Knotting

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Knotting (French: nœud) is a key concept in the later work of Jacques Lacan, referring to a topological model of the subject based on the interlinking of three fundamental registers: the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary. In his post-structural phase, particularly from Seminar XXII: RSI (1974–75) onward, Lacan replaces the linguistic emphasis of his earlier work with knot theory to describe the psychic topology of subjectivity. This approach culminates in the introduction of the Borromean knot as a structural representation of mental life and its possible breakdowns.

Knotting allows Lacan to reconceptualize the formation and failures of the subject—not through signifying chains alone, but through the entanglement or disjunction of topological elements. It becomes central to his theorization of psychosis, symptom formation, and the late notion of the sinthome.[1]


Definition and Overview

In Lacan's psychoanalytic theory, knotting refers to the interlinking of the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary (RSI), which together constitute the structural framework of subjectivity. The term is closely associated with Lacan’s topological turn in the 1970s, in which he begins to conceptualize the psyche not as a structure of signifiers, but as a set of topological relations.

The Borromean knot—a chain of three linked rings where the removal of any one unlinks the others—serves as the primary figure for Lacan’s knotting of the RSI. For Lacan, psychic reality is stable only when the three registers are “tied together” in this configuration.[2]

Knotting thus becomes more than a metaphor: it is a technical model of psychic integrity, with profound consequences for understanding subjective breakdowns, the function of the symptom, and the limits of interpretation.

Historical and Theoretical Context

Lacan’s shift toward topology emerged gradually but becomes fully articulated in Seminar XXII: RSI and Seminar XXIII: The Sinthome (1975–76). In contrast to his earlier focus on language and the signifier, these later seminars seek a non-representational model of the psyche—one that can formalize the structural relations between registers regardless of linguistic mediation.

In Seminar XXII, Lacan introduces the Borromean knot as a literal “writing” of the subject. The interlinking of RSI is no longer conceptualized as metaphorical relations (as in earlier models of metonymy and metaphor), but as topological consistency: the subject persists insofar as these three domains are properly knotted.[3]

This shift reflects Lacan’s dissatisfaction with the limitations of structural linguistics and his desire to inscribe subjectivity in topological space, outside of the epistemological constraints of representation.

The Borromean Knot and the RSI Registers

The Borromean knot is a three-ring configuration derived from knot theory in topology. Each ring in the Borromean link represents one of the three Lacanian registers:

  • The Imaginary: the domain of images, identifications, and ego formations.
  • The Symbolic: the order of language, law, and the Name-of-the-Father.
  • The Real: that which is outside symbolization, marked by trauma, jouissance, and non-sense.

In the Borromean knot, the removal of any one ring unlinks the remaining two. This reflects Lacan’s assertion that the subject exists only through the inseparability of RSI. The failure of knotting—when one ring is not properly joined—results in a psychic disorder, most dramatically in psychosis.[4]

Thus, knotting provides a model of psychic structure: when the three registers are tightly knotted, the subject has a coherent structure. When the knot fails—particularly in the Symbolic order—the subject may experience phenomena like hallucination, delusion, or breakdown.

Lacan emphasizes that the Borromean knot is not a metaphor but a material topology—a form of writing the subject without relying on representational logic.[5]

The Sinthome: Fourth Ring and Stabilization

In Seminar XXIII: The Sinthome Lacan introduces the notion of the sinthome (an archaic spelling of “symptom”) as a fourth ring that may be added to the Borromean configuration. This sinthome acts as a stabilizing supplement when the basic RSI knot is insufficiently secured—particularly in certain psychotic or borderline cases.

Rather than being interpreted or resolved, the sinthome functions as a creative, idiosyncratic mode of knottification—a personal anchor that secures subjectivity. It is not to be deciphered, but rather sustained.

Lacan illustrates this through a detailed reading of James Joyce, whose literary writing he interprets as a sinthomatic formation that compensates for a defective Symbolic function. In Joyce’s case, writing becomes the fourth ring that allows the three registers to remain knotted.[6]

The sinthome thus redefines the symptom not as something to be removed, but as a solution to the subject’s mode of being—a unique response to the structural impasses of desire, language, and jouissance.

Clinical Implications

Lacan’s theory of knotting has major implications for psychoanalytic diagnosis and treatment. Each clinical structure—neurosis, perversion, psychosis—can be understood as a mode of knotting (or failure to knot) the three registers. For instance:

  • In neurosis, the RSI registers are generally well-knotted, but the subject’s symptom may reflect repression and internal conflict within this configuration.
  • In psychosis, the Symbolic is often foreclosed—excluded from the knot—leading to a structural deficit. The Real may then emerge in the form of hallucinations or delusional constructions.
  • In perversion, the knot may be stabilized through a fetish or other rigid formation, often functioning like a sinthome.

Clinically, the analyst’s task may not be to "correct" the structure, but to help the analysand construct a knotted solution—a sinthome that allows for a sustainable mode of jouissance and symptomatization.[7]

Lacan’s topological model offers an alternative to interpretive analysis: it suggests that writing, creation, and repetition may serve as means of reinforcing or repairing a knot.

Topological Extensions

Lacan’s interest in topology extended beyond the Borromean knot to include a range of geometric and mathematical figures that serve as models of psychic structure, desire, and jouissance. These include:

  • Möbius strip – A one-sided surface with a single boundary, used by Lacan to illustrate the inversion and continuity of the subject, particularly in relation to inside/outside and the formation of the unconscious.[8]
  • Torus – A doughnut-shaped surface with a central hole, representing repetition, circularity, and the passage of the subject around the void of the Real. It models the looping of drive and the absence at the heart of being.[4]
  • Trefoil knot – A more complex knot than the Borromean, used in later seminars to explore the multiplicity of psychic knots and their singular configurations in different subjects.[5]

These topological models allowed Lacan to rethink the subject beyond representation, shifting the analytic aim from decoding meaning to tracing formal structure and consistency. They also emphasized the inscriptive nature of the unconscious—as something written, twisted, or looped, rather than spoken or represented in straightforward linguistic terms.

The move from signification to inscription in Lacan’s final period reframes the clinical task: from uncovering repressed content to attending to the structure of repetition, fixation, and topological consistency in each subject’s sinthome.

Diagrammatic and Visual Representations

Given the complexity of Lacan’s topological thinking, visual models are often used to help readers grasp the logic of knotting. Common diagrams include:

  • A three-ring Borromean knot, with each loop labeled as the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary.
  • A four-ring knot, with the additional ring representing the sinthome, stabilizing the other three.
  • Unknotted or unlinking diagrams, showing what happens when one ring is missing or fails to hold (e.g., Symbolic foreclosure).

These diagrams should be seen as topological representations, not literal spatial models. Their aim is to demonstrate relational structure rather than depict anatomy or mental “locations.” Lacan’s use of topology is conceptual and formal, meant to map consistency, knotting, and failure within the psychic apparatus.[3]

Visualizations are particularly important for clinical training and interpretation, helping to formalize subjective structures and account for their diverse presentations in neurosis, psychosis, and perversion.

Critical Perspectives and Reception

Lacan’s introduction of knot theory into psychoanalysis has generated both admiration and skepticism. For some, it marks a profound deepening of psychoanalytic theory; for others, it represents an overly formalist turn that risks losing clinical grounding.

Critics have argued that Lacan’s late work becomes esoteric and inaccessible, using mathematical forms that alienate practitioners. Some have seen the knots as “empty formalism,” disconnected from affective or interpersonal reality.[8]

However, defenders argue that Lacan’s knotting theory is clinically rigorous, offering precise models for psychic structure that do not rely on norms of pathology. In the work of Jacques-Alain Miller, Bruce Fink, and Colette Soler, knotting has been further developed into a differential diagnostic framework, particularly for understanding psychosis and the limits of interpretation.

  • Bruce Fink emphasizes the clinical value of the Borromean model, suggesting that it formalizes how the unconscious works structurally—regardless of content.[4]
  • Colette Soler has explored the clinical use of the sinthome, arguing that its recognition changes the ethical orientation of analytic practice.[7]
  • Joan Copjec notes how Lacan’s topology reflects a non-reductive ontology of the subject, positioning psychoanalysis against both cognitive neuroscience and social constructivism.[9]

In contemporary Lacanian clinics, especially those influenced by L’École de la Cause freudienne, knotting is often used to conceptualize the subject’s singular mode of enjoyment (jouissance) and its inscription through repetition, fantasy, and the symptom.

Conclusion: Knotting and the Subject

In Lacan’s late teaching, the concept of knotting replaces earlier models of the unconscious organized around signification, meaning, and metaphor. Through the Borromean knot and its extensions, Lacan provides a formal topology of the subject, anchored in the inseparable linking of the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary.

The addition of the sinthome as a fourth ring, particularly in psychotic or artistically sublimated structures, reveals how the subject may invent a new mode of knotting to sustain psychic stability. Knotting is thus not merely descriptive, but prescriptive: it names the way each subject is written, held together, or unraveled.

Rather than aiming to “cure” or resolve the symptom, the analytic task becomes one of tracing, sustaining, and sometimes constructing a knot that holds. This shift in emphasis—from content to form, from meaning to consistency—remains one of Lacan’s most enduring contributions to contemporary psychoanalytic theory.

In this sense, knotting offers a powerful framework for thinking subjectivity, not as a set of repressed meanings, but as a topological consistency—a writing of the body, the word, and the Real in a configuration that holds or breaks.

References

  1. Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely, University of Minnesota Press, 2004, pp. 122–127.
  2. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXII: RSI (1974–1975), unpublished seminar, lesson of 10 December 1974.
  3. 3.0 3.1 Jacques-Alain Miller, “The Sinthome, A Mixture of Symptom and Fantasy,” in The Lacanian Review, Vol. 6, 2019, pp. 25–34.
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 75–78.
  5. 5.0 5.1 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XXII: RSI, lesson of 17 December 1974.
  6. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII: The Sinthome (1975–1976), trans. A. R. Price, Polity Press, 2016, pp. 122–130.
  7. 7.0 7.1 Colette Soler, Lacanian Affects: The Function of Affect in Lacan’s Work, Routledge, 2016, pp. 98–101.
  8. 8.0 8.1 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, Routledge, 1996, pp. 114–117.
  9. Joan Copjec, Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists, MIT Press, 1994, pp. 36–41.