instead, the pervert assumes the position of the object of the drive. The subject abdicates subjective agency to become the instrument of the Other's enjoyment. The pervert is a "crusader" working tirelessly to ensure the jouissance of the Big Other. Lacan encapsulates this structural position in Écrits:

"The subject here makes himself the instrument of the Other's jouissance."[12]

This instrumentalization implies that the pervert is not pursuing their own pleasure (in the sense of the pleasure principle's homeostasis) but is acting in service of a "will-to-enjoy" (volonté-de-jouissance) that is attributed to the Other. This provides a rigorous explanation for the rigid, ritualistic nature of perverse acts: the subject is fulfilling a mandate or a law that exceeds them.

Kant with Sade

Lacan explicates this logic in his influential essay "Kant with Sade" (1963), where he juxtaposes the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant with the libertine literature of the Marquis de Sade. Lacan argues that Sade’s libertine is not an agent of absolute freedom, but rather the servant of a tyrannical Law—a "categorical imperative" of enjoyment.

In the Sadean fantasy, the executioner does not act out of personal whim but claims to be the agent of a "Supreme Being of Evil" or Nature’s law of destruction. The pervert elevates the object of the drive to the dignity of the Thing (das Ding), serving a master who demands enjoyment without limit. Thus, the pervert is not a hedonist but a "worker" of jouissance, enduring the anxiety of the act to sustain the consistency of the Other.[12]

The Inversion of Fantasy

Lacan formalizes the structural difference between neurosis and perversion through the mathemes of fantasy.

The general formula for the neurotic fantasy is written as: $a Here, the barred (divided) subject ($) maintains a relationship to the object cause of desire (a). The neurotic is divided by language and seeks the lost object to sustain desire, using fantasy as a screen to protect themselves from the overwhelming jouissance of the Real.

In perversion, Lacan argues that this structure is inverted: a$ In this schema, the perverse subject occupies the position of the object a (a) and confronts the barred subject ($).[12]

This mathematical inversion encapsulates several clinical realities:

  1. Identification with the Object: The pervert identifies with the partial object (the gaze, the voice, the whip, etc.). They reduce themselves to this object-instrument to act upon the Other.
  2. Division of the Other: The aim of the perverse act is to produce a division ($) in the Other. By presenting themselves as the object a (e.g., the exhibitionist flashing a stranger), the pervert attempts to provoke anxiety, shame, or shock in the Other. This reaction confirms that the Other is indeed divided ("castrated") and that the pervert holds the key (the object) to their enjoyment.
  3. Certainty: Because the pervert occupies the place of the object a, they possess a structural certainty regarding enjoyment. Unlike the neurotic who questions ("What does the Other want?"), the pervert acts as if they hold the answer to the Other's lack.

This inversion renders the perverse subject difficult to analyze using standard techniques. In the clinical setting, the analysand is typically expected to occupy the place of the divided subject ($) seeking knowledge. The pervert, however, presents as the object (a) who already possesses the knowledge of jouissance, leaving no gap for the analytic question to emerge.

Specific Clinical Manifestations

While the perverse structure is unified by the mechanism of disavowal and the inversion of fantasy, it manifests clinically through specific configurations of the partial drive. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, these forms are categorized by the specific object a (the gaze or the voice) that structures the scenario.

Scopophilia: The Scopic Drive

Manifestations related to the scopic drive (the gaze) are divided into voyeurism and exhibitionism.

  • Voyeurism: The subject positions themselves as the pure gaze looking at the Other. Crucially, the Other must remain unaware of being watched; this sustains the illusion of the Other's wholeness. However, the voyeur is structurally seeking the moment the Other betrays a lack or castration—a slip, a gap—which fascinates the subject. The voyeur reduces themselves to a point of perception ($a$) to secure the Other’s existence.
  • Exhibitionism: The subject identifies with the object-gaze ($a$) and thrusts it into the field of the Other. By exposing themselves, the exhibitionist aims to capture the Other's gaze, provoking a division (shock or shame). The exhibitionist does not seek to see, but to *be seen*, thereby making themselves the object that causes the Other's desire or anxiety.[11]

Sadism and Masochism: The Invocatory Drive

Manifestations related to the invocatory drive (the voice) and the Law include sadism and masochism. Lacan argues these are not symmetrical opposites but distinct structural positions.

  • Sadism: The sadist identifies with the Law and acts as the instrument ($a$) to inflict pain or humiliation on the victim. However, the ultimate object of the sadistic act is the voice—specifically the scream. The sadist tortures the victim not to destroy them, but to extract the voice, which marks the point of the Other's division and endurance.
  • Masochism: The masochist identifies with the object "waste" or "trash" ($a$) to force the Other to occupy the position of the cruel Master or Law. By drawing up a contract (as seen in the writings of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch), the masochist educates the Other on how to punish them. The aim is to generate anxiety in the Other; as Lacan notes, "the masochist's anxiety is the anxiety of the Other."[13] By making themselves the abject object, the masochist guarantees the Other exists as a consistent, punishing authority.

Controversies: Norms, Nature, and Homosexuality

The psychoanalytic concept of perversion has generated significant debate, particularly regarding its intersection with social norms and the clinical status of homosexuality. Understanding these controversies requires maintaining the strict Lacanian distinction between social norms (morality/law) and clinical structure (psychic logic).

Norms vs. Nature

A frequent criticism of the term "perversion" is that it smuggles normative morality into clinical diagnosis. Jacques Lacan defends the term by rigorously stripping it of biological functionalism. He argues that Sigmund Freud occasionally erred by conflating the normative requirements of the Oedipus complex with biological necessity. For Lacan, the importance of heterosexuality in the Oedipus complex is "a question of norms and not of nature."[14] Since human sexuality is constituted by language, there is no "natural" instinct to deviate from.

Consequently, the ethical stance of the Lacanian analyst is one of neutrality. The analyst must not act as a "moral orthopedist" attempting to align the patient with social ideals. The diagnosis of perversion refers strictly to the subject’s defense against castration, not to the social acceptability of their sexual practices.

The Status of Homosexuality

The relationship between homosexuality and perversion is complex in Lacan’s teaching. In his early work, following Freud, Lacan viewed homosexuality as a potential variation of the perverse structure, specifically regarding the "inversion" of the object. However, he explicitly distinguished this from any moral judgment or pathologization.

Lacan’s most notable commentary on this subject appears in Seminar VIII: Transference, where he analyzes Ancient Greek pederasty (the 'erastes/eromenos' relationship). He characterizes this specific cultural configuration as structurally perverse because it establishes a sexual relation that bypasses the castration anxiety central to the Oedipal norm. In this context, desire was organized without the "No" of the Father prohibiting the object, creating a love structured by a "model" rather than a lack.[7]

However, in contemporary Lacanian clinical practice, it is axiomatic that homosexuality is not a clinical structure. A subject’s object choice (same-sex or opposite-sex) does not determine their structure.

  • A homosexual subject can be neurotic (e.g., struggling with repressed desire and guilt).
  • A homosexual subject can be psychotic (e.g., Daniel Paul Schreber).
  • A homosexual subject can be perverse.

The diagnosis of perversion depends solely on the mechanism of disavowal and the subject's identification with the imaginary phallus, not on the gender of the partner. As Lacan famously asserted, "Heterosexuality is no less a structure than homosexuality," meaning neither is "natural"; both are symbolic constructions.[15]

Psychoanalytic Treatment

The treatment of the perverse subject presents unique challenges to psychoanalytic technique, primarily regarding the establishment of the transference and the direction of the cure.

The Demand for Analysis

A distinctive feature of the perverse structure is the rarity of the demand for analysis. Unlike the neurotic, who suffers from a symptom that divides them (e.g., anxiety, inhibition) and addresses a question to the analyst ("Why am I suffering?"), the pervert is characterized by certainty. Because the perverse subject identifies with the object a and believes they possess the knowledge of enjoyment, they rarely experience the division necessary to seek help.

When a perverse subject does enter analysis, it is usually not to "cure" their perversion, but due to external factors:

  • Legal compulsion: Following arrest for transgressive acts.
  • Social crisis: The threat of divorce or loss of employment.
  • The collapse of the fantasy: When the perverse scenario fails to produce the expected jouissance, leading to an outbreak of anxiety.

Transference and Analysability

A longstanding debate exists regarding whether perverse subjects are "analysable." The traditional view held that because the pervert does not suffer from repression and lacks doubt, they cannot establish transference, which relies on the analyst occupying the position of the "Subject supposed to know."

Lacan contested this pessimism. While acknowledging the difficulty, he argued that perverts are analysable. He cites Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium as a prime example of a perverse transference toward Socrates. Alcibiades offers himself as the object ($a$)—the "agora" or precious jewel—to Socrates, attempting to seduce the master. Socrates’s intervention—refusing the object and pointing Alcibiades toward his true desire (Agathon)—is the model for the analytic act with the pervert.[7]

Lacan also re-read Freud’s case of the "Young Homosexual Woman" as a clear demonstration of transference in a perverse structure. Although Freud eventually failed the case by acting as a moral authority, the patient’s dreams indicated a clear engagement with the analytic function.[9]

Direction of the Cure

For Lacan, the goal of psychoanalytic treatment in perversion is not the elimination of perverse behavior or "conversion" to heterosexuality. Such an objective would reduce analysis to adaptation. Instead, the aim is the "hystericization" of the subject.

The analyst must refuse the position of the accomplice (who validates the pervert's scenario) or the judge (who embodies the Law the pervert wishes to transgress). Instead, the analyst seeks to introduce a gap or a lack into the subject's certainty. By analyzing the subject's identification with the imaginary phallus and the object-instrument, the treatment aims to shift the subject from the position of the object ($a$) to the position of the divided subject ($). The goal is to allow the subject to confront the anxiety of castration that the perversion was constructed to veil, thereby opening the possibility for a desire that is not strictly bound to the instrumentalization of the Other.

Conclusion

The psychoanalytic concept of perversion names neither a moral failure nor a mere catalogue of forbidden acts. From Sigmund Freud’s early investigations into the polymorphous nature of infantile sexuality to Jacques Lacan’s structural reformulation, perversion emerges as a coherent and rigid logic of the unconscious.

Freud established that perversion is not an aberration of nature but a variation of the sexual function, linked structurally to neurosis via the mechanism of repression. Lacan refined this by locating the essence of perversion in the mechanism of disavowal (Verleugnung). By refusing the symbolic reality of castration, the perverse subject erects a fetishistic veil and identifies with the imaginary phallus, working as the instrument of the Other's jouissance.

This structural approach allows psychoanalysis to maintain ethical neutrality, distinguishing clearly between social norms and psychic structure. Whether manifesting as fetishism, sadism, or voyeurism, perversion represents a sophisticated defense against the anxiety of the Real. Ultimately, the study of perversion reveals the fragility of the "normal" sexual position, demonstrating that all human desire is constructed around a fundamental lack that can never be fully satisfied.


See Also

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 Freud, S. (1905). Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Standard Edition, VII. London: Hogarth Press, p. 135.
  2. Freud, S. (1905). Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Standard Edition, VII. p. 165.
  3. 3.0 3.1 Freud, S. (1927). Fetishism. Standard Edition, XXI. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 152–157.
  4. Freud, S. (1960). Letters of Sigmund Freud. (E. L. Freud, Ed.). New York: Basic Books. Letter to an American Mother (1935).
  5. 5.0 5.1 Lacan, J. (1988). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique (1953–1954). (J. Forrester, Trans.). New York: Norton, p. 221.
  6. Fink, B. (1997). A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  7. 7.0 7.1 7.2 Lacan, J. (2015). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference (1960-1961). Cambridge: Polity, p. 43.
  8. Clavreul, J. (1980). "The Perverse Couple". In Returning to Freud. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  9. 9.0 9.1 9.2 Lacan, J. (2020). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book IV: The Object Relation. Cambridge: Polity, p. 197-198.
  10. Mannoni, O. (1969). "Je sais bien, mais quand même." In Clefs pour l'imaginaire ou l'Autre Scène. Paris: Seuil.
  11. 11.0 11.1 Lacan, J. (1981). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. New York: Norton, p. 185.
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 Lacan, J. (2006). "Kant with Sade". In Écrits. New York: Norton, p. 648.
  13. Lacan, J. (2014). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety (1962–1963). Cambridge: Polity, p. 112.
  14. Lacan, J. (2006). "On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis". In Écrits. New York: Norton, p. 464.
  15. Lacan, J. (1998). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: Encore (1972–1973). New York: Norton, p. 32.